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A political risk analysis is an approach to address political risks in a systematic way. This is 
essential for any company seeking to invest in developing countries in order to reduce the 
uncertainty related to investments.  
The objective of this research study was to conduct a political risk analysis of SN 
Power AfriCA (SNPA) in the sub-Saharan region. The aim was to discuss the conditions that 
enable SNPA to mitigate their political risks in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique all 
perceived as high-risk destinations. This was done through a systematic analysis: First by 
identifying the relevant risks, thereafter assessing the risks, and analyzing the company 
capabilities of SNPA, followed by a measurement of the risks. This constituted the basis for 
analyzing whether the company capabilities in conjunction with the proposed risk mitigation 
measures had the potential to mitigate the high-risks of these countries. As such, this thesis 
aimed for theory development, as political risk management analysis on hydropower 
companies in sub-Saharan Africa has not been conducted academically before.     
The findings indicate that there are certain conditions that enable SN Power AfriCA to 
manage its high political risks in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, and that the ability 
to mitigate risks depend on the company’s capabilities as well as the various risk mitigation 
measures proposed in this study, such as the company’s position in the world industry, the 
backing from multilateral financial institutions, risk sharing and transfer, strategic 
relationships and political risk policies. However, as company capabilities mainly cover the 
relation between the company and host governments, they are of limited utility to be risk 
mitigating since political risks in these countries mainly are local. The findings indicate that 
despite of the notion that African countries are high-risk destinations, investments in the 
continent are possible. This is valid, at least for hydropower companies sharing the same 
characteristics as SNPA, which invest in countries with the same contextual attributes as 
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1.1 General Introduction  
Worldwide demand for energy is estimated to increase significantly over the coming decades. 
Findings further prove that this demand will be particularly pressing in developing countries. 
In comparison with other parts of the world, energy deprivation and lack of access to energy 
is, and will remain, the most prevalent in Africa (United Nations Industrial Development 
(UNIDO) 2007:1). It is therefore a paradox that the African continent is in fact endowed with 
unexploited hydropower resources with the potential to meet the continent’s critical energy 
demand. The hydropower potential is to such an extent, that it has the prospective of meeting 
the crucial energy needs for all of Africa. In spite of this, the hydropower sector has only been 
harnessed on a small scale, leaving Africa to be the continent with the least exploited 
hydropower resources in the world (United Nations Water (UN Water) 2008:3,7). In order to 
meet Africa’s energy demand it is essential to exploit the energy resources the continent is 
endowed with. In relation to this, African leaders have come to understand the role that 
renewable energy and above all– hydropower, can play for the economic development of 
Africa. A number of African countries are in fact characterizing hydropower as the backbone 
for further social and economic development in their respective countries. Investments in this 
sector are therefore encouraged, and enormous efforts have been made to create an enabling 
environment for private investments by African leaders. Despite of these efforts, challenges 
remain in facilitating hydropower projects (Bartle 2002:1232, 1238).    
One of the main reasons for this is that it has been proven difficult to attract private-
sector investments in the continent. Data from investor surveys indicate that risk factors such 
as macroeconomic instability, investment restrictions, corruption and political instability have 
a negative impact on foreign direct investments (FDI) to Africa (Asiedu 2003:1). According 
to the investors, it is the uncertainty related to the African region that leads to a significant 
exposure to risk (Dupasquier & Osakwe 2003:11). While the link between FDI and political 
risk is not clear-cut, investors frequently rank political risk as one of their main concerns 
when investing abroad, making political risk an essential FDI determinant. In addition to this, 
political risk is often perceived as being outside business’ control. Given the complexity of 
political risk and the notion that it is something that cannot be managed, the companies often 
fail to address it systematically (PwC 2006:5). Political risk analysis (PRA) is an approach in 
which political risk can be analyzed in a systematic way. According to Bischoff & 
Lambrechts (2010:61) the primary purpose of PRA is to identify and forecast political event’s 
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ability to reduce the profitability of a company.  The secondary function of PRA is to suggest 
ways in which risk can be managed. This is important because investors put their assets at risk 
to achieve pre-determined objectives when they invest abroad. An analysis of political risk 
and risk management is therefore a precondition for successful investments (Bischoff & 
Lambrechts 2010:61). PRA has become more prevalent for foreign investors due to the fact 
that in the international economy, emerging markets are starting to dominate, and the energy 
supply is increasingly coming from countries regarded as political unstable. This requires a 
shift in companies’ business practices (Bremmer & Keat 2009:vii). The prevalence of 
political risk can further be related to shifts in the global conditions: where globalization and 
the deregulations of markets are two of the main factors. As such, executives in foreign 
companies need to understand and assess political risk– how politics affect the markets where 
they wish to operate – if their business is to prosper (Bremmer & Keat 2009:vii). 
Subsequently, PRA should be an integral part of companies’ business structures. 
Nevertheless, it appears that political risk represents somewhat of a challenge for 
foreign investors. A survey conducted by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) (2009:32), where investors where asked about their ability to appraise and manage 
political risks confirms this. 24 percent of investors considered their ability to anticipate 
political risk to be weak or non-existent, 29 percent regarded their aptitude to evaluate 
political risk strategies as weak or non-existent, and 23 percent acknowledged that their 
capabilities to implement risk management were poor (MIGA 2009:32).  This survey suggests 
that a substantial amount of investors may need an approach where the assessment and 
management of political risk can be made. It is therefore the purpose of this study to provide a 
risk management analysis in which the challenges of political risk can be addressed 
systematically. The role that private hydropower investors can play in the context of 
hydropower development in Africa is an important aspect to emphasize. This is because the 
mobilization of sufficient capital for the investments needed in the sector is not possible 
without including private investors. It is therefore a necessity for commercial investors to 
cover parts of the costs related to hydropower developments (Norad 2007:1). 
The Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund) is a key investor 
for Norway in the renewable energy sector in developing countries. This is mainly through its 
cooperation with Statkraft in the company SN Power, with hydropower-expertise and the 
mandate to invest in developing countries (Norad 2007:1). Their success in South-America 
and Asia is an indication that it is possible to succeed in the hydropower sector in developing 
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countries despite of challenging surroundings. SN Power AfriCA (SNPA) is a subsidiary of 
this company and was established to invest in Central America and Africa (SN Power 2010a). 
In January 2010, two Norwegian energy companies - BKK and TrønderEnergi, joined SN 
Power and Norfund as owners of SNPA with an ownership stake of 39% (SN Power 
2009:34). At present, SNPA is exploring investment opportunities in Africa and more 
specifically in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, making the company a highly relevant 
case to study, as the company is about to enter the African hydropower market.   
A risk management analysis of political risk can help foreign companies to protect 
their investments by reducing the uncertainties related to political risks and improve their 
business performance by an active risk response. This requires leaving behind the perceptions 
of the continent, and to integrate political risk management into a systematic process in their 
business conductance (PwC 2006:2). It is this study’s assumption that by establishing a 
systematic approach to political risk management, it will enable foreign companies to assess 
the conditions that can mitigate political risks, so that hydropower companies like SNPA can 
drive improvements in business performance as well as to add value to the host countries 
where they are involved.  
1.2 Research Question and Research Design 
The objective of this research study is to conduct a PRA for SNPA in the sub-Saharan 
region. Because systematic analyses of political risks, especially for the hydropower sector do 
not figure prominently in the literature, the objective of this study is to develop an analytical 
approach to assess SNPA’s political risks in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, where 
the relevant risks will be identified, assessed and measured. How SNPA can respond to these 
risks will be assessed through analyzing the company’s capabilities as well as various risk 
mitigation measures. Basically, the objective is to discuss the conditions that enable SNPA to 
manage its political risks in (perceived) high-risk destinations such as Zambia, South Africa 




To answer the research question, a political risk management analysis will be 
conducted to provide some indications on the conditions that enable SNPA to manage its 
political risks, adapted to the African hydropower business climate.  
What are the conditions that enable SNPA to manage the high-political risks in Zambia, 
South Africa and Mozambique?  
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The systematic approach of risk management in this analysis will consist of three main 
stages: risk identification: (ii) risk assessment: and (iii) risk response, where company 
capabilities and risk mitigation measures form the basis of this stage. The process of risk 
management in this analysis will begin with the analysis of SNPA’s company capabilities, 
which have the potential to influence the company’s political risks. Moreover, the macro 
(country-specific) and micro risk (industry-specific) factors associated with hydropower 
investments in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique will be measured based on the 
potential impact and probability of the risk. From this, the political risks considered as high 
for SNPA will be derived for further analysis. This is followed by an assessment of which of 
the risk mitigation measures identified in the academic literature can mitigate the high-risks in 
these countries in conjunction with the company’s capabilities. Finally an evaluation of the 
company capabilities’ and the risk mitigation measures’ implications will be presented. The 









Figure 1: Research Model 
1.3 Justification for the Research Question 
According to King, Keohane & Verba (1994:15) a social science study should satisfy two 
criteria: “First a research project should pose a question that is important in the real world” 
and “second, a research project should make a specific contribution to an identifiable 
scholarly literature by increasing our collective ability to construct verified scientific 
explanations of some aspects of the world” (King et.al 1994:15). 
 The study of political risk management for hydropower companies in Africa is 
important in the real world primarily for two reasons: Firstly, Africa needs clean energy in 
order to meet the continent’s developmental goals. Secondly, it needs to attract FDI for the 
same purpose. SNPA is therefore a company that can provide both, clean energy through FDI. 
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on development, that access to clean energy is one of the most crucial factors to combat 
poverty and an essential basis for economic growth. The access to energy for developing 
countries is not only a goal in itself, but also a means of achieving sustainable development 
(Norad 2007:1). Today, more than 80% of the world’s energy use is based on fossil energy, 
consequently leading to large greenhouse gas emissions. A way to mitigate the climate 
changes is to reduce the world’s energy dependence on fossil fuels through a redirection 
towards renewable energy. Particularly crucial is the demand/supply of energy in Africa 
where more than 500 million people lack access to electricity and the high oil prices are 
having severe macroeconomic consequences for some of the countries. The level of access to 
electricity in the African countries is considerably lower in comparison to other developing 
countries. Over 90% of the African population still relies on traditional biomass energy 
sources for cooking and heating (UN Water 2008:3, 7). In addition, droughts - which serve to 
reduce the production of renewable energy – and the poor maintenance of transmission and 
distribution grids, characterize large parts of the African continent. These factors constitute a 
significant challenge, especially for hydropower companies, and are exacerbated by the 
continent’s widespread poverty, rapid population growth, and poor governance (Norad 
2007:1). The combination of these factors has made Africa one of the most vulnerable 
continents with regards to climate change, and the recognition of this highlights the 
importance of attracting FDI in renewable energy to the continent. 
Critics of FDI argue that the link between FDI and development is not as 
straightforward as FDI proponents argue (Tandon 2004). Until recently, African leaders did 
not embrace FDI as an essential component of economic development. This was reflected by 
a fear that it could lead to loss of political sovereignty, bankruptcy of domestic firms due to 
heightened competition, and acceleration of environmental degradation (Dupasquier & 
Osakwe 2003:4). However, one can also find research supportive of FDI in developing 
countries. According to Dupasquier & Osakwe (2003:4) FDI’s potential benefits in a host 
country include employment generation and growth, a supplement to domestic savings, 
integration in the global economy, skilled human capital, transfer of modern technology and 
enhanced efficiency. Nevertheless, the literature does present a broader consensus concerning 
the link between energy and development and in particular renewable energy. Several 
research studies have emphasized the strong link between energy consumption and economic 
growth because “access to modern energy services directly contributes to economic growth 
and poverty reduction through the creation of income generating activities” (UN Water 
6 
 
2008:4). Even though there has been a wave of public opposition to hydropower, those that 
are planned, constructed and operated with high environmental and social standards, have a 
major role to play in future energy supply of Africa, and the rest of the world (Bartle 
2002:1238).           
 With regards to the second criteria, this research study aims to make a specific 
contribution to the social science on political risk as a research gap has been identified: There 
is no academic research on political risks for hydropower investments in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The objective is also practical; to develop an analytical approach that might produce valid 
inferences about the specific political risks for SNPA in Africa, and the risk management of 
these, through the company’s ability to influence political risk as well as proposed risk 
mitigation measures. As such, this thesis will contribute to theory development.   
Most of the western businesses are still not aware of the investment opportunities the 
African region offers. This is due to the fact that the continent on an aggregate level still is a 
fairly small economy in comparison to the rest of the world (Mc Kinsey 2010:62). Africa’s 
economy with very few exceptions, used to be too badly run for any viable opportunities for 
investors to take place. This is about to change. According to Mc Kinsey (2010:61), one can 
now say that Africa is on the move. Investors blinded by the perception of the African 
continent as a high political risk region and therefore not attractive when it comes to 
investments may be missing a massive business opportunity if they fail to pay attention to the 
new changes in the continent. An analysis of investment opportunities and political risk in the 
region is therefore an attracting field to acquire knowledge about. Lambrechts (2010) has 
argued that what is keeping foreign investors away from Africa is not risk but rather 
uncertainty, and the only way to find out whether there is an actual risk in Africa is to observe 
and measure the potential threats that can cause political risks, in order to implement suitable 
capabilities and risk mitigation measures. This can be done through a political risk 
management analysis. The perception of Africa as a high-risk continent is partly due to the 
interdependence of African economies and the globalization of the world economy, which 
makes economic and political risks highly contagious. This interdependence affects investor’s 
assessment of the actual risk in individual countries (Dupasquier & Osakwe 2003:14). 
Because of this imperfect information, the outbreak or occurrence of risk in one country is 
associated with the likelihood of this happening with other countries in the region, and 
consequently there is no differentiation between the countries in Africa. This is known as 
statistical discrimination, and implies that the outbreak of political stability in one country 
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will diminish the probability of foreign investment of another country in the region 
(Dupasquier & Osakwe 2003:15). There are undoubtedly political factors in the African 
context that can be considered as high risk for foreign investors. Nevertheless, one of the 
main assumptions in this study is that the high political risks in Zambia, South Africa and 
Mozambique can be managed, through a combination of SNPA’s company capabilities as 
well as with appropriate risk mitigation measures. Hence, this study will make a specific 
contribution to social science through an exploratory case study. King et. al’s (1994:15) two 
criteria’s for a research project are therefore considered as met.  
1.4 Structure of the Research Study 
The structure of the research study consists of seven chapters outlined below: 
 
Figure 2: Structure of the Research Study 
The focus of chapter 1 has been to give a general introduction of the study, followed by the 
research question and the research design, to provide a more systematic orientation on the 
course of the study. Finally a justification for the research question was given to present the 
relevance as well as the objective of this thesis. 
 Chapter 2 explains the methodological reflections concerning this study. First, the 
research method, the case, and research objective will be presented. Second, the implications 
of forecasting political risks will be introduced, before the data collection and reliability 
considerations are presented. Finally, a discussion of validity will take place. 
Chapter 3 will present the theoretical approach of PRA consisting of an introduction of 



















related to political risk. Afterwards, the different concepts of political risk management 
namely company capabilities, risk measurement, the analytical framework of political risk, 
risk response and risk mitigation measures, will be presented, which will be the approach 
specifically developed for the study, and thus contribute to theory development. 
Chapter 4 will provide the contextual dimensions of Zambia, South Africa and 
Mozambique. Furthermore, it will present the risk assessment consisting of the risk factors 
that were identified in chapter 2. This chapter will lay the basis for measurement of the 
political risk levels for SNPA in chapter 5. In this chapter the countries will be assessed 
individually. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to a political risk management analysis. Here, an analysis of 
SNPA’s capabilities will be given as they can mitigate the high political risks, followed by a 
risk measurement of the risk factors with the purpose to extract those factors deemed as high-
risk for further analysis on how to mitigate them. Moreover, an assessment of which of the 
risk mitigation measures addresses the different risks in conjunction with the company’s 
capabilities will be provided. In this chapter the countries will be analyzed as one entity, as it 
is the specific risks, capabilities and risk mitigation measures that will be the main focus for 
the analysis. 
Chapter 6 will provide an evaluation of the findings where SNPAs capabilities as well 
as an evaluation of the risk mitigation measures in the context of the high-risks in Zambia, 
South Africa and Mozambique will take place, in addition to a summary of the main findings. 
Chapter 7 will conclude the study with a summary of the thesis, and by assessing the 
theoretical, methodological and practical implications of the study. It will also discuss 
whether the study was able to answer the research question, provide recommendations for 
further research, and give an overall concluding remark by reviewing all of the main findings 








2.0 METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS  
2.1 Chapter Introduction  
”The methodology tells us how to analyze political risks. It is the key to structuring 
our thoughts, directing us toward important information, and organizing our procedures. The 
finished analysis is a product of the methodology. In a sense, methodology is our quality 
control: it ensures similarity in procedures and comparability of results”. (Lax 1983:120).  
A comprehensive management of political risk requires an understanding of which methods 
that are most suitable for the political environment one is studying, and an acknowledgement 
of the fact that the analyst’s research style can produce biased results (Bremmer & Keat 
2009:11). The objective of this chapter is to present the methodological reflections that were 
made throughout the course of this study. As such, the method, the implications of forecasting 
political risk, data collection and reliability, and validity will be discussed.     
2.2 Qualitative Case Study 
Since there is no academic research on political risk for hydropower companies in sub-
Saharan Africa, the research study will be carried out as an inductive and explorative 
qualitative case study. Inductive because it is based on the assumption that political risk 
management for hydropower companies might reduce the high-risks encountered in sub-
Saharan Africa and more specifically in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. The research 
question is therefore founded on assumptions, based on observations where the objective is to 
obtain more general notions about a phenomenon (Hellevik 2003:83). Furthermore, it is 
explorative as there has not been provided any studies of political risk management for 
hydropower companies in Africa. Hence it is difficult to say something about the relationship 
of the variables chosen, and their impact on the independent variable, namely risk mitigation. 
A case study thus becomes the most viable method to establish the relationship and 
mechanisms of the variables. In this sense, this study can contribute to theory development.  
2.2.1 The Case of SNPA in Zambia, Mozambique & South Africa 
The selection of case did not prove difficult, as SNPA is the only hydropower company in 
Norway with the mandate to invest in sub-Saharan Africa. The aim however, is an industry-
specific analysis where the findings can be applied to foreign hydropower investors sharing 
the same characteristics and political capabilities as SNPA. The most important characteristic 
is that the company is a state-owned entity, which invests in emerging markets, and thus is set 
up to take a high risk in the first place. In addition, to be applied in other African countries 
than in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, it is essential that the countries share the 
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common features of the political risks faced in these countries. The analytical framework in 
the theoretical chapter will thus be developed out of the notion that are certain characteristics 
in the African continent which can be considered as common features of Africa. Hence, it is 
possible for this thesis to generalize to that specific class. The research problem must further 
be refined conceptually, geographically and temporally (Fouche 2003:4):  
• Conceptual demarcation: The analysis will be confined to a PRA, excluding 
economic factors deemed essential for a country risk analysis. Moreover, it will focus on the 
high political risks for foreign hydropower companies in sub-Saharan Africa and how they 
can be managed through company capabilities and risk mitigation measures. The focus on 
high-risks does not indicate that low and medium risks should not be taken into consideration 
in companies’ risk management. However, it is the high risks factors that are the most 
consequential for foreign companies in terms of both impact and probability.    
• Geographic demarcation: The study will be confined to Zambia, Mozambique and 
South Africa. However, as sub-Saharan Africa have many common political risk factors, it is 
anticipated that it can be applied in other African countries. A contingent generalization is 
therefore the aim, and will be further elaborated on. The case selection was based on the 
political and business climate in sub-Saharan Africa, in addition to the location of hydropower 
resources. Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique have abundance of hydropower resources. 
Furthermore, the decision to select countries from the Southern African region is based on the 
fact that members of the regional cooperation Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) are currently working to implement a common market with a the Southern African 
Power Pool (SAPP), which was recently created with the aim of providing reliable and 
affordable electricity supply to all of the member countries (Norad 2009:109-111). It is 
therefore believed that this common market will be of strategic interest for potential 
hydropower investors in the future, as this will create investment opportunities for 
hydropower development. Additionally, Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique are the 
countries that SNPA has selected as the company’s investment destinations based on the same 
argumentation as why the countries are chosen for the purpose of this thesis.  
• Temporal demarcation: It is the recent and future political context that can cause 
political risk for SNPA in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. However, a short review 
of the political history of the countries should also be included in order to understand the 
political context that hydropower companies will operate in.     
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2.2.2. Theory Development  
PRA is according to Lax (1983:111) moving towards theory building, where analysts are 
specifying the area of study through systematic approaches. Although PRA falls short on 
theory, systematic approaches enable and invite comparisons between countries. The 
approach provided in this thesis can be considered as an intermediate step in creating a theory 
on political risks hydropower investments in Africa, notably with the same characteristics as 
the subjects for this thesis, by developing explanations of enabling conditions to mitigate 
risks. The aim of the research study is to make a contingent generalization for hydropower 
companies risk management when investing in African countries. According to George & 
Bennett (2005:112-113) one can generalize from cases by treating them as members of a class 
or a type of phenomenon. SNPA is a member of a class – namely hydropower companies 
(with similar characteristics) and so are Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique as case 
studies of the investment climate in African countries.  
This thesis’ contribution to the development of theory is based on the fact that the 
literature on political risk has yet to formulate theories of foreign hydropower investments, 
and especially with regards to the sub-Saharan continent. It is therefore assumed that this 
analysis can shed light on an understated subject, as the overarching object is to gain insight 
on how to mitigate political risks so hydropower investors can reduce the uncertainty that 
characterizes the African continent. Hence this is a preliminary study on a relatively untested 
academic field (George & Bennett 2005:75). 
2.3 Forecasting of Political Risk – A Methodological Concern? 
One of the most important tasks for a PRA is to forecast. PRA does not result from prediction, 
but rather on forecast based on probability (Hough 2008:4). Certain aspects of PRA inhibit 
the possibility of prediction. Different risk factors may be used in a model and with that there 
can be different outcomes (Brink 2004:27). Prediction is more definite, while forecasting 
involves a probability that something may occur, and is based on rationality, empirical 
evidence, scientific theory and systematic information gathering. Still, accurate forecasts are 
difficult to make because of the political systems unpredictability. Political risk forecasting is 
essential for investments in developing countries. The “go” and the “no go” are often based 
with forecasting as the principal driver (Brink 2004:28). Even though a differentiation 
between predictions and forecasting has taken place, one should not have the assumption that 
everything can be forecasted. Frequently forecasts end up as “…unselfconscious, historical-
philosophical assumptions about the course of the world” (Frei and Ruloff 1988:17). This 
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implication must therefore be taken into consideration when conducting a political risk 
management analysis.  
2.4 Data Collection & Reliability  
2.4.1 Primary and Secondary Sources 
For the purpose of this study a range of authors from various backgrounds will be used as 
reference. In order to obtain relevant information on Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, 
books, journals, news, articles, websites, and especially websites related to risk analysis and 
country profiles have been used, in addition to reports, working papers, and other documents 
from different research institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and business. 
To secure the reliability of the sources provided, cross-referencing will be applied at all times. 
Furthermore, it is of importance to note that many of the reports, documents and general 
primary sources can have their own objectives and agendas, released to fit the political and 
personal goals of those controlling the release (George & Bennett 2005:100). It is therefore 
essential for the reliability of the study to use a variety of sources to secure objectivity and 
accuracy, and to ask what purposes the different documents was designed to serve at all times 
(George & Bennett 2005:199). Data triangulation is thus applied throughout the thesis.  
During the research period I experienced that it was difficult to obtain relevant and 
new information with regard to the political- and business environment in Zambia, South 
Africa and Mozambique, and especially academic literature. Consequently, not all of the data 
gathered presents the most recent information about the countries. This could have some 
implications with regards to the measurement of the risk level in the countries, as the risk 
exposure might have changed over time. Furthermore I have tried to use data and sources 
provided from African authors as well as from other developing countries to enhance the 
context-specificity1 and provide a better understanding of what it requires to conduct business 
in environments that are totally different from the countries the investments usually stems 
from, as a contextual dimension to understand risks is a prerequisite to manage it.  
2.4.2 Interviews with Key Informants 
The interviews that took place with two of SNPA’s employees were mainly to obtain relevant 
information about the company that could not be obtained elsewhere. As I work for the 
company I wanted to keep a critical distance to the research study, for this reason, I wanted to 
delimit the interviews to not compromise the reliability of the study. Since the study is not of 
                                                
1 Context-specificity refers to “the specific domain to which a systematized concept is applied” (Adcock & 
Collier 2001:535).   
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a normative nature, questions related to how the company is conducting and should conduct 
their business was left out of the interview to avoid an eschewed analysis. At the same time I 
wanted to avoid questions related to the company’s actual activities, since my employment in 
the company could lead me to shedding light on the company in a more positive way than 
others not working there. Hence I wanted to base my analysis on primary and secondary data. 
However, at the same time I wanted to take advantage of the opportunity to get access to key 
informants to gain a better insight of the company’s capabilities. The key informants were 
given the opportunity to read the texts with their comments to ensure that they had been cited 
correctly, and the interview guide is available in the appendix to enhance the reliability and 
transparency of the study, as well as for the purpose of replication.   
 Due to time and resource constraints I did not have the opportunity to go on a field trip 
in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, which could have enhanced both the validity and 
reliability of this analysis, and maybe providing me with other insights. Nevertheless, I have 
attempted to balance this through applying method-triangulation.  
2.5 Validity 
2.5.1 Construct Validity 
To secure construct validity (Yin 2009:40), a reliance of credible sources to operationalize 
central concepts related to political risk such as uncertainty, political instability, micro and 
macro risks, risk outcomes, company capabilities, risk management risk measurement 
(identification and assessment), risk response and risk mitigation measures, will be applied for 
the purpose of this thesis. According to Adcock and Collier (2001:532), when conceptualizing 
one must choose from a variety of background concepts (a diversity of meanings associated 
with a given concept) in order to get to a more systematized concept, which means a more 
specific formulation of a concept. The way to get from a background concept to a 
systematized one is through reasoning about the former. By reasoning on the various concepts 
related to political risk, a systematized concept will derive from it. A conceptualization of key 
concepts within the political risk discipline is therefore more than providing a definition of the 
terms; it is also a clarification of how concepts differ from other concepts (Brink 2004:14). 
This will be the main task for the literature review, which will assess the different dimensions 
of political risk.          
 One of the most important methodological challenges related to construct validity in 
this study is the fact that there is no consensus on the political risk concepts among political 
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risk analysts and academics. For this reason this research study will use a significant amount 
of time to get to a conceptualization with regard to the concepts to ensure construct validity. 
A study of political risk is a study about the political environment in host countries. However, 
there appears to be no consensus in defining what the political environment is. Yet, to see the 
political environment as a whole is essential in a PRA. The separation of political and 
economic risk for instance, is at times difficult to make. Government decisions are always 
political, but the decision-making is often heavily influenced by economics (Robock 1971:8). 
In an assessment one will have to break the external environment down for analytic purposes, 
but always note that it does not necessarily reflect the realities of the world.  
2.5.2 Measurement Validity  
A complex political environment is one of the main reasons that PRA can be subject to 
methodological challenges. For the research purpose it is not possible to include all the factors 
that can create political risks for foreign companies when investing abroad. The fact that the 
analyst has to select the risk factors deemed relevant, raise the concern of subjectivity. Hence, 
one should always be aware of biases and eschewed findings. One often assumes that 
indicators are objective and therefore measureable, but this objectivity should be assessed 
properly as indicators will always rest on assumptions. Subsequently, it is essential to not 
interpret observed signs as the reality (Brink 2004:27). A specific example of this is the way 
the high-risks will be rated in the study. Even though I will base my ratings on an 
impact/probability chart, the ratings will ultimately be based on my subjective interpretation 
of the risk levels. Furthermore, contextual specificity is also a fundamental concern that 
arises, as I have chosen to analyze the level of risk for Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique 
jointly.  Because there are differences in contexts, this can potentially threaten the validity of 
the measurement (Adcock & Collier 2001: 534). However, it is SNPA that is the main focus 
of this study, and my choice to analyze the countries jointly is based on this. Albeit the aim is 
a contingent generalization I must be aware of the fact that an analytical tool that works in 
one circumstance, may not work in another despite of aiming for a contingent generalization 
(Bremmer and Keat 2009:197). By taking this into account the chances of getting a valid 
analysis will improve.  
Moreover, the quantity of information and how to process that information are also 
important methodological concerns (Frei and Ruloff: 1988:14-15), and must be taken into 
consideration in a PRA. To obtain information is not always the implication, but rather to 
obtain relevant information and interpret them correctly (Brink 2004:26). The fact that 
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Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique to a large extent have the same political context 
minimizes the chances of getting unreliable and invalid results from the analysis. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to select what is important and relevant out of the massive 
amount of information, and to separate this from the unimportant and irrelevant information 
(Frei & Ruloff 1988:14).  
2.5.3 Internal & External Validity 
Internal validity is about the establishment of a causal relationship and is thus a concern for 
my study since it is exploratory (Yin 2009:40). Risk factors are identified and assessed 
according to the probability and impact they have of creating risk outcomes that will affect 
SNPA’s investment in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, and it is assumed that the 
independent variables, company capabilities, risk factors and risk mitigation measures can 
lead to risk mitigation, which is the dependent variable of this study. Hence, the establishment 
of a causal relationship is essential for the purpose of analysis. By applying the case study 
method it is easier to establish the veracity of a causal relationship. Subsequently, it is the 
most suitable approach to answer the research question. 
 Case studies are generally weak with respect to external validity i.e. generalizations 
(Gerring 2007:43). However, as stated previously the purpose is to make a contingent 
generalization, meaning that the members of the class must be specified thoroughly, as I 















3.0 THEORETICAL & ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
3.1 Chapter Introduction  
This chapter’s aim is to introduce the theory and central concepts related to PRA. Firstly, the 
historical background of PRA will be presented, followed by the underlying logic of PRA; 
decision-making and problem-solving theory. Afterwards, a literature review with the aim of 
arriving at a conceptualization of political risk that will be applied throughout the thesis will 
be introduced, before the theory of political risk management is elaborated, consisting of 
company capabilities, risk measurement and risk response with the corresponding risk 
mitigation measures, which is developed for the purpose to answer the research question.   
3.2 The Theoretical Discipline of PRA 
The academic field of political risk evolved in the 1960s- 1970s. The revolution and 
expropriation in Cuba, the revolution in Iran and Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan, were all 
events that made foreign investors aware of other types of risk than commercial and economic 
risks (Jakobsen 2004:44). It was not until the 1970s that it became acknowledged as an 
academic field as a result of the 1973-oil crisis (Brink 2004:3). The multi-disciplined research 
on PRA lost its momentum toward the end of the Cold War, with the fall of communism. 
PRA was again triggered by the 9/11 attacks in the US (Nodland 2006:18-19), indicating that 
business can never be insulated from social or political events. The contrast to earlier in 
today’s reality, the escalating pressure and the growing complexity of the political forces, 
which can affect company’s risks (Bonini, Mendonca & Oppenheim 2006:22).    
 It has been stated “Political risk strides across numerous disciplines” (Jarvis 2008:2). 
The reason for this is that the literature on political risk is influenced by events in the 
international political economy, and as a consequence, theory, conceptualization, and methods 
mapping the academic field have been episodic (Jarvis 2008:1). Hence, the lineage of theory, 
models and conceptual frameworks of analysis are difficult to identify. Political risk is 
therefore best approached as a praxis driven ontology that should be defined in relation to its 
practical utility (Jarvis 2008:1). Most political risk analyses are therefore conducted for a 
practical reason. The increasing volumes of trans-border trade, production and investment has 
driven the demand for PRA, and the vast bulk of literature on political risk is invoked by host 
countries political environment and how it impact on foreign business. Its practical utility is to 
provide decision-makers in companies to identify, manage and mitigate uncertainties and 
threats to investments (Nodland 2006:9). Political risk is further studied by a number of 
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disciplines such as political science, development studies, international relations, international 
business, economics and economic geography. As such, the academic discipline is still 
regarded as unconsolidated (Jarvis 2008:2).  
3.3 A Theoretical Grounding: Decision-Making & Problem-
Solving Theory 
In order to comprehend PRA’ relevance in the decision-making of companies, an explanation 
of the underlying theory of political risk is essential. There are two theories that are 
considered as the theoretical groundings of PRA, namely decision-making- and problem-
solving theory. The relationship between the two is described as symbiotic and they are 
regarded as practical theories (Brink 2004:31). For business, a PRA is the first step in the 
decision making process on political risk for foreign investment. A PRA focuses on 
challenges regarding decision-making, in addition to the implementation of actions to mitigate 
political risk. In problem solving, the potential solutions require a systematic ordering of ideas 
that can be applied in the decision-making process of foreign investment companies.  
 Subsequently, PRA is about choices and the conditions of uncertainty and risk for 
companies investing abroad. The problem of decision-making can be solved by the selection 
of appropriate actions to manage the potential risks. The core of these theories is the notion of 
decision makers as rational agents whose aim is to minimize risk and uncertainty when they 
are considering an investment (Brink 2004:31). Consequently this will be the underlying 
theoretical grounding of the study.  
3.4 Literature Review: Dimensions of Political Risk  
3.4.1 Risk & Uncertainty  
A differentiation between the terms risk and uncertainty is essential to make solid investment 
decisions (Brink 2004:3). In the literature there are three basic types of risk that have to be 
identified when conceptualizing political risk. According to Verzberger (1998:18), there is 
real risk, an objective risk which deals with the actual consequences of a behavior or a 
situation; perceived risk, which is the subjective and socially constructed risk experienced 
differently by those affected by it; and acceptable risk, the risk a decision maker is willing to 
undertake in order to pursue certain goals. However, there are some implications of these 
types of risks for a PRA. With real risk it is difficult to obtain a standard of measurement, 
which was discussed in the previous chapter. Perceived risk has its implications for an 
obvious reason; often it does not correspond with objective and actual risk and is therefore 
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subject to misinterpretation, misconception or lack of information. Lastly, acceptable risk 
does not have to correspond with neither of the two other risks since it changes whenever a 
decision makers goals changes (Hough 2008:2).      
 According to Hough (2008:3-4), the distinction between risk and uncertainty can in 
fact be seen as an indication of two levels of uncertainty; instances where outcome 
probabilities are known, also called structured uncertainty, and instances where these 
probabilities are unknown called unstructured uncertainty. Political risk should therefore be 
applied where the probabilities of outcomes are uncertain and unknown. According to 
Jakobsen (2004:32) risk is objective while uncertainty is subjective. Hough (2008:14) once 
stated, “Actual risk in Africa, although real, is at times less than perceptions of risk”. This 
statement indicates how important it is to assess objective risk, rather than subjective risk, to 
avoid an equation. Hence, this will be the focus of this study.   
3.4.2 Political Risk & Political Instability  
Political risk and political instability has often been treated as synonyms. The reason for this 
is that political instability is cited as the biggest impediment to foreign investment flows 
(Robock 1971:15). The nature of the relationship between the host country’s political 
environment and the investing company’s business environment is an uncertain relationship 
stemming from the difficulties to assess the outcomes from changes in the political 
environment and how it will affect the business environment (Brink 2004:43). According to 
Kobrin (1979:114) two questions need to be answered to establish the relationship between 
the two concepts. The first is; what is the probability of a political event occurring; and 
secondly, what is the probability that it will affect the company? Instability needs not cause 
political risk for a company because changes may affect companies differently (Kobrin 
1979:114).            
 What are the implications of regarding these two concepts as synonyms? The most 
significant consequence is that companies may miss viable business opportunities just 
because of an overestimation of the actual political risk. This can happen when decision 
makers have limited knowledge about the host country’s political patterns, or because they 
apply ethnocentric standards and try to juxtapose political patterns in a host country with the 
patterns from the home country. When assessing political instability it is deemed essential to 
be sensitive about the fact that the criteria for political instability may, and usually do vary 
from country to country (Robock 1971:15). This can be exemplified with how misleading it is 
to interpret frequent changes in governments as political instability, while in fact frequent 
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changes in leadership on the top need not constitute instability for the rest of the 
government’s institutions. To a great extent, political instability can be regarded as a 
culturally specific phenomenon because at times it can be difficult to evaluate whether 
political events pose a political risk due to the ethnocentrism naturally embedded in the 
human mindset (Kobrin 1978:120). Political instability therefore depends on the political 
setting. This can serve as an indication that political risk has to be analyzed with caution, as it 
is particularistic and contextual, while political stability is systemic and therefore not 
necessarily a risk to business (Jarvis 2008:34).  
3.4.3 Micro & Macro Risk 
Although all foreign companies can improve business performance by better managing 
political risk, not all companies should approach political risk management equally. The 
potential impact of risk varies with the company’s international exposure, and depends on the 
company’s industry, size and location (PwC 2006:9). This acknowledgement enables to 
analytically disentangle investment types and to demonstrate the extent of correlation between 
political events, political systems and their impact upon the different foreign investments. 
Kobrin (1981, in Brink 2004:38) identified two dimensions of political risk that foreign 
businesses may encounter when investing in a host country. The first dimension is political 
risk as macro risk: the general risk of the political environment in the host country. The 
second dimension is micro risk that affects a specific company. Frei and Ruloff (1988:3-4) 
discuss whether macro risk is too abstract as a concept, and questioned its utility. They came 
to the conclusion that micro risks most likely will affect businesses, and that the approach 
should be to evaluate the specific consequences to the specific company one is analyzing. 
However, this approach might be slightly problematic to implement due to the fact that macro 
and micro risk cannot easily be separated from each other.     
 To study macro risk alone is not a fruitful approach in corporate political risk studies 
because there is a difference between the general political environment and the specific 
business environment for a company. Robock (1971:250) defines macro risk as 
“Unanticipated and politically motivated environmental changes…broadly directed at all 
enterprises” and micro risk as “the environmental changes… intended to affect only selected 
fields of business activity or foreign enterprises with specific characteristics”. Brink 
(2004:13), claims that these types of risk cannot be effectively shielded from the other, and 
that a PRA should include a micro and macro risk assessment (Brink 2004:21, 13). Thus, this 
will be the focus in this thesis.   
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3.4.4 Political Risk & FDI  
The emergence of neo-liberal free-market economic policies in developing countries has 
created many investments opportunities for foreign investors (Comeaux & Kinsella 1994:1). 
The possibility of exploring new markets has therefore lead investors to approach unknown 
environments, characterized by a higher level of uncertainty. Along with the immense 
opportunities, there is also a substantial risk. According to Comeaux & Kinsella (1994:1) 
investments in developing countries are therefore greater than when investing in liberal and 
predominately Western democracies. In theory, the spread of economic liberalism should 
indicate that political risks are less significant than before due to governments’ acceptance of 
FDI. Nevertheless, the reality is more complex, as political leaders have to satisfy different 
interests to remain in power (Bray 2003:291). The notion that only government action can 
create political risk does not provide a reflection of reality in relation to FDI.  
“Today’s political risks are not the classic risks associated with communist takeovers 
or post-colonial outbursts of anti-foreign sentiment. They are more subtle, arising from legal 
and regulatory changes, government transitions, environmental and human rights issues, 
currency crises and terrorism. Because these risks are subtle (often occurring at the same 
time as the government is declaring the country “open for business”) they are often hard to 
manage (Ferrari & Rolfini 2008:2),   
3.4.5 Conceptualization of Political Risk  
The literature on political risk has according to Brewer (1981:1) been focusing on a narrow 
concept of political risk with emphasis on expropriation, regulations, government instability 
and such. A more exhaustive approach should be utilized to fully understand the concept. The 
most important factor in conceptualizing a term such as political risk is to make it flexible 
enough so that it can be applied to different contexts, yet specific enough so it will not be 
contested and criticized for not being clear enough. A constant awareness of the dynamics 
involved in political questions is the only way to secure this (Brink 2004:43).An analysis of 
political risk can therefore be conceptualized as:  
“the analysis of the probability that factors caused or influenced by the (in)action or 
reactions of stakeholders within a political system to events outside or within a country, will 
affect investment and business climates in such a way that investors will lose money or not 
make as much money as they expected when the initial decision to investment was made. 
These factors can be of internal (from inside the host country) or external origin, and can 
pose macro (generic) and/or micro (specific) risks (Brink 2004:1).  
In order to assess the political risks for a foreign company, Brink (2004:165) emphasize that 
businesses themselves can be actors of political risk. Consequently, it is not sufficient to only 
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assess the host governments’ investments climate. A conceptualization of political risk should 
therefore entail political risk on a country level (macro), in addition to political risk on a 
project level (micro), as firms are actors who can influence their business environment 
(Frynas & Mellahi 2003:543).        
 Brink’s definition of political risk will be applied in this research study because (i) it 
views political risk in the context of a political system including other actors of risks than 
political leaders, (ii) differentiates between micro and micro risks, (iii) makes a distinction 
between internal and external political risk factors, and (iv) takes into account that companies 
themselves can create political risks.  
3.4.6 Outcomes of Political Risk  
To create a political risk for foreign business, the political environment must have the ability 
to affect the business environment negatively. In the political risk literature, the following 
outcomes of political risk are presented2: expropriation risk, political violence, reputational 
risk, breach of contract, and policy change.      
 Expropriation Risk: “refers to losses due to measures taken or approved by the host 
government that deprive the investor of its ownership or control over its investment” (Ferrari 
& Rolfini 2008:5). Expropriation can be direct through nationalization, formal transfer of title 
or physical seizure. It can occur through state intervention or with enjoyment of the benefits 
from the investment. It can also take the form of creeping/indirect expropriation. Creeping 
expropriation is defined as “the act of a government squeezing a project by taxes, regulations, 
or changes in law”, and is becoming an important source of risk for foreign investors (Ferrari 
& Rolfini 2008:4). The most common form of expropriation is the latter, where investors are 
deprived of ownership in their investment through governmental acts (Ferrari & Rolfini 
2008:7). The incentives to expropriate depend on the difference between the benefits of 
obtaining capital from foreign investors and the opportunity costs of an expropriation. Host 
governments have the incentive to expropriate to maximize their national income on a short-
term. An example of creeping expropriation is to increase the taxes from companies’ profits 
for redistribution (Ferrari & Rolfini 2008:10). Other examples are confiscation and loss of 
assets without compensation (Jarvis 2008:37-38).       
 
                                                
2 The political risk outcomes listed in this research study are not an exhaustive list of all the political risk 
outcomes, as it is not possible for a research study to assess all the potential risks for business. However, the 
selected outcomes are the ones mostly referred to in the literature on political risk. The analysis might therefore 
include other outcomes, dependent on the findings.   
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Political Violence:  
“refers to losses from damage to, or the destruction and disappearance of, tangible 
assets and politically motivated acts of war or civil disturbance in the host country, including 
revolution, insurrection, coups d’état, sabotage and terrorism. It is also caused by an 
interruption of project operations essential to the overall financial viability and obligations to 
lenders” (Ferrari & Rolfini 2009:8).  
Jarvis (2008:19, 25) has also included labor strikes, and general social and political unrest as 
indicators that can create political risk because those indicators have the potential to turn 
violent. The outcomes of political violence expect the obvious physical constraints that are - 
“Damage to property or to human life/personnel from riots, insurrection, revolution, terrorist 
attacks and general civil unrest” (Jarvis 2008:39), are loss of freedom to operate, loss of 
future profit and the implications for shareholder value (Jarvis 2008:37).   
 Reputational Damage: One of the most significant political risk outcomes that have 
emerged since the 1990s relates to the risk of reputational damage. This relates especially to 
companies operating in countries and regions associated with governance failures with a 
record of corruption, social unrest, human rights abuses, and low labor ethics (Bray 2003:294, 
291, Bremmer & Keat 2009:180). Investments in these markets not only have the potential of 
creating political risks in the host country, but also in the home government in form of 
enormous public relations problems. Improvements in communication have made it easier for 
NGOs to obtain information about the activities of companies and thereby mobilize 
campaigns through regulatory scrutiny, boycotts and demonstrations against companies 
failing to comply with reasonable standards (Bray 2003:291, Bremmer & Keat 2009:180).  
 Breach of Contract: “the potential losses resulting from government termination of 
contracts without compensation for existing investments” (Ferrari & Rolfini 2009:8). The 
political risk takes place if the government or a state-owned company in the host country, 
does not comply with the contract or cancels  (Ferrari & Rolfini 2009:8). In addition, 
revisions in contracts and agreements to the detriment of the foreign business can also create 
political risks for the operating company (Jarvis 2008:38).    
 Policy Change: Policy change can be an outcome of political risk in which a change 
in any political parameter can have ramifications for stakeholders in the affected policy area. 
In this case, political risk is a function of governmental activities and/or inactivity that are 
regarded as negative for a company’s business conduct (Jarvis 2008:5). Examples of policy 
changes are currency inconvertibility, unfair tax laws, and production or export restrictions, 
restrictions on local market access and restrictions of information flows. Moreover, 
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employment policies and locally shared ownership requirements can also create political risks 
for foreign companies (Jarvis 2008:19, 38).  
3.5 Management of Political Risk  
The theory on management of political risk has been marked by lack of a linear genealogy of 
theory, models and conceptual frameworks: As a consequence of risk being a multifaceted 
concept (Jarvis 2008:1). According to Brink (2004:148), political risk management is about 
the sensitivity of a foreign company’s projected profitability and operation ability in a host 
country, to changes in the investment climate. In addition the nature of risk depend upon the 
project and the host country’s investment climate associated with the project.  
 Risk management can be divided into two categories depending on what the company 
objectives are; risk management with a sole function of financial performance and risk 
management with a focus on financial, social and environmental performance. In recent years, 
the practice of risk management has, by some corporations and academics become closely 
aligned with principles of sustainability (Knott & Fox 2010:38). Today, the political role of 
private enterprises is becoming more important due to economic and moral issues such as 
triple bottom lining; socially and environmentally responsible investment; protection of the 
physical environment; investment in human capital etc. (Brink 2004:152).  
 In hydropower investments, there is a conviction that when developed properly, 
hydropower projects can provide economic, social and environmental benefits (The World 
Bank Group 2007:25). Corporate sustainability risk management can thus be defined as “a 
business approach that creates long-term shareholder value by embracing opportunities and 
managing risks derived from economic, environmental and social developments” (Yilmaz & 
Flouris 2009:163).          
 Independent of what the company objectives are, and what kind of risk management 
approach a company will undertake, risk management consists of three main steps; a) risk 
identification; b) risk measurement; and c) risk response (Wang Dulaimi & Aguria 2004:238). 
The process of risk management starts with the initial identification of the relevant and 
potential risks associated with the investment project. This part of a PRA is of considerable 
importance “…since the process of risk analysis and response management may only be 
performed on identified and potential risks” (Wang et. al 2004:238). Moreover, risk 
assessment of the political risk factors is the intermediate process between risk identification 
and risk management and integrates risk in a manner to enable evaluation of the potential 
impacts of the selected risk factors. According to Wang et. al (2004:238), the evaluation 
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should in general concentrate around the risk factors with high probabilities, high financial 
consequences or combinations thereof deferring a substantial financial impact. Once the risks 
have been identified and analyzed, a suitable risk management must be adopted. Within this 
framework one should formulate appropriate risk management measures based on the nature 
and the potential consequences of the identified risks (Wang et. al 2004:238-239).
 Furthermore, the capabilities of the foreign company must also be assessed in the 
context of risk management, as there exist corporate variables with the potential to affect the 
political risks of foreign companies (Lax 1983:17). An analysis of risk management should 
therefore include the three dimensions; company capabilities, risk measurement and risk 
response with risk mitigation measures, which will be further assessed in the following 
section.    
3.5.1 Risk Management & Company Capabilities 
The discipline of political risk has emphasized that the most fundamental differentiation 
between a foreign- and a national company is based on their social, political and economic 
circumstances.  
“MNCs face an additional and unique element of risk, namely that of operating in 
countries with different attitudes toward political philosophies, legal systems, social attitudes 
toward private property, corporate responsibility and free enterprise” (Brink 2004:151).  
The business environment of a national and foreign company is therefore not the same, thus 
they can experience different political risks even though they are operating in the same 
country, and even within the same sector (Brink 2004:151).    
 In addition, foreign companies attract more attention than national companies by being 
foreign, and especially in developing countries. Foreign investors are often wielders of 
economic power when bargaining with host country governments (Brink 2004:151). In the 
literature it has been expressed that political risk is dependent on the companies’ ability to 
influence by virtue of their capabilities. Company capabilities can thus be defined as a 
company’s ability to successfully confront and even shape the political environment in the 
host country (Frynas & Mellahi 2003:544-545).      
 Central to this is the concept of bargaining power, which explains how foreign 
companies differ in their approaches to the political forces that shape their business 
environment, and refers to the notion that host government interventions in a company 
depends on the ability of the specific company to influence the host government (Moon & 
Lado 2000:85-86). The bargaining power of a company will primarily be a result of its 
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industry-specific resources and capabilities. Accordingly, companies with greater bargaining 
power are likely to attain more favorable conditions when negotiating with the governments, 
and further, are less likely to face intervention from the host government after investing 
(Moon & Lado 2000:86-87). Lax (1983:113) has identified four key corporate variables that 
can affect a company’s political risk in a host government: 
 
1. The nationality of the company: 
2. The position of the company in the world industry,  
3. Special bargaining advantages: including technology, managerial skills, service, 
capital and other advantages which can influence their position and:  
4. Dealings with host government: What will be the company’s approach? Receptive, 
diplomatic and open, or unreceptive, brusque, and unyielding? 
 
It is thus expected that these corporate variables either can mitigate or actually increase 
company’s political risk. Hence, two different companies exposed to the same political risk in 
a country, may be affected in a different way as a result of their specific resources and 
capabilities (Frynas & Mellahi 2003:544, 558). In addition, this will depend on the specific 
risks the company is exposed to, as well as the risk mitigation measures applied for this 
purpose. This will be assessed in the next section.  
3.5.2 Risk Measurement: Risk Identification & Risk Assessment  
The concept of risk measurement is referred to as an estimation of the probability and impact 
of political risk to a foreign company (Hough, Du Plesis & Kruys 2005:13). To be able to 
measure political risk one has to look at the factors that create the political risk outcomes. An 
assessment must therefore forecast the political risk events that may materialize, and translate 
these events and the general political environment into “specific managerial contingencies” 
(Lax 1983:110). A systematic approach to assess the level of political risk is needed to 
counterbalance the subjective nature of political risk. Below is the framework on which the 
ratings of the political risk factors will be based3 (Brink 2004:169):   
                                                
3 A: Political risk categorized here indicates an acceptable impact of political risk meaning that it will not be cost 
effective to take preventative action even though the probability of risk is high (Brink 2004:169).  
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Based on this chart, the political risk factors that will be given the category A are considered 
as medium risk, category B as high risk, and categories C and D are considered as low risks. 
The research study will focus on the political risk factors categorized as high risks, which are 
the most crucial for foreign investors. 
3.5.3 Analytical Framework for the Research Study  
The objective of this section is to create a political risk index adapted to the African context in 
order to analyze which of the company capabilities and risk mitigation measures that can 
manage political risk. The literature suggest that the macro factors with potential to create 
political risk are political stability, political effectiveness and accountability, the quality of 
bureaucracy and corruption, internal and external conflict, military in politics, religious 
tensions and socio-economic conditions, (Brink 2004:84-87), and can be supplemented by 
looking at existing frameworks4. A review of these frameworks indicates that there are certain 
risk factors that are represented repeatedly and can thus be extracted into a new framework for 
the purpose of this analysis.         
                                                                                                                                                   
B:  Political risk factors in this category signify that the potential for damaging impacts are high. This type of 
foreign investment should only be pursued if the political risks are manageable (Brink 2004:169-170). 
C: The probability and the impact of the political risk are low (Brink 2004:170). 
D: Although the probability of political risk is low, the impact of the risk is high  (Brink 2004:170).  
4 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), The Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI)(Howell & 
Chaddick 1994), Brink’s model (2004) and Jakobsen (2004). The frameworks are listed in the appendix, and are 

















 Iroanya (2008) introduced an alternative risk assessment model for Africa after been 
analyzing the indicators used in the EIU and BERI framework, and acknowledged that the 
factors used were important but that several of them were biased towards African countries. 
Relevant risk factors were introduced in a model for African risk assessment, and the factors 
were: State legitimacy, public service, state capacity, political stability, corruption and crime, 
ethnic and religious bigotry, socio-economic development, population growth, law 
enforcement, environmental stress, regional developments and operating policies such as 
reconcilable goals between the company in host government. Many of the risk factors are 
already incorporated in the risk framework applied in this study, however, environmental 
stress and operating policies are not included and will be assessed as part of micro risks 
(Iroanya 2008:112-113). Recalling the need for context-specificity, his arguments are 
included to accurately assess the political risks for foreign hydropower companies in Africa. 
The following table shows the selected risk factors: 
Table 3.5.3a: Macro Risk Factors 
 
What follows below is an elaboration of these variables. In turn, these form the basis for a 
construction of a political risk index for SNPA in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. 
Macro Risks  
Political Stability and Legitimacy: Political instability can be a signal to the investor of an 
increase in political risk. However, as stated, instability only affects foreign investors if it 
ultimately results in policy changes or government intervention against foreign companies 
(Jakobsen 2010:484), in addition to reputational risk and in worst-case, political violence. 
Legitimacy is an important risk factor to emphasize because the concept implies an unforced 
and positive acceptance of the state from the population (EIU in Howell & Chaddick 
1994:76). The higher the level of public consent, the less is the chance for a legitimacy crises, 
political violence and societal uprising (Brink 2004:91). Africa has had instability and 
Political risk factors       EIU   BERI   Brink  Jakobsen 
Political stability and legitimacy         X      X      X      X 
Political effectiveness and Accountability        (X)            X      X 
Internal conflict         X      X      X      X 
External conflict /Negative influences of 
regional or other external forces 
      
        X 
 
     X 
 
     X 
 
      
Security risk          X      X      X      X 
Socio-economic conditions         X      X      X  
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illegitimacy issues since independence. One of the biggest challenges for the continent has 
been political leadership with consequences such as freedom fighters turning into dictators, 
the looting of natural resources, politics of exclusion and deprivation (Ong’ayo 2008:2). The 
leadership crisis has been marked by concentration of power in single political parties, 
personal rule by the president, centralization of power followed by elimination of competitive 
elections and intolerance of dissent (Gordon 2007:59). Both the EIU and BERI model argued 
that authoritarianism is a political risk for foreign investors. According to Iroanya (2008:108), 
this is theoretically possible. However, it is important to emphasize that democracy also has 
the potential of causing political risk. Actions such as expropriation can be used as a means of 
consolidating power and redistribute wealth to satisfy the electorate. This risk factor should 
therefore be measured trough assessing political transfers, government stability, and policy 
stability. Sudden changes in policies can point towards further anticipated shifts such as 
contract repudiation, cancellation of licenses, whereas legitimacy issues can cause political 
unrest with the potential to hamper the operational environment of business (Brink 2004:84).
 Political Effectiveness and Accountability: Well-functioning political institutions are 
essential to reduce the risks associated with large projects such as hydropower investments. 
Although this does not guarantee policy stability, a solid institutional framework does 
enhance the credibility of promises to protect investor’s assets (Jakobsen 2010:485). The 
institutional capacity to implement policies is therefore essential for investments (World 
Economic Forum 2010:7). The institutional strength and quality of a country’s bureaucracy 
have the potential to minimize revisions of existing policies when government’s change, and 
where the bureaucracy tends to be autonomous from political pressure. As a consequence, the 
political risk of a country will be lower if the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to 
govern without dramatically changes or interruptions in policy or other types of government 
services (Brink 2004:87). Africa is still haunted by historical injustices and oppressive 
structures as part of its history, a dimension that informs the weak institutions of the states 
and flawed legislative systems (Ong’ayo 2008:2-3). The indicators that will be assessed in 
this risk factor are: institutional effectiveness, the quality of bureaucracy, transparency and 
fairness, and democratic accountability (Brink 2004:84). Signs of institutional strength such 
as efficient distribution of resources, policy delivery and competent civil servants should also 
be assessed  (Brink 2004:87).        
 Moreover, corruption drains resources from public and private projects into the 
pockets of officials and thus represents an additional cost to investments. Corruption remains 
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a serious challenge in many African countries, as it is rampant in 36 out of 52 countries in the 
African continent according to Transparency International, and a serious challenge in 14 
more. (World Economic Forum 2010:11). Companies in the resource sector are particularly 
vulnerable to corruption because of the large amount of capital involved, and because of their 
frequent and regular contact with host governments (Bray 2003:295-296). Corruption within a 
political system poses a threat to foreign business for several reasons: It leads to distortion of 
the economic and financial environment, reduces the efficiency of government and businesses 
through patronage over ability, and leads to an innate instability to the political processes 
within a country (Brink 2004:86).        
 Internal Conflict: Ethnic tensions are a common feature of most African political 
systems, and can cause divisions among the various groups in a country. It can affect foreign 
businesses negatively through open conflicts or through more subtle forms such as restrictions 
from investing in certain areas, and who to employ (Iroanya 2008:106). Yet, ethnicity in itself 
does not cause political risk. According to Iroanya (2008:106-107) ethnicity can in fact add to 
the profitability of foreign investors because they might find more skilled personnel in 
heterogeneous settings than in a homogenous environment. Countries with higher degrees of 
social cohesion are more resilient towards conflicts than countries with a low degree of 
cohesion. The African countries have comparatively low levels of social cohesion. The most 
widespread measure of this is ethno linguistic fractionalization. Nevertheless, ethnic diversity 
is not a conflict-trigger in itself, but where the resources are scarce, unevenly or unjustly 
distributed, it can be explosive (Nodland 2006:11). Political salience has to be gained, and 
used for a competitive purpose in power struggles to actually pose a risk (Iroanya 2008:107). 
 Social unrest and disorder5 can create political risk for foreign investors because of the 
potential for disruption of business activities. Unemployment, declining remittances, and 
pressure on social programs makes the risk of civil unrest pronounced and might lead to 
resource nationalism. Civil unrest can lead to changes in law due to political, social and 
economic pressures (MIGA 2009:27, Wang et.al 2004:241). The signs to watch are increased 
ethnic tensions and violence, political weakness, or social and political tensions over access to 
food and water (World Economic Forum 2010:9, 7). Internal conflict is an indication of 
political violence in a country as well as its potential or actual impact on governance. Certain 
criteria have to be taken into consideration like whether the conflict is confined to a certain 
area, or attacks occur nationwide, whether movements have widespread support, or whether 
                                                
5 This aspect of political risk will be further discussed under the risk factor socio-economic conditions. 
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acts of violence are sporadic or sustained. A country is low risk if there is no evidence of 
armed opposition to the government, and where the government does not indulge in arbitrary 
violence. A high-risk rate would be given countries in an ongoing civil war (Bischoff 
2010:36, Brink 2004:85). These tensions and divisions in society are well known predicators 
of political turmoil and hence a signal of an increase in political risk. Such tensions redirect 
government attention to their solution, restrict resources available for economic development, 
or may result in open conflict and destruction of property. A government may even fall 
account of social tension representing a threat to consistency in economic and social policy 
(Bischoff 2010:37).         
 External Conflict/Negative Influences of Regional or Other Political Forces: 
Armed conflict in neighboring countries has the potential of destabilizing the nation through 
the amount of refugees and rebel movements (Brink 2004:91). War and armed conflict applies 
to all regions in the world, but in Africa this seems more at risk than other continents. War has 
the potential to cause shortage of skilled human work force, destruction of physical 
infrastructure, nationalization and expropriation (Iroanya 2008:105).   
 This factor will be measured by monitoring the prevalence of trouble spots6. A 
measure of external conflict is also included (Brink 2004:85). It can range from conflicts like 
trade embargos, geo-political disputes, armed threats exchanges of fire on and across borders, 
foreign supported insurgency and full-scale war (Bischoff 2010:36). Even though war does 
not necessarily affect foreign investors, the presence of armed conflict can create risk because 
of the possibility of harmful interventions such as insurgents, kidnappings, sabotage etc. 
(Jakobsen 2010:484).         
 Security Risk: General and organized crime, kidnappings, hijackings, riots and 
sabotage and terrorism are indicators of relevance to assess in the context of security risk. 
However, according to Iroanya (2008:107) terrorism is not as relevant for foreign investment 
in Africa, and especially not religious fundamentalism. Even in countries where Islamic 
fundamentalism exists it is often used to achieve domestic objectives rather than to target 
foreign investors. However, US concerns about the role of different terrorist groups in Africa 
have led to an increase in their military presence since 2002, and thus might serve as an 
indicator of increased presence of terrorism in Africa (World Economic Forum 2010:10). 
 Socio-Economic Conditions: This factor attempts to measure the general public 
dissatisfaction with a government’s policies, and performance on social delivery, as this can 
                                                
6 Trouble spots: Countries in a region with history of unrest, insecurity or continuous violence. 
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create political violence and potentially affect foreign investments (Brink 2004:85, Iroanya 
2008:110). It is assumed that public dissatisfaction with government’s policies will enhance 
the chances for a government to change its policies. Public dissatisfactions can possibly be to 
the detriment for investors if it creates a social crisis (Hough 2008:25). In addition, the 
growing income inequalities are a factor that might generate social unrest and violent 
conflicts, as African countries rank at the bottom of the United Nation’s Human Poverty 
Index (World Economic Forum 2010:12).        
 Social delivery in almost every African state is poor, with high unemployment rates, 
poor health care delivery, unequal distribution of wealth, and serious problems of rural-urban 
migration, causing poverty and an increase in urban populations leading to increased 
competition for employment and criminal acts (Iroanya 2008: 112, 110).   
Micro Risks          
 Infrastructure investments such as hydropower are considered as more prone to 
political risk than others (Frynas & Mellahi 2003:541). In 1971 Vernon (in Doh & Ramamurti 
2003:340) introduced the notion that investors’ bargaining power in host countries would 
diminish over time as a consequence of high fixed costs and the inability to transfer capital 
investments abroad. Once companies have committed to investments in form of establishing 
physical assets, the host government has greater leverage over the company and thereby the 
company’s vulnerability increases. This is called asset specificity or the obsolescing 
bargaining (Doh & Ramamurti 2003:340). Investments in infrastructure are innately 
characterized by an active government role, and only a small percentage of the infrastructure 
in developing countries has been privatized because of the notion that these industries should 
be natural monopolies. Additionally, the assumption that all should have a basic right to 
access these services has led to the view that the government should be both producer and 
provider (Doh & Ramamurti 2003:340). Many natural resource projects pose a risk on their 
own. Subsequently, hydropower must be developed taking all of the potential risks into 
consideration, both the risks that the political environment can cause to the investment, in 
addition to their own risks (The World Bank Group 2007:27).  This section will further 
introduce the political risk factors that are deemed relevant in the context of hydropower 






Table 3.5.3b: Micro Risks 
• Human Rights 
• Human Capital 
• Energy Dependence 
• Environmental Vulnerability 
• Regulatory Framework 
• Attitudes Toward Foreign Business 
                                                
Human Rights: In recent years, business has been regarded as one of the key social 
institutions that have the responsibility to uphold human rights rights (Bray 2003:295). One of 
the most significant political risks since the 1990s is the risk of reputational damage to 
companies operating in countries with records of human rights abuses. Investment can cause 
problems in countries where the government has been accused of human rights violations, and 
the development of new supplies under these circumstances may not be acceptable unless 
companies can satisfy potential critics; that their investment will serve a developmental 
purpose in the host country (Bray 2003:294). As energy supply in Africa is a development 
purpose, an important assumption is that companies investing in this sector should have an 
even stronger emphasis on upholding human rights, due to the likelihood of being targeted by 
local stakeholders, the government, NGOs and other international interests if not complying. 
 A country’s human rights record also serves the objective of signifying levels of 
government tolerance when threatened and challenged (Brink 2004:96). Working conditions, 
labor rights, and dams’ impact on local communities should therefore be assessed when 
discussing the risks of human rights for hydropower companies (Blowfield & Murray 
2008:317).            
 Human Capital: The quality of the labor force is usually described as human capital 
and often refers to skills, knowledge, and health (Brink 2004:109). In addition to the already 
thin manpower base in the renewable sector in Africa, the high incidence of HIV/AIDS 
reduces the productivity due to loss in trained personnel (Economic Commission of Africa 
2006:52). As such, HIV/AIDS has a destabilizing effect on labor forces, productivity, 
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economies and profitability (Brink 2004:102). The Corporate Council on Africa has estimated 
that in some parts of Southern Africa, HIV/AIDS and related illnesses and death thereof have 
reduced the workforce by as much as 20% with corresponding decrease in productivity7 
(Meridian Group International 2006:4).        
 The level of education in a country is also significant in relation to this risk factor. The 
literacy rate and mean period of schooling should be noted since it is assumed that the longer 
this period is, the higher the quality of human capital in the workforce (Brink 2004:109-110). 
Both unskilled and skilled workforce is needed when constructing a hydropower plant. 
Skilled personnel, who can install, operate and maintain a hydropower plant, may not exist in 
large numbers. Thus this becomes prevalent for the hydropower sector.  
 Energy Dependence: The African continent is in desperate need of energy. Energy 
has always been considered as a strategic sector, essential to international competitiveness, 
economic and social development, and national security (UNIDO 2007:24). The strategic 
nature of natural resources such as hydropower makes it more prone to uncertainty and 
possible government intervention. The increase in resource nationalism one has witnessed the 
recent years, has heightened the perceptions of expropriation (MIGA 2009:31). However, a 
country that depends heavily on energy import can benefit from hydropower as it can benefit 
their economy, as hydropower is not dependent on energy imports, and therefore unaffected 
by the fluctuation of the international energy prices (UN Water 2008:31).   
 Expropriation or nationalization poses a significant political risk for foreign investors. 
However, investors with great bargaining power consisting of capital and expertise are needed 
by the government to develop the economy and to exploit its resources (Comeaux & Kinsella 
1994:14). The capabilities of the company thus become essential when analyzing how this 
risk can be mitigated in a risk management analysis. Additionally, how dependent the host 
country is on energy supply, and especially hydropower should be considered.  
 Environmental Vulnerability: Current models on climate change impacts indicates 
that Africa is the continent most at risk, with both drought and desertification, and heightened 
flood risk that can be disastrous if impacting vulnerable under-resourced societies (World 
Economic Forum 2010:6). Greater frequency and severity of extreme weather events raises 
the threat of food insecurity, water insecurity and more poverty, disease and population 
                                                
7 Additionally lower respiratory infections, HIV/AIDS, diarrheal diseases, tuberculosis, malaria, and measles, 
cause more than 90% of the deaths from infectious diseases worldwide. Despite recent reductions in prevalence, 




displacement in the continent. (World Economic Forum 2010:14). Social unrest has already 
been sparked by food prices in some African countries, and triggered riots in Niger, Senegal, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Mozambique (World Economic Forum 2010:8), and thus poses 
a political risk for companies. Africa also faces the challenge of poor water security because 
the variability of fresh water is variable and unevenly distributed across the continent and 
threatens human survival, agricultural production and human growth (World Economic 
Forum: 2010:8).         
 Climate changes will have an effect on the viability of hydropower projects, 
exemplified by extreme event as flooding. More sediment on top of changed composition of 
water, could raise the exposure to turbine erosion and can also lower the turbine generator 
efficiency which can result in a decline in the energy generated (UN Water 2008:5).  
 Hydropower projects have the potential to cause environmental degradation as they 
can alter forest and land into aquatic ecosystems and effectively reduce the availability of 
farmlands. Hydropower dams can also compete in part with the usage of water for irrigation 
“since using the energetic potential of hydropower by running turbines means that the water 
is only available at a lower altitude afterwards” (UN Water: 2008:29). The construction of 
dams indirectly or directly affects the use of land through competition for land use with 
agricultural, recreational, scenic or development interests (Beck & Martinot 2004:5). 
Environmental degradation caused by business operations might lead to activism from local 
communities and NGOs, which also can lead to compensation demands (Jakobsen 2010:487). 
How environmental degradation can create risks for hydropower companies, and how 
hydropower can affect the environment and cause political risk are therefore the two 
dimensions that should be assessed.       
 Regulatory Framework: Political risk related to regulatory actions is perceived as the 
most consequential and also most likely to occur for foreign business (Komendantova, Patt, 
Barras & Battaglini 2009:1, 3). Regulatory burdens such as complicated regulations and the 
lack of effectiveness in the departments that deals with energy, local-content policies, and 
inadequate policies is of importance to assess. A rigid an ineffective regulatory framework is 
time- and cost consuming for private companies and causes political risk due to the potential 
of delays and incertitude about the administrative and legislative procedures (Beck & 
Martinot 2004:3)        
 Transparency, efficiency and inclusiveness could reduce uncertainties for foreign 
investors by providing more predictable applications of government rules and regulations that 
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can enhance the investment climate (Komendantova et al. 2009:3, 5). Regulatory risk is also 
connected to possible government interventions such as non-payment and non-enforceability 
of contracts, expropriation, cancellation of licenses and permits, limitation of business 
options, property rights, discriminatory actions against foreign ownership, 
under/overregulation, legal issues and taxes (Nodland 2006:29).    
 Attitudes Toward Foreign Business: Political leaders have to satisfy a variety of 
domestic interests to remain in power and might therefore not prioritize improving the 
business conditions for foreign businesses (Bray 2003:291). When making deals with private 
companies, governments face a political risk as natural resources are considered as a part of a 
country’s national patrimony and selling these resources can be regarded as a betrayal (Bray 
2003:315). This form of nationalism can sometimes be protectionism put forward by local 
commercial interests when faced with competition, or by the population (Bray 2003:315). 
Attitudes of local government towards hydropower development must be considered in a risk 
assessment as well as the demand of nationalism. If the regional government fails to give its 
consent, or is ineffective, the project may not be feasible even though the host government 
approves (Bray 2003:316). Nationalism can also manifest itself through reluctance of 
governments to ease regulations that restrict their business operation (Bray 2003:292). 
 Foreign dominance of important sectors in the national economy such as hydropower, 
can spur anti-foreign capital sentiments and actions (Jakobsen 2010:488). As already 
mentioned energy companies face the problem of asset specificity when investing abroad. 
This means that companies from this industry have to make significant capital investments 
before expecting to get any returns in form of profit. This type of investment amount to a 
“hostage” situation, once the companies have invested, they cannot simply withdraw from 
the host country. However, if the company brings capabilities not easily accessed from other 
national actors, it can turn into an opportunity (Bray 2003:292).       
3.5.4 Risk Response  
The political risks for hydropower companies in sub-Saharan Africa have now been 
identified. The next step is to introduce the concept of risk response with the corresponding 
risk mitigation measures that enables the management of political risks.   
 “Once the risks of a project have been identified and analyzed, an appropriate method 
of treating risk must be adopted” (Wang et. al 2004:238). Risk response is done in light of the 
measures that will have to be implemented in order to manage political risks to secure 
profitability of the investment (Brink 2004:149). Bremmer & Keat (2009: 192) have 
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identified four main strategies for reducing the likelihood of a political risk to occur: 
Eliminate the threat, minimize its likelihood, isolate the event, or avoid the risk altogether. 
Obviously, the ideal of a company would be to eliminate all possible risks. However, some 
risks cannot be eliminated and can at best, only be minimized or isolated (Bremmer & Keat 
2009:193). An emphasis on those risk mitigation measures that have the ability to mitigate 
political risks will therefore be the main focus of the analysis. There are a number of ways in 
which foreign companies can manage political risk. 
 According to Brink (2004:156) there are two ways of reducing the impact of political 
risk and those are integrative and protective techniques. The purpose of integrative techniques 
is to increase the integration of the foreign company into the host environment, based on the 
assumption that the more integrated a foreign company is, the less it will be perceived as 
“foreign” to the environment it operates in (Brink 2004:156). Examples of techniques that 
can be called integrative are: policies related to local sourcing, distribution and employment; 
sharing of ownership with the host government, local firms, and /or local citizens, and close 
ties with governments to ensure compatibility between the host government’s goals and the 
corporate goals (Brink 2004:156).        
 Protective techniques’ purpose is to discourage interference from host government, or 
to minimize the company’s potential losses in the event of interference. These measures aim 
to provide for a non-integration of the foreign investment into the host country environment 
(Brink 2004:156). Protective techniques range from financial techniques; vertical integration; 
maintaining full ownership (including technology); and intra-company sourcing (Brink 
2004:157). Ideally, foreign companies should endeavor to develop a risk management 
framework that includes both integrative and protective techniques. This is because the use of 
integrative techniques will enable companies to respond to the demands of a host country’s 
political environment, and also the opportunities presented by this. On the other hand, 
protective techniques can assist companies in protecting their competitive strengths (Brink 
2004:156-157).  
3.5.5 Risk Mitigation Measures  
Risk mitigation measures that are planned, budgeted, and actually implemented have the 
potential of reducing the political risks that exist in hydropower projects (Ledec & Quintero 
2003:3). Risk mitigation measures can be divided into three broad categories; risk sharing and 
transfer, strategic relationships and political risk policies. This section’s objective is to give an 
outline of these measures, and to further categorize them as either protective or integrative, in 
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order to analyze whether the identified measures can reduce the political risk factors that are 
deemed as high risk in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique.  
Risk Sharing and Transfer: The objective of risk sharing and transfer is to obtain external 
sources of finance in order to share the political risk and thus reduce the company’s own risk.  
Foreign companies usually share and transfer the risk to joint venture partners and external 
lenders through project finance and political risk insurers. These measures have the potential 
of reducing political risk in addition to bringing about opportunities for the investing firm, 
enabling companies to invest in risky zones (Bray 2003:321).     
 Joint ventures: Entering into joint venture partnerships is a proactive way of tackling 
some forms of political risk by choosing a partner- either the government, or a company that 
is well-regarded by the government to share risks. This type of partnership therefore serves as 
a buffer for state intervention (Wood 2009). In addition, when establishing operational 
presence in a country, entering into joint ventures give access to local knowledge by 
“borrowing a partner’s already-in-place local infrastructure” (Doz, Prahalad & Hamel in 
Inkpen & Beamish 1997:180,) and thereby prevent unnecessary problems which can occur 
when foreign investors operate in unknown business environments. A local partner 
contributes with knowledge about the government and society, and can therefore navigate the 
company through legal processes, administrative incompetence and political corruption. In 
addition, the local partner might have important contacts within the political hierarchy and 
serve to reduce the skepticism often associated with foreign capitalists (Jakobsen 2004:121). 
Joint venture partnerships are therefore both an integrative and protective technique. 
 Project Finance: Is recognized as one of the principal risk mitigation measures, 
especially related to energy developments (Pollio 1998:687). International financial partners, 
usually multilateral agencies8, can provide leverage for foreign investors in order for better 
protection against political risk as well as to share the financial burden (Bremmer & Keat 
2009:159). Companies involve influential multilateral agencies because they believe that the 
governments of host countries are less likely to pull out of agreements that give them 
significant support in other areas such as aid and bilateral trade (Bray 2003:322, Boshoff 
2010:67). Essentially, the backing from key international players may reduce political risks 
that can be caused by government interventions due to the governments’ fear of losing access 
to international financial markets, withdrawal of aid, and other types of sanctions (Bremmer 
                                                
8 External finance can be raised from private financial institutions or institutions such as the World Bank’s 




& Keat 2009:159, Jakobsen 2004:124). According to Brink’s (2004) categorization of risk 
mitigation measures, project finance can be categorized as a protective technique, as it 
protects the assets of the foreign company.       
 Political Risk insurance: Companies buy political risk insurance to protect 
themselves against property- and casualty losses, an against product liability suits (Brink 
2004:163). The insurance industry on political risk has traditionally been focusing on four 
main areas: Expropriation, governmental renegotiation of contracts and confiscation, currency 
transfer, and war and other civil disturbances. Risk insurance can be divided into two types of 
categories: private insurance and public insurance (Jakobsen 2004:125-126, Bray 2003:323). 
Obtaining political risk insurance is therefore a protective technique.   
Strategic relationships: “The more that companies can do to build up a wide body of 
support among different sections of the host population, the safer their investment will be” 
(Bray 2003:293). The aim of an integrative approach as strategic relationships are, is to meet 
the expectation of stakeholders, without losing sight of own goals (Brink 2004:151). The 
objective of strategic partnering is to promote effective results for all parties: business, 
governments, the community and NGOs. Hence, the theory on stakeholders is increasingly 
being regarded as one of the touchstones of good corporate responsibility management. 
Companies pay attention to stakeholders by adopting integrative processes (Blowfield & 
Murray 2008:160). The most important stakeholders related to political risk management are: 
the national government, the provincial and local administration, the local community, and 
NGOs.            
 The national government: This relationship is of strategic importance since it is not 
possible for companies to operate without the government’s consent, and host government’s 
intervention policy can impose severe constraints on a company’s strategies and operations 
(Moon & Lado 2000:85). The government’s are responsible for the overall legal, political and 
social environment in which the companies operate. Consequently, a good relationship 
between companies and governments should be nurtured in order to reduce or take advantage 
of the opportunities this relationship might bring (Bray 2003:314).   
 Provincial and local administration: If the provincial and local administration fails 
to give its consent, or are ineffective, the investment may not be viable (Bremmer & Keat 
2009:152, Bray 2003:316). In many countries local and regional governments exert 
noteworthy influence over taxation rate agreements, business permits and other elements of 
regulatory power that can influence the foreign investment climate. If these governments in 
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addition are elected, they can face significant media, public and interest group pressure that 
can materialize when regulations are enacted and implemented. Hence, it is important to 
create good relationships on a local government level, and also to understand the regional and 
local dynamics in the areas in which foreign investors will operate (Bremmer & Keat 
2009:152-153).           
 Local communities: Good community relations, as well as first-rate local knowledge 
to identify key local stakeholders are prevalent from the beginning of a business 
establishment, and should therefore be an essential approach for companies to pursue (Bray 
2003:317). Examples of engagement with local communities is to employ the workforce from 
the local community in the construction phase of a project, address land rights to everyone 
with a genuine entitlement, and maintain a general good reputation and image to the public. 
This can be done through actively participating in public relations activities and charities, and 
by complying with local social and cultural values (Bray 2003:318, Wang. et al 2004:245). 
 NGOs: The role of NGOs in creating risk for corporations has been thoroughly 
discussed in the literature. For corporations, NGOs can bring knowledge and expertise, 
credibility and reputational gains (Cowe 2006). NGOs represents stakeholders outside of the 
core corporate structure, and thus provide an early warning network of potential problems that 
arise as a result of the company’s business activities. In this sense NGOs provide 
opportunities to reduce risks in proactive ways. Business – NGOs relations therefore provide 
a means for linking the economic world of business with the social and value-generating one 
of civil society, and thus serve as a valuable risk mitigation measure for companies (Waddell 
2000:205, Cowe 2006:2).   
Political Risk Policy: Not planning for a political risk policy implies: 
 “…a degree of ignorance of local conditions in a country; insensitivity to possible 
changes in the particular industry’s investment climate both in and outside of the host 
country; and a lack of acknowledging the relevant stakeholders in decision making 
processes” (Brink 2004:164).  
The aim of a formulation of a political risk policy is to reduce a company’s exposure and 
vulnerability to political risks without drastically changing the company’s overall business 
strategy (Brink 2004:167).  It consists of three approaches: corporate values, triple bottom 
line, and contingency plans.        
 Corporate values: Clearly defined corporate values are a key risk mitigation measure 
that should be integrated in a company’s risk management (Nodland 2006:25). When 
analyzing a company’s social and environmental credentials through corporate values one 
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must look at the company’s voluntary internal policies and practices as well as their 
compliance with external regulations (Bray 2003:304).      
 Internal corporate values can be measured through the company’s code of conduct, 
which is a set of guidelines on how companies should conduct their business. External 
regulations can be related to multilateral guidelines for corporations such as the UN Global 
Compact (PwC 2006:7, Meridian Group International 2006:1). One can build a strong 
reputation through a comprehensive corporate social responsibility (CSR) approach in a 
company’s corporate values; the possession of a track record in responsible business practice 
can reduce a project’s permitting time, enhance corporate-community relations as well as 
contribute to the overall competitive advantage of operations (PwC 2006:10, Warhurst 
2001:64). A corporate value policy drives closer collaboration with governments, NGOs and 
community partners at the operational level, and address policies with regards to indigenous 
peoples, human rights and corporate governance. The more elaborated and focused these 
corporate values are, the better they might lead to measurable standards (Warhurst 2001:69, 
Kolk, van Tulder & Welters 1999:150).       
 Triple bottom lining (TBL): Another way for companies to manage political risks is 
to create clearly defined structures for reporting and addressing them (Bremmer & Keat 
2009:180). This can be done through applying a TBL approach, which entails commitment to 
economic, social and environmental performance (Blowfield & Murray 2008:135, 28). Today 
it is regarded as a mechanism for accounting and reporting related to impact assessments 
(Vanclay 2004:27, 30). According to Vanclay & Bronstein (in Vanclay 2004:30), impact 
assessment can be defined as “…the prediction or estimation of the consequences of a current 
or proposed action (project, policy, technology)”, and is therefore an integrated approach 
compounded of two forms: environmental impact assessment (EIA) and social impact 
assessment (SIA). The establishment of effective policies and procedures to manage political 
risk should include these types of assessments (Bray 2003:303). Impact assessments are 
designed to target external stakeholders to provide them with an assurance of the company’s 
social and environmental commitments, to build trust and live up to shareholder’s 
expectations (Blowfield & Murray 2008:202). EIA is a process of identification and 
prediction of potential environmental impacts of proposed projects and actions, and the 
communication of this information (Vanclay 2004:30). The concept embraces aspects such as 
natural resource management and pollution prevention and control. SIA includes human 
rights, working conditions, labor rights, impact on indigenous peoples, and impact on local 
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communities (Blowfield & Murray 2008:316-317).    
 Contingency plans:  Foreign companies should draft a contingency plan to prepare 
for all possible outcomes of potential political risks the company might encounter. A 
contingency plan will ensure the capacity to survive a threat and it is an important tool of risk 
management for a company (Bremmer & Keat 2009:194). Preparations can range from 
business continuity planning and lobby capacity development that can mitigate potential risks 
(Bremmer & Keat 2009:194). The outline of a contingency plan will depend on the risks that 
the foreign companies are exposed to, and consequently the risks must be identified before 























4.0 RISK ASSESSMENT OF ZAMBIA, SOUTH AFRICA 
& MOZAMBIQUE 
4.1 Chapter Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to give an informative account of the political risk 
environment related to foreign investments in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. First, 
the historical political context and the current political context of Zambia, South Africa and 
Mozambique will be presented, followed by a risk assessment with the political risk factors 
derived from the analytical framework. This will lay the basis for chapter fiver, where the 
factors considered as high-risk will be analyzed in the context of SNPA’s company 
capabilities and risk mitigation measures.   
4.2. Zambia 
4.2.1 Historical Political Context  
Zambia attained independence from Britain in 1964. Kaunda became the first 
republican president of Zambia, and represented the United National Independence Party 
(UNIP), which was the ruling party until 1990. In 1991, the country opened up for multi-party 
elections due to international and domestic pressure, and the Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy (MMD) won, and has won all of the Zambian elections since (Gordon & Gordon 
2007:90, Freedomhouse 2010a). MMD was originally a loose coalition of the urban 
population and the trade union movement, but it organized itself as a political party to 
represent a viable opposition to the sitting government (Lunn, Beale & Townsend 2009:2). In 
spite of a relative peaceful transition to a multi-party system, the subsequent election in 1996 
saw deliberate harassment of the Zambian opposition parties. The election in 2001 was further 
marked by administrative problems with three parties filing a legal petition challenging the 
election of the ruling party candidate Mwanawasa. However, in 2006 he was re-elected in an 
election that was deemed free and fair (UCLA African Studies Center 2010a). Mwanawasa 
died in 2008 and vice president Rupiah Banda was elected as president in the election that 
followed, he is still the president of Zambia (Freedomhouse 2010a).  
The economic mismanagement during the Kaunda period brought deterioration of the 
domestic conditions of Zambia, causing severe food shortages, and a vivid increase in 
inflation rates and unemployment. The optimism was therefore high when a new government 
was established in 1991, but did not bring about the improvements in the country’s economy 
that were expected. When the president left office 10 years later, the Zambians were still 
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beleaguered by food shortages, high inflation rates, and worrying unemployment that the 
MMD government had failed to address (Lunn et.al 2008:4).  
4.2.2 Current Political Context 
Zambia has moved from being a significant producer of copper and potentially one of 
Africa’s richest countries at its independence in 1964, to become one of the world’s poorest 
countries. The legacy of colonialism, mismanagement from the political leaders, debt and 
disease are said to be the main reasons for the country’s lack of development (BBC 2010a). 
Currently, the country is facing many challenges. 2009 was a year characterized by uncertain 
copper prices, job losses, high inflation and tensions between the Zambian government and 
mining companies, in addition to donor nations who have been dissatisfied with the Zambian 
government’s efforts to combat corruption. Furthermore, the state of the public finances has 
been poor, and the government has turned to international institutions for financial aid (The 
Africa Report 2010a).  
In spite of economic mismanagement, the 21st century has been a period of sustained 
economic growth. However, a higher level of growth (7% or more) is needed if the poverty in 
Zambia is to be reduced (Lunn et.al 2008:4). The main constraints to economic growth in the 
future include a decrease in productivity caused by the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS, 
shortage of energy, especially electricity, and further appreciation of the Zambian currency 
(African Development Bank 2008:619). Zambia is heavily dependent on foreign aid. After the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)- and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) 
relief were granted in 2005 and 2006, Zambia’s foreign debt has remained at a low level. The 
government is now very reluctant to take up non-concessional loans and intends to limit its 
external borrowing to finance growth-enhancing projects (African Development Bank 
2008:623). Ambitious reforms have been taken place over the years in order to increase the 
economic growth as well as political development in various areas ranging from public sector 
managements and decentralization to private sector and financial sector development. The 
constitution has also been under revision, and the government’s ability to implement these 
reforms is now being tested (African Development Bank 2008:624). 
4.3 South Africa 
4.3.1 Historical Political Context 
Dutch traders established a stopover point on the spice route between the Netherlands and the 
East in modern day South Africa in 1652. After the British seized the Cape of Good Hope in 
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1806 many of the Dutch settlers trekked north. The diamonds and gold discovery prompted 
wealth and immigration, leading to an intensification of the suppression of the native 
inhabitants. The British and Dutch ruled together under the Union of South Africa that was 
created in 1910 (UCLA African Studies Center 2010b).  
In 1948, the Afrikaaner National Party was voted into power, and implemented a 
policy of apartheid9. However, excessive domestic and international pressure prompted 
President de Klerk to legalize the anti-apartheid African National Congress (ANC)- the main 
resistance movement to the white minority, and to release the ANC leader Nelson Mandela 
from prison in 1990. Between 1990 and 1994, almost all apartheid legislation was abolished 
(Freedomhouse 2010b).  
The first multi-racial elections were held in 1994 where ANC won, and Nelson 
Mandela became president. As required by the interim constitution, a national unity 
government was established that included the ANC, the National Party and the Zulu-
nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party. In the subsequent election, the black majority ANC won 
almost two-thirds of the votes with Thabo Mbeki, Mandela’s successor as president. In 2004, 
the ANC won an even greater victory with almost 70% of the national votes (Freedomhouse 
2010b). By this, the ANC consolidated its position as the dominating party in South Africa, 
which has dominated the political environment since. 
4.3.2 Current Political Context 
After the end of white rule, Mandela’s visionary leadership gave confidence in the belief that 
a political miracle had occurred. Its negotiated transition from minority rule to democracy is 
indeed one of the wonders of the end of the twentieth century, but remains “…only the first 
chapter of the post-liberation narrative” (Russel, 2010:xvi). Only a decade and a half after 
the first democratic elections, the history of South Africa still has a profound influence on the 
political state of affairs (Butler, 2009:1). The legacy of apartheid continues to manifest itself 
in form of economic, social and political inequality with especially poverty and lack of 
empowerment among the disadvantaged groups. Another legacy has been for the ANC to 
convert from a national liberation movement to a government ruling in a democracy (Gibson, 
2003:774, UCLA African Studies Center 2010b). 
Over the years, rifts within the ruling party and the governing alliance including South 
African Communist Party (SACP), and the Congress of South African Trade Unions 
                                                
9 The separate development of the races through a platform of institutionalized racial separation, designed to 
maintain white minority rule, and black and colored oppression (Freedomhouse 2010b).  
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(COSATU) have characterized the political climate. There has also been a hostile climate 
between the ANC and the opposition parties. In addition, personal conflicts between Mbeki 
and his deputy president Jacob Zuma has materialized. In December 2007, Zuma defeated 
Mbeki in a battle for the presidency, and Zuma’s allies were elected to fill the majority of the 
ANC’s executive positions. As a result, Mbeki supporting ANC leaders established a new 
party, Congress of the People (COPE) in 2008 (Freedomhouse 2010b). Despite the new 
competition from COPE, the ANC won another striking victory in the 2009 elections, taking 
65.9% of the national votes and further consolidated its position. Today the Democratic 
Alliance (DA) is the leading opposition party, followed by COPE and the Inkatha Freedom 
Party (Freedomhouse 2010b). 
South Africa is a constitutional democracy, moving towards consolidation, where all 
the formal requirements of democracy such as constitutionalism, rule of law, separation of 
powers, independence of the judiciary, freedom of the press, protection of human rights, 
regular free and fair elections, and the right to opposition are formally met (Venter 2005:30). 
Additionally, South Africa is the economic powerhouse of Africa, a middle-income emerging 
market, rich on natural resources, well-developed financial, legal, communications, energy, 
and transport sector, and a modern infrastructure supporting an efficient distribution of goods 
to the major urban centers (Mbendi 2010a, UCLA African Studies Center 2010b). Compared 
to other emerging markets, South Africa displays a high structural current account deficit 
financed primarily by potentially volatile portfolio inflows. Consequently there exists 
uneasiness about the country’s vulnerability to changes in the global environment. Despite 
progress on the macroeconomic front, South Africa remains confronted with major structural 
and social challenges where infrastructure and human capital have suffered from years of 
underinvestment and lack of competition. Unemployment, lack of skills, and poverty remains 
a significant problem to the country (African Development Bank 2008:556), and political 
conflicts, energy crisis, and the consequences of the financial crisis have influenced the 
political environment. (Millstein 2009:241).  
4.4 Mozambique  
4.4.1. Historical Political Context  
Mozambique was colonized by Portugal in 1498, and became independent in 1975 after ten 
years of military struggle against colonial domination (Serapião 2004:365). After the guerilla 
triumph, the new Frelimo government had set out to transform the social, political, and 
economic life of Mozambicans as part of a Marxist-Leninist agenda, cultivating close 
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relations with the Soviet bloc and China, and opening its borders to other liberation 
movements, particularly those that were challenging the white minority-regimes in Rhodesia 
and South Africa (Weinstein 2002:147). The tight domestic control was seen as essential to 
build a socialist society, and the government suppressed all political activity outside of 
Frelimo. Frelimo’s platform in 1977, and its ambitious reforms and nationalization projects 
were disruptive to the country’s society and economy, undermining Frelimo’s already weak 
legitimacy (Manning & Malbrough (2010:148). The choices made by Frelimo at the domestic 
level in terms of development and economic policies, by excluding certain groups from 
governance processes on the basis of ideology, contributed to the establishment of a domestic 
foundation for destabilization and the consolidation of Renamo10. In 1977, civil war broke out 
between the two parties encouraged by Rhodesia and South Africa (Lundin 2000:2, Manning 
& Malbrough 2009:77). 
Since the policies initially were designed to benefit the colonizers, little attention was 
paid to national integration, economic infrastructure and skills of the population (Pereira 
2009:2). Subsequently, Mozambique was one of the world’s poorest countries at 
independence. The socialist mismanagement and the brutal civil war exacerbated the situation 
in the country (BBC 2010b). The civil war, sabotage from neighboring states, in addition to 
the economic collapse, characterized the first decade of independence in Mozambique as well 
as a mass emigration of Portuguese nationals, weak infrastructure and economic 
mismanagement (Pereira 2009:3).  
In 1983, Frelimo admitted the failure of socialism, and recognized the need for 
significant political and economic reforms. When the peace talks were initiated between 
Frelimo and Renamo in 1990, a new constitution was enacted, providing for a multi-party 
political system, a market-based economy, and free and fair elections (Pereira 2009:3). The 
peace accord in 1992 ended the civil war, and in 1994, the country held its first democratic 
election where Frelimo’s Chissano was elected president (Pereira 2009:14). Renamo accepted 
the outcome of the elections and transformed itself to into a peaceful opposition party. Yet, in 
the subsequent election, Renamo accused the government of fraud and threatened to form its 
own government in the provinces it controlled (Freedomhouse 2010c).  Nevertheless, the 
                                                
10 Renamo was founded in 1976 by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organizations to mostly fight ZANU 




country has now made significant progress in terms of economic development and political 
stability (BBC 2010b).  
4.4.2 Current Political Context 
Guebuza from Frelimo is currently the president of Mozambique. He succeeded the long-time 
leader Chissano in 2005. He won another term in 2009 with a massive majority (BBC 2010b). 
Frelimo continues to claim the alleged progress in rural development, health, education and 
basic infrastructure of Mozambique and no party is in a position to challenge them for at least 
another election (The Africa Report 2010b).  
Mozambique has experienced the economic destitution that is often associated with 
transition to a market economy, with a significant impact on the lives of Mozambicans, who 
previously could access cash, free education and health care, stabilized prices and stable jobs, 
even though the country always has experienced food shortages. In contrast, the transition to 
market economy brought more food security but at the cost of price hikes, unemployment, 
inflation and a general uncertainty in the country (Pereira 2009:6). On the other hand, 
Mozambique has experienced high levels of economic growth, owing to a relative stable 
political environment and commitment of the government to donor-backed reforms 
(Freedomhouse 2010c). Nonetheless, the economic growth is mainly due to the post-conflict 
reconstruction that took place in the country (UCLA African Studies Center 2010c). After 
years of steady economic growth with an average of over 8% for more than ten years, the 
economy has experienced problems that have beset other developing countries. The exports in 
Mozambique have suffered, and the trade and current account balances have turned negative. 
Moreover, there are growing gaps between the richer and poorer parts of the country, and the 
general poverty remains widespread, with more than 50% of the Mozambicans living on less 
than $1 a day (The Africa Report 2010b, BBC 2010b). However the country is considered as 
one of the success stories of Africa although the country is heavily reliant on foreign 
assistance (Mbendi 2011b). The country’s once substantial foreign debt has been reduced 
through forgiveness and rescheduling under the IMF’s HIPC and is now at a controllable level 
(UCLA African Studies Center 2010c). The economy has shown resilience in the face of the 
recent global financial crisis, and the close relationship with international donors has financed 
significant spending levels on social-sector investments (Freedomhouse 2010c).  
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4.5. Risk Assessment 
4.5.1 Political Stability and Legitimacy (Macro Risk) 
Zambia: Zambia is enjoying a relatively stable political environment underlined by 
successful elections in 2006 and 2008, although with minor irregularities and violence after 
the announcement of the results. Analysts have even been speculating that if this continues, 
Zambia might be on the verge of discovering the way to development (Lunn et. al 2008:4). 
However, during Banda’s time in office, the general political climate has been marked by 
contentious politics and governance challenges, as the president has been in conflict with 
members of his party seeking to challenge his leadership position. In addition, the government 
has taken aggressive and at times violent actions against the political opposition and the civil 
society perceived to be against the president. However, there is no evidence of systematic 
harassment from the government and the opposition has been able to operate relatively freely 
(Freedomhouse 2010a). 
Zambia’s election in October 2011 is expected to be highly competitive as the two 
biggest opposition parties agreed to join forces to challenge MMD (Global Insight 2011a:6). 
It remains to be seen which of the party leaders that will be the presidential candidate as this 
is a source of contention that might lead to the end of the cooperation. At present there is 
internal dissent within the MMD party, as Banda wants to extend his presidency beyond the 
next election. This decision has drawn criticism for being undemocratic. Despite some 
negative signs of the political climate in Zambia, the overall peaceful and orderly 
environment in which all the elections have been held, indicates that politicians, regardless of 
their increasingly aggressive rhetoric towards each other, and the public as a whole, are now 
accepting pluralism (Global Insight 2011a:6).  
The political environment is likely to be dominated by a number of issues this year, 
such as the adoption of a new constitution- a major source of conflict between the MMD and 
the opposition, the opposition’s effort to oust MMD from its government position, and the 
internal dissent over Banda’s wish to extend his presidency (Global Insight 2011a:6-7). The 
one-party domination in Zambia is largely due to the presence of numerous opposition parties 
that have taken votes from each other and therefore allowing the MMD to win the elections 
without even being close to obtaining an overall majority. If the two opposition parties 
succeed in joining forces this year, they might stand a chance of defeating the MMD (Global 
Insight 2011a:12). However, there are no signs that the political stability and legitimacy in the 




South Africa: The political climate in South Africa has been, and will likely remain stable, as 
ANC further consolidated its power in the elections in 2009. The re-election has represented 
policy continuity favorable to foreign business, especially as the head of planning is 
considered as being a key moderate (EIU 2010a). Nonetheless, there are developments that 
threaten to undermine the political stability with possible implications for the political risk for 
companies operating in the country. The continuing dominance of ANC points toward higher 
political risk as history shows that where one-party dominance occurs, it can lead to 
arrogance, corruption, and confusion of the interests between the ruling party and the state 
(Venter 2005:33). The absence of a strong formal opposition has not materialized. As the 
ANC is a broad coalition of different groups, a stringent within-opposition has grown. There 
has especially been a confrontational rhetoric between ANC and the country’s biggest labor 
union COSATU, who has been unwilling to accept the business-friendly labor reforms 
proposed by ANC (Venter 2005:33). In addition, there is growing public dissatisfaction with 
ANC’s stranglehold on power, continuing to fuel divisions and could therefore lead to a 
potential split in the future (Global Insight 2011b:6).  
However, the lack of credible opposition that can attract the electorate, independent of 
political, class, and racial divides, is likely to ensure ANC’s continued dominance. This has 
led to a fear of political stagnation with implications for the legitimacy of the political system 
(Global Insight 2011b:6). Two opposition parties, DA and the Independent Democrats (ID) 
announced in 2010 that they would join forces to challenge ANC’s dominance. The next 
election is in 2014, and it is expected that ANC will win (Global Insight 2011b:6). In addition 
there is a leadership problem with regards to the president. Zuma has been involved in 
corruption scandals and is currently working to clear his name. Adding to the complications 
are his questionable leadership skills as well as his controversial private life, which have 
served to undermine him as a leader and prompt the question of whether he will be re-elected 
(EIU 2010a).  
Political violence has occurred after the end of apartheid rule, although never severe. It 
increased in the run-up to the 2009 elections where 40 incidents of electoral violence were 
reported, most of them in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape. Additionally, five politicians 
were killed of violence related to the election and the inciting rhetoric during the campaigns 




Mozambique: Frelimo is the only party to hold power in Mozambique, and its unbroken 
position has allowed it to obtain significant control over the state institutions. In the lead-up to 
the 2009 elections, the government was heavily criticized for disqualifying candidates 
representing the opposition on technical grounds when the real motive was political. The 
campaign period was further marked by partisan violence mainly from the ruling party, with 
attacks where a Renamo supporter was reportedly killed. However, the elections in 2009 
served to entrench the political status quo in the country. In fact, the party won the two-thirds 
majority required to stand unopposed in the parliament (Freedomhouse 2010c). 
Despite of this, the low voter turnout indicates voter apathy that undermines the 
legitimacy of the government, exacerbated by the continuing centralization of power around 
the president. Frelimo’s victory should therefore not be confused with endorsement of the 
regime. The popularity of the party has been undermined by the way it won the elections in 
2009, with lack of transparency and numerous procedural obstacles. However, the party has 
been able to capitalize on fractions within the opposition (Global Insight 2011c:6, 11). It has 
been stated that the gap between Frelimo and Renamo never has been as wide as presently. 
Renamo used to be one of the biggest opposition parties in sub-Saharan Africa, but has now 
lost its position in the country due to internal divisions. Today the party has only 15% of the 
seats in parliament. A new political party has emerged, and is expected to be an influential 
actor for the elections in 2014 (Global Insight 2011c:6-7). The growing tensions between 
Frelimo and the opposition party is largely due to the president’s centralization tendencies, 
seeking to consolidate the party’s dominance, at the risk of weakening democratic reforms 
(EIU 2010b).  
The overwhelming majority Frelimo won has raised the concern of whether it will 
tighten its grip and change the constitution to its own advantage (Global Insight 2011c:10). 
The president is also getting older, and this has led to leadership speculations, as he has not 
given any indications of a preferred successor. His departure could create a destabilizing 
factor, as factions of the party most likely would compete for dominance (EIU 2010b). Even 
though there are no prevalent signs of threats to the political legitimacy and stability of 
Mozambique, the undermining of the opposition, and the difficultness of distinguishing 
between the ruling party and the state, have the potential to threaten the legitimacy of 
Frelimo, and have a destabilizing effect on the country. Overall, the president has created a 
more authoritarian and confrontational political environment, breaking with his predecessor 
who promoted national reconciliation, and therefore raised tensions  (EIU 2010b).  
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4.5.2 Political Effectiveness and Accountability (Macro Risk) 
Zambia: The bureaucracy in Zambia is characterized by long and complicated administrative 
procedures, especially related to obtaining licenses and permits for the private sector (Global 
Advice Network 2010a). However, the government has a relatively sound record in promoting 
and implementing liberal pro-business policies with many opportunities for foreign investors 
to participate. In spite of this, the quality of the bureaucracy is low with considerable delays 
between announcements and implementation of policies (EIU 2010c). In addition, there is 
also considerable instability every time the government or presidency changes, as Zambian 
politics is largely based on patronage (EIU 2010c).  
The corruption committed by civil servants and politicians has not been adequately 
investigated and prosecuted, implying that accountability in the country is low and that 
judicial processes are not autonomous from political interference. It is especially in relation to 
land administration that the corruption is rife, but it is still pervasive at all levels and sectors. 
Facilitation payments are also prevalent. However, the ratification of several anti-corruption 
conventions illustrate that the Zambian government is headed in the right direction of creating 
an enabling environment for the private sector (Global Advice Network 2010a).  
 
South Africa: The leading members of ANC and the civil service are considered as highly 
educated and competent in South Africa. However the efficiency and effectiveness of lower 
ranking civil service constitutes a problem because policies are not habitually implemented 
quickly or efficiently, especially at the local/regional level. The government has attempted to 
improve the bureaucracy faced by foreign investors, but with limited success. Foreign 
investors have therefore been encouraged to build in some delays into their business plan 
when investing in South Africa (EIU 2010a). Moreover, there have been some growing 
concerns that the ANC will make some shifts in their economic policy because of the party’s 
obvious swing to the left and the increased influence of COSATU and SACP. However, 
Zuma has assured that there will not be any major shifts and that ANC will continue to 
support a market-based system balanced by a development-focused state (EIU 2010a).  
Compared to the rest of Africa, foreign companies encounter a less complicated 
bureaucracy in South Africa. Nonetheless, public services are still characterized by high 
levels of excessive regulations and rigid conformities, much to the disadvantage of companies 
(Global Advice Network 2010b). In addition, corruption is a considerable risk to foreign 
investors, although less than in many emerging markets, due to the country’s well-functioning 
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government institutions. Nevertheless, business surveys indicate that corruption still is a 
significant obstacle to business operations (EIU 2010a, Global Advice Network 2010b). 
Despite the launch of anti-corruption initiatives, there is a lack of political will to confront the 
problem. More constrains on the media and a weak administration indicates a risk for 
investors, as suspicious deals could increase (Ibtimes 2010).  
The political dominance of ANC has also weakened institutional checks and balances, 
and the party’s political power has been used to strategically influence investigations in 
corruption scandals (Global Advice Network 2010b). It is particularly endemic in the granting 
of government contracts as exemplified by the high-profile procurement scandals that have 
been revealed the last decade. Moreover, Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) that aims to 
increase the participation of the black population in the economy, has been criticized for 
providing too much preferential treatment to the wealthy black elites. According to critics, 
this has led to increased procurement corruption (Global Advice Network 2010b).  
 
Mozambique: The complicated and non-transparent administrative procedures in the 
Mozambican bureaucracy are considered as major obstacles to doing business in the country 
(Global Advice Network 2010c). The current president has removed many competent civil 
servants and re-politicized the civil service, undermining the progress that was made by the 
previous government. The president’s centralization tendencies have contributed to paralyze 
decision-making processes, as new civil servants refrain from making major decisions in fear 
of reprisals. In addition, some civil servants block new investments as a means of protesting 
against their loss of privileges under the new government. With new investments taking 
longer time to approve, and the tendencies of centralization, the investment climate has 
become more unfavorable. There is also a growing tendency for new investments to be 
approved if involving Frelimo related enterprises. The president’s grip of power has ensured 
policy stability, but it remains to be seen whether he can further consolidate the party’s power 
without protests from the opposition (EIU 2010b). 
Although the investment climate has improved over the last years, corruption remains 
the main business impediment for foreign investors, and especially related to public 
procurement and land applications, as they provide opportunities for public officials to 
demand bribes. Corrupt practices happen at all levels of the society, from the state 
administration to the public and private sectors. (Global Advice Network 2010c). The current 
president has pledged to fight the endemic corruption in the country and has introduced 
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several anti-corruption initiatives. Control of corruption has unfortunately only slightly 
improved the recent years. Several political observers have blamed the strong ties between the 
political and economic elites as the main factor behind the high level of corruption. The ruling 
party has created a variety of uncompetitive practices by practically institutionalizing 
donations to Frelimo in some business circles in return for excessive advantages (Global 
Advice Network 2010c).  
In addition, the judiciary is not considered as independent from political influences 
and is undermined by endemic corruption, scarce resources, poor training and unqualified 
judges (Global Advice Networks 2010c, Freedomhouse 2010c). The corruption, excessive 
bureaucracy, and weak judicial institutions point to the broader challenge of Mozambique, 
and that is to secure transparency and accountability. These factors hinder private enterprises 
in operating in the country, and especially at the local level (Freedomhouse 2010c).  
4.5.3 Internal Conflict (Macro Risk) 
Zambia: Zambia has no history of ethnic war and almost no history of unrest and it has been 
said that the multitude of ethnic groups is a stabilizing factor. The only ethnic tension that has 
been pressing is the 20-year grievance between the Lozi and the government, as the MMD is 
considered as pro-Bembe11 and has therefore ignored the Lozi group’s claims to the 
independence of their homeland, and to the restoration of cultural rights. The elections in 
Zambia are therefore heavily determined by ethnic and tribal loyalties as much as politics and 
policies, where the biggest ethnic groups Bemba, Lozi and Tonga compete for ethnic 
domination (Global Insight 2011a:50).   
Political violence remains an occasional problem, especially in relation to elections. 
Political tensions between the government and opposition parties are always lurking under the 
surface. Despite its presence, it has never actually escalated into major violence the past years, 
with the notable exception of the industrial unrest in the country’s largest mining company 
which descended into a full-scale riot, leading to looting and damaging of property (Global 
Insight 2011a:50). However, concerns about whether Zambia will be able to maintain peace 
during the elections in October 2011 have been raised. Yet, the extent of such unrest is not 
expected to have an impact on foreign investors in the country. Furthermore, the risk of armed 
conflict remains low, as Zambian politics is pluralistic enough for all to engage 
democratically (EIU 2010c).  
                                                
11 The MMD government has come to be staffed by Bembe, an ethnic group who comprise 18% of the total 
population (Global Insight 2011a:50).  
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South Africa: Racial, ethnic and language differences are profound in South Africa and 
therefore a source of ethnic-driven tensions. All of the election results indicate that ethnic 
groupings tend to support parties in which their ethnic group represents the majority. Thus the 
governing ANC gets a majority support from the black population whereas, the official 
opposition DA attracts the white votes. In the formal political sphere, most of the parties tend 
to emphasize non-racialism and do not explicitly play on race or ethnicity in elections (Venter 
2005:39-40). Within the black population, there have also been tensions between the 
modernizers and the traditionalists. This his led to violent clashes, especially in KwaZulu-
Natal, including the assassination of political leaders. The ANC has therefore tried to combine 
both elements in its politics. Subsequently, tensions within the organization have occurred and 
are expected on issues such as gender rights, sexual orientation, urbanization, and economic 
development (Venter 2005:40). EIU (2010a) reports that a potential flashpoint for unrest 
could be the “hostile” political climate between the ANC and DA in the Western Cape. A 
worst-case scenario would see inter-ethnic and inter-race conflict between South Africans. 
However, the country has strong institutions, established democratic traditions and a solid and 
respected constitution that will limit the risk of conflict (EIU 2010a).    
The ethnic dimension in South Africa has affected the policies of the state. BEE has a 
number of implications for investors, such as quotas for affirmative action of black South 
Africans in the private sector, to the allocation of state tenders, and contracts to black 
enterprises. From a political risk point of view, government interference in the staffing of 
private businesses is regarded as a political risk because it interferes with the freedom of 
management to appoint the most suitable candidates. From a business perspective, reaching 
government-set targets diverts the attention of management, which is to reach favorable 
returns for shareholder’s capital (Venter 2005:40-41). However, companies without a BEE 
strategy suffer from legal and public relations difficulties (EIU 2010a).  
Overall, the risk of internal ethnic conflict in South Africa is low, as incidents of 
politically motivated violence have fallen dramatically. There are, however, groups as the 
neo-Nazi and anti-black Afrikaner Resistance Movement with the potential to cause terror and 
destabilize the country. Despite the latter’s attempt of a comeback in 2009, the group has been 
inactive the recent years (Venter 2005:40 Global Insight 2011b:61).   
 
Mozambique: Frelimo’s relations with Renamo have been tense, but in general, peace has 
been restored since the end of the civil war. There have been occasions where former Renamo 
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fighters have threatened to take up arms again, and especially after the defeat of Renamo in 
the 2009 elections. There are about 150 former fighters who always have refused to be 
integrated into the police or military. Armed ex-guerillas have been known to be involved in 
several incidents of unrest and abduction in some parts of the country (Global Insight 
2011c:43). There have also been incidents of violent street demonstrations by Renamo 
supporters. In 2000, demonstrations were shut down with considerable police brutality, 
leading to 120 deaths, and in 2005, 12 Renamo supporters were killed in relation to a disputed 
local election. With frustration growing in Renamo over lack of policy influence, the risk for 
more violent protests might increase (EIU 2010b). 
It is difficult to predict where and why conflict might break out in Mozambique. 
According to Astill-Brown and Weimer (2010:6), the potential for political mobilization that 
might result in violence, increases in line with the urban-rural divisions in the country. At this 
point however, there are no signs that internal conflicts will threaten the status quo.  
4.5.4 External Conflict/Negative Influences of Regional or Other Political 
Forces (Macro Risk)  
Zambia: At present, Zambia does not face direct external threats, maintains good relations 
with its neighbors, and has a good international standing (EIU 2010c). Nevertheless, as a 
landlocked country surrounded by eight other countries, it is vulnerable to their state of affairs 
(Global Insight 2011a:12). Zambia’s relationship with Angola used to be tense as a result of 
the now-ended civil war between the government and the rebel group National Union for 
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The Angolan government often accused Zambia of 
supporting UNITA by allowing its territory to be used as a supply route and to launch attacks. 
The government was also critical of the Zambian government’s supposed neutrality in the 
civil war since they refused to side with the government. As the Angolan civil war has ended, 
their relationship has been normalized (Global Insight 2011a:12).   
The borders imposed by the colonizers in Africa, divided many groups between one or 
more countries, and so is the case for the Zambian borders. This cross-border affiliation has 
implications for the region as conflicts in neighboring countries could create spillover effects 
in other countries. The history has shown that this has happened in Zambia. Toward the end 
of 2000, the security situation on Zambia’s border with the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) was apprehensive, with both fighters and civilian refugees fleeing from the civil war in 
DRC (Global Insight 2011a:50, 12). Additionally, the two countries were at loggerheads over 
Zambia’s attempt to arrest the governor of DRC’s southeastern province, on charges of 
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corruption and theft of public funds related to his business interests in the country. Today the 
two countries have a good relationship, and both sides have declared to step up cooperation in 
different economic sectors. However, the continuation of the low-scale conflict in eastern 
DRC, indicates that Zambia’s border region remains vulnerable to attacks by Congolese 
militia (Global Insight 2011a:13, 49).  
 
South Africa: South Africa has undergone considerable changes during the last 10-15 years, 
transforming itself from an international outcast during apartheid, into a democratic regional 
power, with well-developed economic and political ties to the rest of the region and beyond 
(Global Advice Network 2010b). At present it has a secure external environment with no 
immediate threats or competitors for regional hegemony. However, the threat with potential to 
constitute a political risk is the unknown but large number of illegal immigrants from the 
southern African region that threatens to drain the resources of the country (Venter 2005:31). 
A type of xenophobia has therefore developed among the poor and unemployed in South 
Africa. Should the economic and political circumstances in Zimbabwe worsen, South Africa 
could be facing millions of refugees, with the potential to overburden the already weak social 
welfare capacity of the country (Venter 2005:31).  
In 2008, a wave of attacks led to the killings of 62 suspected foreigners and the 
temporarily displacement of 80.000 immigrants. Sporadic attacks on immigrants also 
occurred in 2009 under the service-delivery protests. 2500 Zimbabweans were forced to flee 
from their townships after being attacked by residents (Freedomhouse 2010b).  
 
Mozambique: Mozambique’s external relations are characterized by its liberation, with 
Frelimo being an anti-colonial and armed liberation movement. Hence, the government has 
historical links to other countries with the same experiences. It provided support for the 
liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, the main reason for Mozambique being reluctant towards 
criticizing Mugabe’s regime. Under the apartheid rule, the country was one of the targeted 
states for deliberate destabilization, as it provided support to the ANC. Today, the bilateral 
relationship between these countries is described as good as it is one of the major destination 
for South African investments (Global Insight 2011c:11).  
Mozambique is currently enjoying a good relationship with its former colony Portugal, 
and Brazil is showing an increased interest to intensify aid and investment in the country. In 
general it has good relations with its neighbors and the international community, although the 
57 
 
worsening of the political and economic situation in neighboring Zimbabwe has given rise to 
incidents such as theft and assaults against Mozambicans (Global Insight 2011c:11, 43). 
There is also a risk that the political and economic situation could escalate into civil conflict, 
as there have been media reports of the establishment of radical opposition groups against 
Mugabe’s regime, with the aim of engaging in terrorist attacks on the government. The splits 
within the army could also lead to political violence. If this were to happen, the risk of 
Zimbabweans fleeing to Mozambique is high, exacerbated by the fact that the government 
would be unable to handle the influx of refugees, whose presence could cause local 
resentment (EIU 2010b).  
4.5.5 Security Risk (Macro Risk) 
Zambia: Zambia enjoys a fairly secure environment, with the main security threat being 
crime, often cited as a major constraint on business. The crime rate is not as severe as other 
countries in the region, but the increase in severe violence and the growing use of firearms in 
robberies is becoming a trend. The crime has been fuelled by the high unemployment rate, the 
lack of a national social security system and more availability of weapons in the country 
(Global Insight 2011a:49). 
The risk of terrorism is low. There have been terrorist incidents in the country, but 
nothing over the past years. The last terrorist bombing was in 1999 where six bombs exploded 
in the capital, two of them at the headquarter of the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation 
(ZESCO) (Global Insight 2011a:51). The most recent terrorist connection involved a English 
national of Indian origin, who was arrested in connection with the 2005 bombings in London, 
suspected to be one of the masterminds of the bombings that killed over 50 people. Overall, 
aside from crime, there are few other security risks in the country (Global Insight 2011a:51, 
EIU 2010c).  
 
South Africa: The safety and security in South Africa is one of the biggest concerns for 
foreign investors, as the crime rate is exceptionally high and creates risks in terms of personal 
safety as well as the security of private property and physical assets (Venter 2005:42, 49). 
According to Freedomhouse (2010b), the country has one of the highest violent-crime rates12 
in the world, and remains by far the biggest security threat in South Africa, both for 
expatriates and local residents (Global Insight 2011b:59, EIU 2010a). Organized crime has 
become endemic in South Africa, interrelating violence, property crimes and drugs. The fact 
                                                
12 On murder, rape, robbery and assault 
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that South Africa has well-developed transport, communications and banking systems in 
addition to porous borders, understaffed border posts and a problem with corruption, makes 
the country attractive for drug cartels as it facilitate organized crime (Global Insight 
2011b:60). Furthermore, extortion is a growing problem, with both individuals and businesses 
becoming targeted, while kidnapping is not considered as a prevalent security concern. When 
it rarely occurs, it involves the abduction for ransom for a child where the child is returned 
(Global Insight 2011b:61). Since the end of apartheid rule in 1994, there have been very few 
terrorism incidents in the country. The only reported incident involves the Cape Town-based 
pro-Islamic group, Pagad and various white supremacy groups. Despite a lack of recent 
activity, the CIA claimed in 2004 that South Africa is one of a number of countries that has 
become a haven for lower-level al-Qaeda operatives. Pakistani intelligence have claimed that 
the group have planned various attacks in South Africa, including tourist spots, government 
buildings and other strategic targets (Global Insight 2011b:62). However, at present none of 
this has materialized.        
 
Mozambique: Considerable strides have been made to ensure safety and security in 
Mozambique, but the legacy of the civil war is clear from the socio-economic challenges the 
country faces. Violent crime is a security concern and has increased significantly over the last 
years. The police have so far not been able to reduce the violence. Occurrences of petty theft, 
car jacking, armed robberies, and scams, are extremely prevalent incidents, enabled by the 
access to weapons and growth in drug smuggling (Global Insight 2011c:43). Organized crime 
networks encompass drugs, arms trafficking and financial fraud, and affects formal business 
and governmental sectors, in both of which assassinations are not unknown. However, anti-
crime measures have been taken to the increased feeling of public insecurity. In addition, land 
mines continue to be a problem with 1.5 million landmines nationwide, killing over 1000 
civilians since 1992, and with the highest number of amputees in the world alongside Angola. 
At present there are no known active terrorist groups in the country indicating that terrorism is 
a non-significant risk for foreign investors (Global Insight 2011c:43).  
4.5.6 Socio-Economic Conditions (Macro Risk) 
Zambia: Zambia has experienced economic growth the recent years, yet it is only a minority 
of the population benefitting from this growth, as over two-thirds of the population live under 
the poverty line of US$ 1, indicating severe economic inequalities. 50% of the population is 
unemployed, and 35% of the population lives in urban areas (CIA 2010). The poverty in the 
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country is linked to the failure of the government of creating sufficient productive and 
sustainable jobs. With regards to health and education, there are great urban-rural divides 
within the country, and even though provisions have been made to ensure essential services to 
all of the population, major challenges remains to secure basic social deliveries 
(Mwenechanya 2007:5-6, Augland 2009:255).  
Due to rise in the petroleum prices, Zambia’s inflation rate has increased and has led 
to high fuel prices in addition to high food prices (Augland 2010:234). The price of food has 
on several occasions led to urban riots in Zambia, and will consequently continue to be a 
concern for the government in addition to the rise in fuel prices (Lunn et.al 2008:5). This year 
the issue of food prices have reemerged, pushing headline inflation to 9%. Moreover, the 
electricity cost has also increased (35%). A further increase in prices is likely to spark protests 
with the potential of getting violent (Global Insight 2011a:20).  
 
South Africa: South Africa is characterized by severe structural challenge such as poverty, 
unemployment, low level of human skills and high crime rates, all factors that creates a non-
conducive business environment (Royal Norwegian Embassy South Africa:1 2010). The ANC 
government remains committed to the delivery of essential socio-economic services to the 
poor. However, as a result of the global financial crisis and the current economic slowdown, 
its ability to deliver has been undermined. The ANC came to power based on the promise to 
improve on the provision for vital social services, and consequently the public is expecting 
deliverance. There are growing signs of public dissatisfaction over the service delivery in the 
country, exemplified by the public delivery protests in 2009 (Global Insight 2011b:6).  
A recent trend of protests over the swiftness and extent of public-service delivery 
including housing, electricity and water, have escalated notably in both extent and violence, 
indicating that this will continue unless the government is able to meet the demands of South 
Africans (Freedomhouse 2010b). The high unemployment, income inequality, and poor 
service delivery are expected to generate more protests on a regular basis and they might turn 
violent. Most unrest will be at a low level, but with the potential to escalate as seen by the 
protests in 2008-2009. Another potential flare-up is labor unrest and strikes (EIU 2010a). 
Strike actions from trade unions occurs, and is a symptom of a wider distrust between the 
ruling ANC and its alliance partners. These tensions within the ANC’s own ranks poses a 
significant risk for investors with regards to labor and social accord and harmony in the 
country (Venter 2005:42).          
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 Failure to tackle the underlying causes for the protests risks a repeat, or worse, an 
emergence of inter-ethnic and inter-racial violence between South Africans. There is therefore 
a risk that the Zuma government will be hauled to the left, implementing radical policies non-
conducive for investments, as the underprivileged cannot wait for the future benefits of 
economic growth to trickle down (EIU 2010a).  
 
Mozambique: Even though the economy in Mozambique is growing, the democratic 
institutions in Mozambique are not providing socio-economic benefits (Pereira 2009:1). The 
country has experienced one of the most dramatic declines in poverty the recent decades but 
remains among the poorest countries in the world, as inequality is increasing (African 
Development Bank 2008:472). The social tensions that fed into the civil war: socio-economic 
inequality, an urban-rural divide, developmental disparity between the north and the south, 
and a tension between the traditionalists and modernists, are therefore still present (Global 
Insight 2011c:43). The lack of jobs and appalling housing conditions will remain the 
government’s biggest challenge (Karlsen 2010:203). There are no reliable figures on 
unemployment, but estimates range from 50-80% and the annual inflation rate ranges from 
between 20% to 35%. 75% of the labor force operates in the informal sector, and only 8% 
have jobs in the formal labor market (African Development Bank 2008:473). 
In 2008, riots broke out in Maputo as a result of a 50% increase in public transport 
fees, leaving four people dead and more than hundreds injured. In 2010, demonstrations 
against price rises became violent, with security forces opening fire on the demonstrators, 
indicating that public demonstrations can turn violent. The protests led to a reinstatement of 
subsidies and the likelihood of violent protests have increased, as Mozambicans now are 
aware of the fact that demonstrations is an effective means of pressuring politicians 
(Freedomhouse 2010c, EIU 2010b). Frelimo’s centralization tendencies have had a negative 
effect on poverty reduction, as there are fewer voices to challenge governmental policies and 
secure accountability (Astill-Brown & Weimer 2010:8). As the government now is fully 
committed to the market economy principles, labor unrest is becoming increasingly common. 
(Global Insight 2011c:40). 
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4.5.7 Human Rights (Micro Risk) 
Zambia: Zambia is given a political rights score of 313 and civil liberties score of 414 by 
Freedomhouse (2010a), in total the country is given the status as partly free. The freedom of 
speech is guaranteed by the constitution, but the government often restricts the right in 
practice as the government controls the two biggest newspapers and appoints the management 
board of the state-owned broadcast corporation. The conditions for the independent press 
deteriorated considerably in 2009, when the government aggressively harassed and interfered 
with the press opposed to them (Freedomhouse 2010a). Moreover, the government has 
imposed legal restrictions on the activities of NGOs, indicating a decline in the general 
freedom in Zambia. Subsequently, Zambia’s civil liberties rating changed from 3 to 4 in 2010 
(Freedomhouse 2010a), and do therefore constitute a risk for foreign investors that will be 
further elaborated in chapter 5.  
The right to strike is not protected by the Constitution neither are the right to fair labor 
practices and standards, and the right to collective bargaining. Collective bargaining is 
provided for in specific labor statutes (Kalula, Ordor & Fenwick 2008:32). Furthermore, the 
trade unions in Zambia are considered to be among Africa’s strongest, and union right are 
constitutionally guaranteed. The biggest and most influential union, the Zambia Congress of 
Trade Unions operates democratically without any political interference. Nonetheless, the 
unions have become weaker both financially and organizationally over the years, and labor 
militancy is increasing (Freedomhouse 2010a, Global Insight 2011a:47).  
 
South Africa: Freedomhouse (2010b) has given South Africa the status as a free country. On 
both the political rights and civil liberties score, South Africa is given the rate 2. Freedoms of 
expression, press, religion, association and peaceful assembly are protected in the constitution 
and generally respected in practice. In addition, South Africans are free to form, join and 
participate in independent trade unions (Freedomhouse 2010b). The country’s constitution 
that was adopted in 1996, is one of the most progressive and liberal in the world, as it 
enshrines a broad range of social and economic rights in addition to the more liberal-oriented 
civil and political freedoms. Discrimination is banned on the grounds of race, gender, age, and 
belief, as well as pregnancy, marital status, sexual orientation and culture (Geddes 2010). 
                                                
13 In the Freedomhouse index countries are ranked on a scale of 1-7, with 1 representing the highest level of 
freedom and 7 representing the lowest level of freedom with regards to political rights (Freedomhouse 2010a). 
14 In the Freedomhouse index countries are ranked on a scale of 1-7, with 1 representing the highest level of 




Moreover, South Africa has an advanced labor standards legislation compared to many 
developing countries covering aspects such as labor relations, basic conditions of 
employment, skills development, compensation of occupational diseases, and occupational 
safety and health.  
 
Mozambique: Mozambique is characterized as partly free according to Freedomhouse 
(2010c). The country’s political rights score is 4 whereas its civil liberty score is 3. In 2010, 
Mozambique’s political rights rating changed from 3 to 4 due to noteworthy irregularities and 
a lack of transparency related to the registration of candidates and votes in the presidential, 
legislative and provincial elections in 2009 (Freedomhouse 2010c). Since the country has a 
generally poor level of education, Mozambicans are unaware of their basic human rights, 
leading to an extensive abuse of poverty, labor and civil rights (EIU 2010b).  
In 2007, Mozambique passed new labor laws introducing progressive reforms that 
have yet to be effectuated. It provides for individual employment relationships, collective 
employment relations, dispute resolution procedures, occupational health and safety 
standards, employment and vocational training, social security, and labor administration. It 
also covers workers with disabilities, student workers, migrant workers and foreign workers 
(Kalula et.al 2008:23). Child labor is not an uncommon factor in Mozambique and the 
government has yet to ratify the International Labor Organization (ILO) on the issue, but 
there are local laws that govern this (Global Insight 2011c:30).  
4.5.8 Human Capital (Micro Risk) 
Zambia: Zambia has a young and urbanized population, where about 46% of the population 
is considered to be active and productive. The country has a profusion of unskilled labor and 
adequate semi-skilled labor. There is a lack of skilled and professional labor, despite of the 
fact that the literacy rate in the country is more than 70% (Global Insight 2011a:46), creating 
a risks for foreign companies in need of a skilled workforce.  
The last two decades, the university and technical education system has declined, 
consequently it does no longer produce local graduates of sufficient quality too meet the 
domestic demands in the country.  Furthermore, obtaining work permits for expatriates can be 
challenging, as delays are common. In addition, Zambia has a high HIV/AIDS rate of over 
15%, but this has decreased, as the rate was 20% a decade ago, in addition to other diseases 




South Africa: The lack of trained human capital poses a considerable risk for foreign 
investors in South Africa. The country has a general shortage of skills. This is compounded 
by the departure of skilled workers to developed countries (Venter 2005:47). The two biggest 
threats with regards to human capital for foreign investors in South Africa are the extremely 
high rate of HIV/AIDS infection15 and the weak educational system. Employing expatriate 
labor could to some extent reduce shortage of skilled work. However, the obtainment of work 
permits is also a significant problem, as it is a complex and time-consuming procedure (EIU 
2010a). The significant disparity between the highly skilled labor required by investors, and 
those available on the labor market poses a noteworthy risk for foreign investors.  
A Harvard University survey of companies in South Africa has concluded that 
companies might need to set aside 7.5% of their annual payroll to fund losses by HIV/AIDS 
(Meridian Group International 2006:4).  The education system has not been able to overcome 
the legacy of poor education from the apartheid rule, despite of being a government priority 
(Venter 2005:47). South Africa has perhaps the most diversified workforce in Africa, with a 
large resource-base of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled labor. It also has a high literacy rate 
(85%) compared to other African countries, in addition to internationally renowned 
universities. However, the South African labor market is characterized by an oversupply of 
unskilled workers, with most of them finding jobs in the informal sector (Global Insight 
2011b:55, 31).  
 
Mozambique: In Mozambique 75% of the labor force works in the informal sector while 
17% are unemployed. Only 8% have jobs in the formal labor market (African Development 
Bank 2008:473). The deadliest disease in Mozambique is malaria and represents a threat to 
the potential workforce for investors. The incidence rate of HIV/AIDS was estimated at a 
high 16.2% of the adult population in 2004, expected to be at the same rate. However, there 
are some regional variations with a decline in the central provinces and an increase in 
southern Mozambique. Even though the government has introduced anti-retroviral therapy 
and 50.000 HIV-positive Mozambicans have access to the medicines, 300.000 are in need of 
treatment (African Development Bank 2008:473).  
Another potential risk for investors is to find skilled labor, as the labor force is small. 
The country has higher illiteracy rates than its regional neighbors. A low skill set indicates 
                                                
15 Freedomhouse (2010c) reports that 5,5 million South Africans constituting 11 percent of the population are 
infected with HIV/AIDS. 
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that productivity can be low, pushing up the unit labor costs. Furthermore, the country’s mega 
projects have recruited a significant portion of the skilled workforce, further complicating the 
process of attracting adequate human capital. Expatriates could to some extent fill this, 
however the obtainment of work permits is a long process (Global Insight 2011c:39, EIU 
2010b). The conditions that govern the labor regulations add to the political risk of human 
capital with regards to the rigid procedures of hiring and firing, and the restriction on foreign 
workers. Compared to other countries in the sub-Saharan region this raises the cost for 
business well above those in the region (EIU 2010b).   
4.5.9 Energy Dependence (Micro Risk) 
Zambia: At present, Zambia is struggling to bridge the gap between demand and supply of 
energy. The electricity demand is expected to increase from 1.600MW to 3.500MW within 
the next five years owing to the massive demand for more electricity from mining (Global 
Insight 2011a:48).  
Zambia has a range of energy sources, such as hydropower, coal and forest biomass, 
and is self-sufficient with the exception of petroleum (REEEP 2010:1). The hydropower 
potential in Zambia is significant, if fully tapped, it could meet the energy demand of the 
entire country in addition to provide regional exports. Nonetheless, the country continues to 
face a number of challenges in realizing this goal. The losses on transmission and distribution 
have remained high, at an estimated 20%. As a consequence, power supply tends to fall short 
of peak power demand, even if all the power stations are operating at full capacity (EIU 
2010c). Zambia’s total energy demand presently surpasses internal generation as a result of 
the flourishing mining sector. The electricity prices are low, and the main electricity producer 
is the government-owned ZESCO. There are two other competing operators that are privately 
financed and operated. The electricity production has increased marginally over the recent 
years because of the ongoing rehabilitation of power stations (African Development Bank 
2008:625, REEEP 2010:3).  
Zambia has experienced supply shortages leading to power shortages that have 
affected production in mining and manufacturing, and an increase in the energy production is 
therefore crucial (African Development Bank 2008:625). Almost all of the energy comes 
from the abundant hydropower resources it is endowed with. However, the electricity 
generation capacity has not increased significantly over the last three decades, and an 




South Africa: At present, South Africa’s total installed electricity capacity is 36.2 GW. The 
state supplier Eskom produces 96% of the electricity generated. It also owns and operates the 
national transmission grids. In 2002 it converted into a public company, although it is de facto 
a parastatal. Increased demand, besides lack of investment in generation, and an outdated 
distribution infrastructure led to an electricity crisis in 2007, as Eskom suffered from 
problems of aged plants leading to shortages and power disruptions to residents and 
businesses in the major cities (REEP 2009a:2, UCLA African Studies Center 2010b). 
Independent power producers are therefore expected to provide around 1000 MW of the new 
electricity. However, this will not cover the demand of energy in South Africa. The 
government is therefore currently covering the deficit by increasing the import of power and 
by restraining the demand for it (REEEP 2009a:1, African Development Bank 2008:563). The 
power supply crisis has further hastened the need to diversify Eskom’s energy mix and move 
it towards alternative energy sources such as nuclear power and natural gas, as well as various 
forms of renewable energy such as hydropower (REEEP 2009a:1). South Africa uses coal, its 
main energy resource, to generate most of its electricity, and a noteworthy proportion of its 
liquid fuels. The country has also proved oil reserves for an estimated 15 billion barrels in 
addition to natural gas reserves (REEEP 2009a:1). It further has a high level of renewable 
energy potential and currently has in place targets of 10,000 GWh of renewable energy by 
2013, where 4700MW is expected to come from hydropower (REEEP 2009a:2).  
Electricity continues to be a bottleneck in South Africa. The government is therefore 
currently working on increasing investments in the power sector and has made it a key 
priority (EIU 2010a). One-third of the South African population relies on wood fuel to meet 
their primary energy requirement, and the country continues to experience critical energy 
crises so the demand for energy will remain high (Global Insight 2011b:57, EIU 2010a).  
 
Mozambique: Electricidade de Mozambique (EDM) is in charge of the electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution, and Hidroelectrica de Cahora Bassa (HCB), a company jointly 
owned by Portugal and Mozambique is the largest generator and the main hydroelectric 
scheme in Southern Africa (REEEP 2009b:3). The total installed electricity capacity of 
Mozambique is 2.38GW, and hydropower is the dominant source of energy, currently 
accounting for 99.7% of the total capacity in the country. The government has identified 
around 100 locations with hydropower potential (REEEP 2009b:1,2).  
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The energy demand is growing considerably, with an average annual rate around 7-
8%. However, the energy sector in Mozambique is currently facing some critical challenges. 
The electricity supply has not been consistent, and has suffered from blackouts in the energy 
supply, which has been one of the reasons for the failure of some industries as they are highly 
constrained by the electricity costs. Additionally, the energy service has been unreliable and 
available 60-70% of the time, and many businesses and individuals have purchased small fuel 
generators to meet their demands. This has led to an addition in the investments costs for 
business and a more polluted environment (REEEP 2009b:1-2).     
South Africa is Mozambique’s most important trade partner and especially within the 
energy sector. Most of the electricity that Mozambique generates stems from natural gas from 
the Inhambane province, and the hydropower plant in Cahora Bassa and exports energy to 
South Africa who has a crucial lack of access within its own borders (Karlsen 2009:214). 
South Africa will benefit from 90% of the electricity generated here, with some of it being 
resold to Mozambique at an increased rate. This has led to frustration as only 4.7% of the 
Mozambican population has access to electricity (Global Insight 2011c:39). The 
government’s Green Revolution Strategy started in 2007 in response to the high food and fuel 
prices and was designed to encourage investment in the renewable energy sector. 
Mozambique is therefore now leading the continent in its clean energy revolution. However, 
the tension between energy security and food security has fuelled a forceful debate on how to 
make us of the land in the country (Global Insight 2011c:6, 10).  
4.5.10 Environmental Vulnerability (Micro Risk) 
Zambia: Zambia has considerable environmental challenges. The key environmental 
challenges are deforestation, wildlife depletion, and loss of biodiversity and ecosystem 
services, land degradation, air pollution, poor water management, water pollution and 
sanitation, and natural disaster risk and climate change (Global Insight 2011a:48 Slunge & 
Wingqvist 2010:11, 5). The severe effects of climate change are already being felt in the 
country in forms of agriculture, food security, housing and health. This has severe 
consequences on the economic, social and environment state of the country (Mudenda 
2010:3). As mentioned, Zambia does not have s significant history of social unrest and 
violence. However, the worsening of the Zambians conditions in relation to environmental 





South Africa:  
“South Africa will become hotter and drier over the interior, agricultural productivity 
and production patterns will change, and we will see species loss in many areas, including 
large protected areas such as the Kruger National Park. The impacts to health are 
frightening. Not only will we face a future with less available water (with consequences for 
hygiene and health) but many disease-causing organisms, such as malaria – carrying 
mosquitoes and water-borne pathogens, are likely to expand their territories and further 
impact on human well-being” (Taylor, quoted in Oxfam International 2009:2).  
Climate change is expected to impact the natural systems in an already systematically 
degraded country. The quotation below does to a great extent sum op the challenges that 
South Africa will face as a result of these climatic changes. The climate change effects in 
South Africa, stems to a great extent from external emissions. However, the country itself 
contributes to this primarily from the coal sector, accounting for over 70% of the county’s 
primary energy, as the government energy policies has provided “a license to pollute through 
emissions” (Oxfam International 2009:2, 14). 
The climate changes are expected to worsen existing vulnerabilities in South Africa 
and add to the pressures on environment and natural resources that many South Africans rely 
on, with strains on the communities in terms of health, water, food and livelihood, with the 
already poor communities expected to be hit hardest (Oxfam International 2009: 28, 2). Water 
management is especially critical, as the lack of water in South Africa is expected to be a time 
bomb to explode due to the shortage as well as its poor management (Oxfam International 
2009:21). In common with many other countries in the region, South Africa suffers from 
natural hazards such as periodic and prolonged droughts (Global Insight 2011b:58).  
 
Mozambique: Mozambique is vulnerable to natural disasters and has been hit by flooding 
and cyclones. These natural disasters have profound effects on food security (African 
Development Bank 2008:472). The country suffered severe setbacks in 2000-2001 when 
floods affected about 25% of the population. In 2002, a severe drought hit the central and 
southern parts of the country including areas previously stricken by the flood (BBC 2010b). 
In addition, the effects of flood damage are exacerbated by the abundance of landmines left 
after the county’s civil war and which can be moved significant distances by the floodwater. 
Some parts of the country are also prone to earthquakes (Global Insight 2011c:42).  
The urgent need for rural electrification has incited much frustration over the 
construction of mega-projects for electricity generation for Mozambique’s neighbours. The 
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hydroelectric dam Cahora Bassa has prompted strong reactions from local campaign groups 
because its power is transported to South Africa, rather than to the local inhabitants (Global 
Insight 2011:39). According to a local environmental group the construction of a new dam 
will affect the fluctuations in the Zambezi River, which further will affect the fish stocks and 
agriculture. Moreover, it will be constructed in an area prone to earthquakes, so the 
campaigners are calling for the local population to be sensitized to the risk of dam 
construction in this area (Global Insight 2011c:39). 
4.5.11 Regulatory Framework (Micro Risk) 
Zambia: Zambia Development Agency (ZDA) covers the export and investment promotion, 
and privatization in Zambia. Its task is to promote joint venture partnerships and grant special 
incentives in order to increase investments into the country (African Development Bank 
2008:625). ZDA was created to rationalize the regulatory environment and to simplify 
business registration, licensing, and inspection procedures for the private sector. However, the 
excessive regulations related to obtaining permits and licenses continue to constitute a 
significant political risk for companies operating in Zambia, as regulations can be ambiguous 
and inconsistent, leading to high operational costs for private companies (Global Advice 
Network 2010a). However, after the recent reformation of the Zambian legal system, it 
represents very few barriers to foreign investments except from it being lengthy and time-
consuming as a consequence of underfunded staff, lack of resources and processes disposed to 
corruption (Global Insight 2011a:32-33). Foreign companies are targets from the 
government’s campaign to reduce tax avoidance. This makes them at greater risk of attention 
from the tax authorities (EIU 2010c).  
Zambia has a favorable tax environment. The government has lowered the taxes to 
attract FDI and to be more competitive. However, the political risk is that the government has 
to balance the need to raise extra revenue to fund its government spending, with policies that 
are pro-business to attract FDI. This has led to the discussion of whether it is fair that the 
average Zambian taxpayer has to bear the burden of the government being too generous 
towards foreign companies (Global Insight 2011a:38). Presently, this does not constitute a 
political risk, but it remains to be seen whether the government will absorb the criticism into 
changes in the tax policies. This has already happened in the mining sector where the 
corporate tax has been raised with 5% Since the large informal sector remains untaxed, it is 
expected that foreign companies will continue to occupy a large and increasing proportion of 
the taxation (Global Insight 2011a:39). The government is presently facing strong pressure to 
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meet its development commitments. However, the likelihood of a considerable tax increase is 
low, as the government is committed to make Zambia an attractive country for investments 
(EIU 2010c).  
 
South Africa: The South African economy is developed and complex with an advanced 
financial system and legislature. These characteristics make the country attractive for 
investors (Royal Norwegian Embassy South Africa:1 2010). Since 1994, the government has 
taken measures to increase investments. There are therefore no restrictions to the extent or 
type of foreign investment. The former president Mbeki followed this marked-friendly policy. 
However, as Zuma represents ANC’s left wing and his support base are the trade union and 
the ANC youth league, investors have raised concerns on how this will affect the business 
climate (African Development Bank 2008:567).  
In comparison to the regional average, investment companies meet less complicated 
and costly regulatory requirements related to starting and closing a company, securing 
property rights, and interaction with tax officials. Dispute settlement and enforcement of 
commercial contracts is relatively easy and not as costly as in most of the countries in the 
region (Global Advice Network 2010b). There is also an ongoing effort to continue to reform 
the legal environment to make it more business-friendly. New legislations have been 
introduced with regards to land, labor, competition, and company governance in recent years, 
to meet international best standards (Global Insight 2011b:37).  
Moreover, there are no restrictions on foreigners acquiring land in the country. 
However, land ownership is a controversial issue in the post-apartheid South Africa as the 
status of ownership is often disputed. Foreign investors should therefore thoroughly 
investigate the title deeds before acquiring land. The legal system does not discriminate 
between local and foreign companies and foreign companies have the same access to 
subsidies and incentive schemes as local firms (Global Insight 2011b:41, 54). In addition, the 
legal frameworks of BBE exempt foreign companies to meet its requirements, but companies 
are less competitive for government tenders if they do not meet them (Global Advice Network 
2010b).  
The tax system is considered as efficient, as regulations and application forms are 
straightforward for private companies. However, managers in private companies can expect to 
spend 6% of their time annually on complying with regulatory requirements (Global Advice 
Network 2010b). The regulations that create challenges are the tax- and labor laws. A 
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company has to comply with 15 different registrations and labor regulations and an 
affirmative action report has to comply with 14 different requirements (Venter 2005:45). The 
corporate tax rate in the country now stands at 28% The likelihood that the ANC might 
increase the taxes on the industry to secure more funds to meet public demands is moderate 
(Global Insight 2011b:47, Ibtimes 2010).  
 
Mozambique: The inefficient bureaucracy in Mozambique is cited as one of the greatest 
constraints on business operations. It underperforms in terms of dealing with construction 
permits, enforcing contracts and registering property, all factors of prevalence for foreign 
investors (Global Advice Network 2010c). The regulatory burden caused by the excessively 
complicated procedures related to various licenses, further creates a market for corrupt 
practices in which public officials often demand facilitation payments (Global Advice 
Network 2010c).  Nevertheless, some improvements have been registered over the years 
partly as a result from the establishment of the Investment Promotion Centre (CPI), which 
functions as a “one-stop shop” for investors, assisting foreign investors in obtaining all the 
licenses and permits needed in one place (Global Advice Network 2010c).  
The tax authority has currently announced that it intends to gradually raise the level of 
taxes until they reach 22% of the nations GDP. Presently, the tax revenue constitutes 16,3% 
of GDP. Tax incentives are provided for certain investment projects (Global Insight 
2011c:34). However, with a policy focused on poverty reduction, there could be increases in 
taxes (EIU 2010b). Furthermore, establishment and ownership are time-consuming and 
lengthy processes. Land cannot be bought, but leases can be granted for a 50-year period and 
it may be renewed once (Global Insight 2011c:31).   
Overall, Mozambique has shown improvements, and especially related to protecting 
investors and starting a business Furthermore, the passage of a new labor law in 2007, was 
another step in easing the business climate for investors. The bill relaxes a number of labor-
market rigidities that restrain job creation, and permits a wider range of contracts, including 
short-term contracts for fixed periods (African Development Bank 2008:469). 
4.5.12 Attitudes Toward Foreign Business (Micro Risk) 
Zambia: The business climate in Zambia is considered as positive. The creation of ZDA is an 
indication of this, as the agency is working to provide information on the investment climate 
and identifying and promoting opportunities for investment (Global Insight 2011a:46). During 
the last years there has been a growing resentment against small-scale foreign investors. In 
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2006, this was turned into a major campaign during the elections. As a result, the government 
announced plans to raise the minimum threshold required to set up business, with a minimum 
requirement of US$500.000. Although there is no legal discrimination between foreign and 
domestic investors, the government encourages foreign investors to commit to local 
participation. However, it is not clear how this commitment is weighed when decisions are 
made (Global Insight 2011a:46).  
The past years MMD in Zambia has downgraded the role of the trade unions and 
developed a more business-oriented policy. Consequently, the government has been faced 
with protests and large-scale actions (Lunn et.al 2008:2). The use of many expatriates can 
lead to opposition and labor unrest. This happened with a major mining company, whose 
workers threatened to go on strike in response to the company’s significant use of foreign 
workers (EIU 2010c). Furthermore, the leader of the biggest opposition party, Michael Sata, 
has spoken out against FDI, and recently opposed the privatization of the state 
communications utility Zamtel. Such sentiments can create a political risk for business if he 
were to win the elections in 2011 (EIU 2010c). The election is likely to be his best chance of 
securing power. Should he become president, policies might change, but according to EIU 
(2010c), this is more likely populist rhetoric. Sata criticized Chinese investments in the 
country, but were forced to moderate his opinions and is now promising to promote 
investments if he becomes president. Overall, the biggest threat to foreign investors is his 
populist policy announcements, as it has the potential to “whip up” local unrest (EIU 2010c).  
 
South Africa: Fractions in the ANC alliance are anti-business. This has led to distrust from 
foreign investors with regards to the political risk of the country (Venter 2005:49). The ANC 
government has always been sensitive to trade union activism because of COSATU (Venter 
2005:41). As the trade unions and the left wings have increased their influence in the ruling 
alliance, there is a risk that the government will become more interventionist. However, the 
government is regarded as being business-friendly so the policies towards foreign business are 
expected to remain accommodating and especially with regard to infrastructure investments 
such as power since it is a government priority (EIU 2010a). COSATU and the ANC Youth 
League have urged for nationalization of the mines. The ANC have considered the proposal 
but will not take any action until 2012. Conversely, nationalization is unlikely given the costs 
and the harm it might cause on South Africa’s reputation as a country supportive of the free 
markets (Ibtimes 2010). The debate with regards to nationalization is being used by actors 
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opposed to Zuma within the ANC as a way to score political points. This has the potential to 
intensify if anger increase about Zuma’s leadership (Ibtimes 2010). As a result, Zuma might 
decide to abandon the ANC’s market-friendly economic and investment policies succumbing 
to the criticism in order to appease his labor backers. On the other hand, he has assured status 
quo to the business community (Global Insight 2011b:13). The balance between private 
enterprise and the developmental state will remain critical. Provided that the forces can 
cooperate this need not constitute a risk for investors (EIU 2010a).  
 
Mozambique: The current president in Mozambique is regarded as being positive towards 
FDI, but is now under pressure to provide the poor with the benefits of tourism and the 
untapped mineral and energy resources that has drawn the attention of foreign direct investors 
(BBC 2010b). For this reason the government is working to increase the share of domestic 
revenue by facilitating FDI to the country and enhance the investment climate of foreign 
companies (Freedomhouse 2010c). An example of this is the strengthening of the business 
environment by simplifying the regulatory environment (The Africa Report 2010b). Important 
revisions have been made of the tax codes governing mining and oil investments and there 
have also been some reforms of labor regulations to facilitate the business environment 
(African Development Bank 2008:462). International donors have also put pressure on the 
Mozambican government to enact another series of liberalizing structural reforms to maintain 
the country’s economic growth and to the benefit of private investors (Freedomhouse 2010c).
 Mozambique’s leading trade union confederation is independent from the government 
and has criticized the government’s market-based reforms (Freedomhouse 2010c). As the 
negotiation process with large multinational companies has been a challenge for the 
Mozambican government, the government has not secured the most favorable terms for the 
country. This has led to criticism, so the government is now setting tougher conditions for 










5.0 RISK MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS FOR SNPA IN 
ZAMBIA, SOUTH AFRICA & MOZAMBIQUE  
5.1 Chapter Introduction  
Based on the previous chapters, this chapter’s objective is to assess the conditions that enable 
SNPA to mitigate the high risks in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, and thus provide 
an answer to the research question. This chapter will first analyze SNPA’s company 
capabilities, which according to the literature can influence the company’s political risk when 
Furthermore, based on the risk assessment that took place, this chapter will measure the actual 
level of the various political risks for SNPA based on the probability and impact of the risks 
to affect the company’s investments. From the risk measurement the political risk factors 
rated as high will be extracted. Furthermore, this chapter will analyze which of the risk 
mitigation measures that can reduce the identified high-risks in conjunction with the 
company’s capabilities, and thus be able to provide some answers to the research question.  
5.2 SNPA’s Company Capabilities 
As previously mentioned, the impact and probability of political risk depend on the 
company’s political capabilities and their approach to cope with the political environment. 
Differences in these capabilities will make the outcome of political risk unequal across 
companies, and even those in the same sector as “firms do differ in their responses to political 
risk”  (Holburn 2001:i, Moon & Lado 2000:85), Four company capabilities were identified. 
These factors have the prospective to either reduce or increase the company’s exposure to 
political risk. The following section will therefore analyze SNPA’s company capabilities in 
the context of future hydropower investments in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. 
5.2.1 Nationality of the Company 
Norway and the Southern African region have enjoyed good relations since 1960, as 
Norwegian NGOs and (later) the Norwegian government, supported the countries’ struggles 
for liberation (Eriksen 2000:9). According to Eriksen (2000:9), there is no other country 
except from Sweden, with such close relations to the liberation movements. These relations 
have been maintained since. From 2003, the Norwegian government has contributed with 
over NOK 35 million to support the Coordination Centre of the Southern African Power Pool 
(SAPP), which aims to implement a competitive electricity market in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). This initiative is part of Norad’s Clean Energy for 
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Development Strategy, and indicates that if nationality is a risk-mitigating factor, SNPA 
should have viable conditions to invest and manage the risks in this region.   
However, according to one of the informants in SNPA (2011a [interview]), being a 
Norwegian company does not have any considerable significance in the three African 
countries. Subsequently this will therefore not change the risk exposure of the company when 
investing in these countries. The foremost reason for this is because the political leaders 
consider Norway as “harmless”, as Norway does not have an imperial background, and no 
power to act “in an imperial manner.” The informant further stated that Norway is not so 
highly regarded in Africa, as Norwegians like to think. One of the main reasons for this is that 
the Norwegian government is known as being moralizers, and with no own opinions as they 
mainly follow Europe and the United States with regards to foreign policy. In addition, the 
Norwegian government is known for supporting programs that contribute minimally to actual 
development in the countries, which reduce their perceived influence in the region (SNPA 
2011a [interview]).  
Another informant’s perception of the Norwegian nationality as a risk-reducing factor 
is more positive. Here the impression is that being Norwegian and representing a country 
known for its democratic culture, and additionally is a significant aid-donor, reduce the 
company’s political risk (SNPA 2011b [interview]). The impression after starting negotiations 
with the different host governments was that nationality had a greater significance than 
previously thought. This was basically due to the Norwegian network already established in 
the region such as the embassies, Norad and Norfund. Being owned by state-owned entities 
can therefore be considered as risk mitigating for SNPA, and especially those risks related to 
government actions. Hence, the exploitation of direct ties with home country officials relative 
to the host government can provide leverage when investing abroad, and thus reduce the 
company’s political risk related to host government actions. This is consistent with Henisz & 
Zelner’s (2002:6) findings, which have specified direct ties as a risk-reducing factor.   
Norway is a strong supporter of the United Nations (UN), and has by that, developed a 
positive international standing and also in Africa. According to one of the interviewees 
(SNPA 2011a [interview]), this is not just an advantage as the best risk mitigation measure is 
for a company to be considered as apolitical. Nevertheless, the fact that Norway is a 
significant aid donor, and especially in Mozambique, can give Norwegian companies 
leverage, as governments would be inclined to take actions that would make donor countries 
cut their aid (SNPA 2011a [interview]). Based on this, one can draw the assumption that 
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being a Norwegian company in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique does have a slightly 
positive influence on SNPA’s ability to mitigate political risks. However, this will depend on 
what the risks are. 
5.2.2 SNPA’s Position in the World Industry 
According to one informant (SNPA 2011a [interview]), this company capability is the most 
influential with regard to political risk and subsequently outranks nationality as a risk-
mitigating factor. “SN Power’s position in the world industry has always had a significance, 
in fact it is crucial – and it is independent of nationality” (SNPA 2011a [interview]). 
Accordingly, it is not the Norwegian nationality that influences SNPA’s company 
capabilities, but rather the Norwegian location and water resources that has given Norwegian 
hydropower companies expertise, which again provide them with political leverage when 
dealing with host governments, as they can export the competence obtained to host countries. 
The Norwegian hydropower industry has developed to become an “industrial cluster16”. This 
concept is what gives SNPA a competitive edge compared to other countries in the 
hydropower sector, as it is known that companies from this cluster bring about competence, 
technology and resources (SNPA 2011a [interview]). This can therefore serve to mitigate the 
political risks that can be created by the governments, as governments in developing countries 
are aware of the fact that it might be difficult to acquire this competence elsewhere. The 
Norwegian hydropower industry has over 100 years of experience related to hydropower 
development. As such, Norwegian hydropower expertise, especially concerning competence 
and technology, is acknowledged on an international level (St.meld nr14, 2010-2011:38). This 
recognition might therefore mitigate potential political risks for SNPA, as it is possible to 
assume that it would be of governments’ interest to tap their hydropower resources. In 
addition, SN Power, which is one of SNPA’s owners, has positioned itself as an influential 
hydropower actor with significant hydropower expertise, as it is the only company in the 
world that operates exclusively in emerging markets. At present, SN Power has 15 operating 
hydropower plants, and 10 more in various stages of planning and development in South 
America, South Asia and South-East Asia (SN Power 2011a, SN Power 2011b). One of SN 
Power’s owners, Statkraft is a state-owned subsidiary, and is the leading renewable energy 
company in Europe. Being backed by such a strong entity as Statkraft can further provide 
political leverage and credibility for SNPA when entering into negotiations with the host 
                                                
16 Industrial cluster is the notion that the most competent industries evolve in clusters consisting of many small 
units that competes hard with each other within the same industry (SNPA 2011a [interview]).  
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governments as well as during their operations in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. 
(SNPA 2011b [interview]), and thus enable SNPA to build upon the competence and the 
reputation that its owner has acquired over the years. A positive corporate reputation enhances 
foreign companies bargaining power in at least two ways. A positive reputation is often a sign 
of the company’s sociopolitical legitimacy, which refers to “the process by which key 
stakeholders, the general public, key opinion leaders, or government officials accept a 
venture as appropriate and right, given existing norms and laws” (Aldrich & Fiol 1994, in 
Moon & Lado 2000:106). In addition, the host governments might use foreign companies 
with a positive reputation as a sign of being committed to an attractive business climate 
(Moon & Lado 2000:106). The latter could therefore be an incentive for the governments in 
Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, and thereby reduce the company’s political risks. 
Norfund17 is also an owner of SNPA, and its mandate is to take a high-risk in 
developing countries. As a consequence, SNPA’s position in the world industry might be 
enhanced because it has a strong development finance institution as its owner, which is an 
obvious advantage compared to other private investment companies. This might also serve to 
increase SNPA’s leverage towards the host governments and thereby reduce potential risks. 
According to an informant (SNPA 2011a [interview]), Norfund is about to become an even 
greater success in the regions they invest in. Subsequently, one can draw the assumption that 
SNPA can capitalize on Norfund’s perceived success in the Southern African Region.  
5.2.3 Special Bargaining Advantages 
Foreign companies with bargaining power are more likely to achieve favorable terms in 
negotiations with host governments, and also less likely to face government interventions 
(Moon & Lado 2000:87). SNPA’s bargaining advantages are various. Obviously its position 
in the world industry point toward a bargaining advantage as its parent companies have 
obtained a solid reputation. Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess SNPA’s firm specific 
bargaining advantages as they have yet to acquire any hydropower plants in the region. 
However, it is viable to draw the assumption that its bargaining advantages are the same as its 
parent company SN Power. According to SN Power (2011a) their competitive advantages are 
that they have a long-term investment strategy, which secures predictability; technical and 
financial viability; the Norwegian hydropower tradition, with skills and expertise that they 
                                                
17 Norfund’s objective is “to contribute equity and other risk capital, extend loans and provide guarantees for 
the development of sustainable commercial activities in developing countries. Norfund aims to establish viable, 
profitable activities that would not otherwise be initiated because of the high risk involved. Norfund contributes 
to reducing poverty and to economic developments in poor countries through investment in profitable 
enterprises and the transfer of knowledge and technology” (Norfund 2009:i). 
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can transfer to the host countries; a multidisciplinary project team and; a proven ability to 
execute projects in markets regarded as difficult. Their projects in Asia and Latin America are 
an indication of this. All of these capabilities serve to indicate that SNPA’s company 
capabilities might provide them an advantageous bargaining position, and protection against 
government actions related to risk outcomes, as it would be of governments own interest to 
attract these resources in their countries.   
Low levels of hydropower technology characterize the African continent, and 
technology subsequently enhances hydropower companies’ bargaining position (UN Water 
2008:32). A high level of technological and managerial complexity makes SNPA less 
exposed to risk from the host government of Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, as 
hydropower expertise is needed in order to ensure economic growth, and secure access to 
capital for infrastructure projects, which the governments cannot finance without private 
involvement. As stated in the risk assessment, the need for increasing the energy supply in 
these countries is prevalent. Given the expertise of SNPA it thus has a great bargaining 
advantage when negotiating with the governments for contracts, as well as during the 
company’s operations. SNPA also has another bargaining advantage: competence with 
regards to SAPP. According to SN Power (2008:34), the integrated electricity market between 
South Africa and its neighbors resembles to a great extent to the development and creation of 
the Nordic interconnected power market and power exchange. This makes SN Power’s 
Norwegian expertise an advantage when dealing with the government, and can therefore 
enable mitigation of political risks.  
 In addition,  “unlike many other developers, who depend on obtaining equity or debt 
financing in the market, we have a strong financial position and can benefit from SN Power’s 
long-term relations with multilateral lenders” (Stenstadvold in SN Power 2008:34). SN 
Power is the biggest financial borrower from the IFC, which has a significant position in the 
African countries as part of the World Bank Group. Being involved with influential 
multilateral financial institutions mitigates many of the risks related to government 
intervention as governments would be more inclined towards intervention of companies 
backed by these. Additionally, it provides financial leverage and sharing of political risks 
(SNPA 2011a [interview]). Most African countries have adopted policies that are attractive to 
foreign investors, with the expectation that investments will generate employment and 
stimulate economic growth by bringing additional capital. The logic of this argument is that 
foreign companies promote the developmental aspirations of the host government. In practice 
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however, government interventions are almost inevitable (Iroanya 2008:99), in countries 
where the state plays an influential role with regard to the hydropower resources.   
5.2.4 Dealings with Host Government 
As seen, SNPA has special bargaining advantages with the probability of giving them 
favorable terms when signing contracts with the different governments. However, the way 
SNPA intends to interact with the different governments could also influence their ability to 
mitigate political risk positively or negatively depending on the approach they undertake. 
Nonetheless, it is not possible to accurately assess SNPA’s dealings with host governments, 
as they have yet to acquire hydropower projects in these countries. However it is possible to 
point to some conditions that can enable the management of risk.  
An informant (SNPA 2011a [interview]) has affirmed that SNPA’s approach in 
Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique will be to be open and diplomatic toward the 
governments, but keeping the contact at a minimum, as too much contact can be obstructive 
for the company, because nurturing contact with governments in countries with questionable 
governance may lead to negative risk outcomes for the company. He further stated that its 
dealings with host government will be “kept at the necessary level” (SNPA 2011a 
[interview]). Another informant (SNPA 2011b [interview]) stated that a risk mitigating 
approach when dealing with host governments is to enter into joint venture partnerships. He 
pointed that local competence was essential to create a good relationship with the host 
government, and that both time and resources should be spent to foster this relationship. 
Hence, this serves to indicate that an indirect contact with the host government through joint 
ventures might be a viable approach to mitigate political risks.  
Based on this, one can draw the assumption that SNPA has the potential to influence 
the political environment in these countries through its capabilities, and thus have the 
potential to mitigate the political risks. Nevertheless, the strength of firm-specific capabilities 
as risk mitigation is moderated by two sets of contextual factors outlined in the theoretical 
chapter, namely country (macro)- and industry-specific (micro) risks. SNPA’s capabilities 
must therefore further be assessed in the context of these factors in order to provide a 
comprehensive answer to the research question. This will be the task of section 5.4. The next 
paragraph will assess the level of risk for SNPA regardless of their company capabilities to 
enable a fruitful discussion in section 5.4, which will combine both the company’s 
capabilities and the risk mitigation measures identified from the literature.  
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5.3 Risk Measurement in Zambia, South Africa & Mozambique 
The aim of this section is to arrive at a risk level for the various political risks in Zambia, 
South Africa and Mozambique for SNPA by measuring the macro and micro risks according 
to the impact/probability chart that was introduced in the theoretical chapter. The factors that 
are given the rating high-risks will be extracted from this chart, in order to further assess them 
in relation to the company’s capabilities and risk mitigation measures.  
5.3.1 Political Stability and Legitimacy (Macro Risk) 
One-party domination, within-party dissent, weak oppositions, and public legitimacy issues 
are what characterize the political environment in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. 
However, at present the political risk for SNPA can be considered as low, owing to the low 
probability of a fundamental change in the governments policies or any other government 
action or intervention that could increase the company’s political risk, despite of the potential 
high-risk impact. There are no clear indications that these political characteristics will alter 
the business environment for the company. Nonetheless, there are some discouraging signs 
that might increase the risk of this factor in the future. The current governments’ legitimacy is 
declining and could therefore lead to instability due to growing dissatisfaction with the 
parties’ stranglehold of power. One of the most severe consequences of a decline in 
legitimacy could be political violence, but to constitute a risk it must have an impact on the 
future operations of SNPA. One potential consequence is the risk of damage or destruction of 
the hydropower site if violence where to occur. However, this will ultimately depend on 
where the project is located, and the probability of a hydropower plant to be physically 
damaged is therefore low. Political violence could however lead to a general disruption of 
business activities and reputational risks for the company if the violence is to escalate.  
Another concern is the risk of expropriation, as infrastructure projects are more prone 
to this political risk outcome. Host governments have an incentive to expropriate, and that is 
to maximize the national income. This incentive will depend on the difference between the 
benefit of attaining income from foreign capital and the opportunity cost of expropriation. The 
main assumption is that host government may have a short-term benefit by terminating or not 
complying with the contract. Whether expropriation takes place, it will depend on how the 
government balances the short-term and medium term benefits of the capital it can get 
through that particular investment (Ferrari & Rolfini 2008:10). A government with a low 
probability to remain in power has greater incentives to expropriate and therefore give priority 
to their short-term gains. This could be a possible outcome if the current governing parties 
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face a political legitimacy or stability crisis. However, the probability of this occurring is low, 
even though this might increase in the future. Overall, the political risk for SNPA is LOW. 
5.3.2 Political Effectiveness and Accountability (Macro Risk) 
The complicated and rigid bureaucratic procedures, weak institutions, and the corruption in 
Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique pose significant risks for SNPA, as these type of 
investments involves a large amount of capital and could create significant financial losses for 
investments trough delays, lack of policy implementation and structures that will divert the 
company’s attention away from business. The bureaucracies are not independent from 
political interference, indicates that they do not have the potential to minimize revisions of 
existing policies if the governments were to change, due to lack of strength or competence to 
govern without interruptions. Political interference in judicial processes also constitutes a risk 
as it leads to low accountability and transparency. Lack of political commitment to 
accountability is the main restrain for a well functioning bureaucracy. This therefore poses a 
significant political risk for SNPA. The poor public service adds to the expenditures of 
delivering, generating bad governance, corruption and ineffective public services. This can 
create a non-conducive environment for the company as it adds unnecessary operational costs 
(Venter 2005:51). Political interference in the bureaucratic processes is a significant risk, as 
this raises the probability of government actions such as sudden policy changes, 
expropriation, and breach of contracts. 
The high levels of corruption also constitute a significant risk for SNPA, as the 
company will be dependent on government contracts such as public procurement contracts in 
their business conductance. Facilitation payments are also widespread, and might lead to 
delays and financial losses for the company. Corruption in general distorts the economic 
environment in which business operates and can also lead to reputational risks if being caught 
of paying bribes. The most common form of corruption that business encounter is financial 
corruption in the form of special payment and bribes related to licenses, exchange controls, 
tax assessments, police protection as well as loans. These types of corruption make it difficult 
to conduct business, and in some instances can lead to withdrawal or withholding of an 
investment (Brink 2004:86). Since the political and economic elites have strong ties in these 
countries, there is a significant risk that SNPA might encounter corruption, mainly due to the 
fact that infrastructure projects involve a substantial amount of capital and tight contact with 
the governments. The impact of corruption cannot be overemphasized as it has led to the 
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collapse of several foreign-owned companies in several African countries (Iroanya 2008:108). 
The political risk for this factor is therefore HIGH.  
5.3.3 Internal Conflict (Macro Risk) 
The ethnic dimension in Zambia and Mozambique is not as pressing as it is in South Africa. 
Nevertheless, South Africa has stronger institutions and is more democratically consolidated 
than the two other countries, indicating the same risk level for the countries. Even though 
there is a high degree of ethnic fractionalization in South Africa, the risk of a violent outbreak 
is not present. BEE creates a risk for SNPA, as not complying with these regulations might 
lead to not obtaining contracts, cancellation of them or other policy changes to the detriment 
of business. In addition, the quotas of affirmative action can create some financial risks 
because companies might have to employ from the black population were the level of 
education and skills are lower than in the white population. This might therefore lead to lower 
productivity for SNPA. The conflict dimension in Mozambique relates more to the urban-
rural division in the country, indicating that if this division increases, it would intensify and 
worsen the relationship between Frelimo and Renamo. Renamo’s threat of taken up arms is an 
indication of this. However, the risk of this actually happening is low, as Mozambique is 
moving towards democratic consolidation. The no-history-of-unrest in Zambia indicates that 
internal cohesion will be maintained. Nonetheless, there is a potential threat of industrial 
unrest as has happened before. This will depend on the company’s conduct and labor policies, 
as the increase of unrest will most likely diminish if the employees are satisfied with their 
working conditions.  
The risk of electoral violence is present in all the three countries, and there are no 
indications that this will decrease in the near future, as the sources of conflict still are present. 
However, the risk of affecting hydropower companies such as SNPA is low when assessing 
this on a micro-level. The potential outcomes of this risk factor are political violence and 
policy changes that might bring about financial losses due to disruption of business. If 
political violence were to occur, it could lead to reputational damage for SNPA if being 
considered as tightly connected to the actors involved the conflict. The potential impact that 
internal conflict would have on SNPA’s potential investments is high. However, there are no 
signs of internal conflicts that could increase the political risks for the company at this point. 
Overall, the risk is rated as LOW. 
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5.3.4 External Conflict/Negative Influences of Regional or Other Political 
Forces (Macro Risk) 
At present the regional environment do not pose a political risk for SNPA’s potential 
operations in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. This could change if a conflict were to 
break out in the region. The impact of this could potentially create risks for the company, and 
especially due to the risk of political violence. However, this is dependent upon whether or 
not SNPA’s hydropower plants are located next to potential volatile borders. Zambia is 
considered to be vulnerable to attacks by the Congolese militia, and South Africa could face a 
substantial amount of refugees if the political and economic situation in Zimbabwe were to 
worsen. This could also be a scenario in Mozambique, but it is not as probable. Nonetheless, 
the probability of this happening is low. The political risk for this risk factor is therefore 
considered as LOW, but the potential impact of an external conflict is high. However, when 
assessing on a micro level, the potential for this to affect the political risk of a hydropower 
project is unlikely, as the risk outcome political violence would most likely not have an 
impact on the business when it involves external actors.   
5.3.5 Security Risk (Macro Risk) 
Crime is one of the main constraints on business in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, 
and especially in South Africa. The potential political risk related to crime is obviously 
representing a threat to the personal safety as well as the safety of property of hydropower 
investors. In addition, the land mines in Mozambique also constitute a security risk for the 
company. However, it is difficult to predict the probability of hydropower employees to be 
affected by this, as crime acts are merely random. Security considerations should be 
incorporated in the businesses’ strategic decision-making process in these countries. 
Nonetheless, if adequate precautions are made, business is possible, as foreign-owned 
companies rarely are damaged and foreigners seldom attacked.     
 The impact and probability security risk would have on hydropower projects can be 
considered as high due to the severe consequences this might have, as well as the high crime 
rates in the countries. The overall political risk of security for foreign hydropower investors is 
therefore HIGH.  
5.3.6 Socio-Economic Conditions (Macro Risk) 
There are three indicators of particular importance with regard to this factor in Zambia, South 
Africa and Mozambique: the population as a whole is not benefitting from the economic 
growth in the countries, the governments have not been able create enough jobs, and there has 
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been an increase in the prices of fuel and food. When combined, the potential risk for 
instability in the countries is high. South Africa is the only country that has experienced an 
economic stagnation due to the financial crisis, and this might lead to a worsening the 
population’s socio-economic conditions. The socio-economic factors that exacerbates the 
discontent among the population may result in social unrest, labor strikes, riots and political 
violence as the anger and dissatisfaction of the public seems to have increased.     
 In democracies, socio-economic conditions affect the political risk for investors since 
the government might be inclined to tax private corporations or discriminate against them in 
various ways to meet the demands of the electorate (Venter 2005:37). President Zuma is 
already starting to feel the pressure from the left-oriented fractions in ANC, as some of them 
have urged for the nationalization of the mines. A risk of this occurring is therefore present, 
even though the likelihood for hydropower companies to be affected by this is low. However, 
the risk of policy changes, expropriation, breach of contract, and political violence is high 
since SNPA’s operations are development projects. In addition, hydropower investors could 
face the risk of reputational damage, as SNPA’s commitment to sustainable growth and 
economic development in their projects is a company objective (SN Power 2011a). A failure 
to do so is a potential pitfall for the company. This will thus depend on who will benefit from 
the electricity generated, and if it actually will lead to sustainable growth for all. The impact 
of this risk is considered as high as well as the probability of this risk to materialize. The 
overall political risk is therefore HIGH.  
5.3.7 Human Rights (Micro Risk) 
The legal restrictions imposed on NGOs’ activities in Zambia as well as the increase in 
labor militancy in the country pose a risk for SNPA. The first one is outside of the company’s 
control, but the latter is possible to mitigate through implementation of labor policies 
considered as fair for employees. In South Africa, all the formal requirements of human rights 
protection are met. However, the poor public delivery indicates that enforcement of these 
rights could also be poor. In Mozambique, abuse of civil and labor rights occur on a frequent 
basis. Being associated with a government with a poor human rights record could increase 
substantial reputational risks for companies, especially for development projects such as 
SNPA. Nonetheless, the general human rights conditions in these countries are only of 
moderate risk for hydropower investors. However, the risks related to hydropower 
development, and the potential impact that this can have on people with regards to forced 
displacement is high. In an overview of all the African dams and their environmental and 
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social impact made by the organization International Rivers (2010), the current hydropower 
projects in Zambia did not have any displacement issues, except for Lunsemfwa Hydro Power 
Company (LHPC), who has been entangled in a conflict with the local community living on 
the banks. LHPC bought the land from Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines, and wants them 
to relocate as they consider the locals as “squatting on private land” (International Rivers 
2010). The locals on the other hand, claim that they did not know that the land they lived on 
were sold to investors. The outcome of this conflict is unknown, but represents issues related 
to land in Zambia. Additionally, there has been activism with regards to hydropower projects 
in Mozambique led by NGOs. The plan to construct a new dam along the Zambezi River are 
likely to bring about more activism, for it is likely to force the resettlement of 1.400 people 
(Global Insight 2011c:39). Hydropower projects in Mozambique that will have to displace 
people will therefore create risks for foreign investors. In total, the political risk of human 
rights is HIGH, since both the impact of the reputational risks of forced displacement is high, 
and the nature of hydropower projects makes it probable to take place.  
5.3.8 Human Capital (Micro Risk) 
The lack of a skilled and educated work force, exacerbated by the high prevalence of deadly 
diseases as malaria and HIV/AIDS are the biggest concerns with regard to this risk for SNPA. 
Especially in the construction phase, the need for competent skills is high. The fact that the 
countries also have challenges with regard to work permits for expatriates, adds to this 
element of political risk. Lack of human capital leads to low productivity as it pushes up the 
unit labor costs of the companies, and subsequently can result in loss in profit and financial 
productivity for business. All of this indicates that it will be challenging for hydropower 
companies to find skilled personnel that can install, operate and maintain a hydropower plant. 
The risk outcome could therefore be financial losses due to low productivity. The potential 
impact this have on hydropower investments is high, so is the probability of this risk to 
materialize when SNPA invests in these countries. Hence, the political risk for SNPA is 
HIGH.   
5.3.9 Energy Dependence (Micro Risk) 
The energy demand in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique is critical, as the countries 
continue struggling to bridge the gap between the demand and supply of energy. The supply 
shortages and poor maintenance of existing power plants have already led to power blackouts 
in all of the countries due to under-investments in this sector. It is expected that the energy 
demand will increase in the coming years. In addition, all of the governments seem committed 
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to increase the energy investments. This will therefore create substantial business 
opportunities for SNPA if the company decides to invest. The potential political risks for 
hydropower projects in this regard could be policy changes, breach of contracts or even 
expropriation, as the governments might want to have full control over their natural resources. 
However, since the energy demand is so critical and the governments have not been able to 
maintain or construct enough energy plants, there is no risk that this factor could affect 
SNPA’s investments negatively. Nonetheless, there could be some tensions over how to make 
use of the land and water as the resources are being put under more pressure in the African 
countries. The balance between energy security and food and water security will therefore be 
difficult for governments to manage in the future, and will subsequently create more risks for 
foreign hydropower companies. The overall political risk for this factor is LOW.  
5.3.10 Environmental Vulnerability (Micro Risk) 
Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique are facing environmental challenges. The already 
vulnerable environments are getting their conditions worsened by the global warming as a 
result of the climatic changes that is taking place. In addition, all of the countries are prone to 
natural disasters, and especially droughts, which are critical for hydropower projects as they 
can result in power shortages and blackouts, leading to a disruption of business activities, and 
thereby losses in financial productivity. Environmental hazards could lead to a worsening of 
the social and economic living-conditions of the population due to a decrease in their food 
security. Subsequently, the risk of social unrest leading to violence might emerge.
 Furthermore, many African dams are built today without an examination on how 
climate change will affect them despite of many existing dams that are plagued by power-
shortages caused by droughts (Imhof & Lanza 2010). Nonetheless, the biggest risk with 
regards to environmental vulnerability, is the risk that hydropower projects can create on their 
own due to environmental degradation that might occur if not complying to environmental 
sustainability standards. Legal actions can be taken against SNPA if disregarding 
environmental regulations. This could ultimately lead to policy changes, possible tax 
increases or fines to make the company cover the damage they caused (Brink 2004:171). 
However, this risk is difficult to measure, as SNPA at present, have not acquired any 
hydropower plants in sub-Saharan Africa. Environmental degradation could create significant 
risks for hydropower projects as it might result in activism from the local community and 
NGOs, leading to reputational risks, and possibly, compensation demands. In addition, this 
could lead to breach of contracts from the governments if the pressure gets high enough, as 
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well as policy changes to the detriment of business. An example of this could be for 
governments to take control over the company to ensure environmental compliance. 
However, it is not likely to materialize, as it does not seem as SNPA has any lower 
environmental standards than the countries they will be involved in. Nevertheless, the 
potential impact and probability of this risk is high, and consequently, the risk level is HIGH.  
5.3.11 Regulatory Framework (Micro Risk) 
The excessive regulatory environment in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique does 
constitute a risk for hydropower investors. In addition, the countries are struggling with 
maintaining a balance of meeting their development commitments in addition to the 
promotion of pro-business policies, putting pressure in the regulation of business. In South 
Africa, complying with the BEE legislation adds the cost of doing business and non-
compliance can lead to loss of government contracts. SNPA must therefore expect to spend 
much time to comply with all the regulatory requirements, and this can lead to losses in 
financial productivity as it divert attention away from business.  
The heavy bureaucracies and rigid laws increase the costs of doing business, and do 
therefore constitute a risk for hydropower companies. The probability of the risk occurring is 
high. However, the potential impact this could have on business is low, as there are no signs 
that the regulatory environment for foreign companies will have negative outcomes on foreign 
business. Nevertheless, if major policy changes were to materialize, the impact could be high, 
but it is not expected as all of the countries are currently working to reform the legal 
environment to make it more business friendly. The political risk for SNPA is therefore rated 
as MEDIUM.  
5.3.12 Attitudes toward Foreign Business (Micro Risk) 
The attitudes toward foreign business in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique can in 
general be regarded as positive. The reforms to make the countries more business-friendly are 
an indication of this. However, trying to ease the regulatory environment for foreign business 
has the potential of sparking protests from workers, as witnessed in Zambia. This actually led 
to a policy change, and implies that governments can change their policies to meet the 
demands of the population. The protests concerning the use of foreign labor have also been a 
source of conflict. The likelihood of this constituting a risk for business is only likely to 
increase if Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique continue to open their economies to 
foreign investments. Furthermore, anti-foreign sentiments are on the rise, with the opposition 
in Zambia, within ANC’s own tripartite alliance, and a general criticism in Mozambique that 
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the country is not benefitting from the foreign investments. All of the countries appear as 
being sensitive to trade union activism. If the activism continues or increases, it could create 
political risks for hydropower projects through government interventions such as policy 
changes, breach of contract and expropriation. This could have negative consequences for 
SNPA’s activities in these countries. The debate with regards to nationalization of the mines 
in South Africa is increasing, and if it were to happen, it is not easy to predict if this would 
spill over to other sectors as well. At this point however, the risk remains low. This risk factor 
will, like the regulatory risk factor above, depend on how the governments will balance the 
commitments of the developmental state and a pro-business orientation.  
In addition, SNPA’s own activities can create anti-business sentiments, but this must 
be assessed on a project-level when the project is initiated. Overall the political risk of this 
factor is MEDIUM, owing to the fact that the probability of the risk to occur is high, but the 
general impact is low, as the countries are in need of energy investments, and would therefore 
most likely be hesitant towards taking actions that would have a negative impact on 
hydropower investments. Nevertheless this is a risk to watch.  
5.3.13 Overview of the High-Risks for SNPA in Zambia, South Africa and 
Mozambique 
The political risk for SNPA’s future investments was measured through a categorization of 
the political risks based on the probability/impact chart introduced in chapter 2, as illustrated 
below:  
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From the risk measurement, six political risk factors were categorized as high-risk (b): 
political effectiveness and accountability; security risk; socio-economic conditions; human 
rights; human capital; and environmental vulnerability. However, as stated in the introduction, 
both company capabilities and risk mitigation measures have the potential to mitigate the high 
risks for foreign companies in host governments. The remaining of this chapter aims to 
analyze whether SNPA’s company capabilities and the risk mitigation measures derived from 
the literature, actually enables SNPA to mitigate its high risks in Zambia, South Africa and 
Mozambique.  
5.4 Risk Response to the High-Risk Political Factors in Zambia, 
South Africa & Mozambique 
Below is a table of the risk mitigation measures identified from the literature that must be 
analyzed with SNPA’s company capabilities to explain the dependent variable; namely risk 
mitigation.  
Table 5.4 Overview of the Risk Mitigation Measures 
Risk Sharing and Transfer Strategic Relationships Political Risk Policy 
Joint Ventures National Government Corporate Values 
Project Finance Local and Provincial Government TBL 
Political Risk Insurance Local Communities  Contingency Plans  
 NGOs   
  
5.4.1 Political Effectiveness and Accountability  
SNPA can mitigate this risk factor in a variety of ways. Joint ventures can significantly 
decrease SNPA’s risk exposure in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique for a variety of 
reasons. First, a partnership with either a parastatal or a private company that enjoys a good 
relationship with the government will reduce the likelihood of government interventions such 
as policy changes, expropriation and breach of contract. Based on the risk assessment, most of 
the energy industry in the different countries have not been privatized yet, indicating that a 
potential joint venture partner for SNPA would be either a state owned corporation or a 
parastatal. The integration of a national player has therefore the significant benefit that it can 
increase SNPA’s bargaining position, as government interference would have a negative 
impact on domestic economic interests. This is something that most governments would want 
to avoid (Bremmer & Keat 200:136). In addition, a domestic company can reduce political 
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risks caused by lack of political effectiveness and accountability by facilitating SNPA’s day-
to-day dealings, as they better understand the business environment (EIU 2010a), such as how 
to obtain licenses and permits, negotiation of contracts, interpreting investment regulations, 
and how to deal with lack of policy implementation (Inkpen & Beamish 1997:81). Both of the 
informants (SNPA 2011a [interview], SNPA 2011b [interview]), confirmed that joint venture 
partnership when investing in the sub-Saharan region is going to be SNPA’s main strategy, as 
it is considered as the most effective risk mitigation tool both in relation to dealing with the 
host government and the local knowledge it provides, and thus are directly connected to 
SNPA’s capabilities. Joint ventures enable SNPA to learn about the business environment in 
addition of being risk sharing. This measure has therefore the potential to mitigate the 
political risk for SNPA. 
Project finance from multilateral institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank can reduce the risks of lack of political effectiveness and 
accountability. According to Doh and Ramamurti (2003:345), the leverage of the World Bank 
and IMF may have actually increased in developing countries due to the requirements of the 
institutions to privatize and liberalize as conditions for borrowing. The institutions’ success 
can be measured through the increase in investment liberalization and privatization initiatives 
in developing countries over the years. The ongoing reforms to improve the business climates 
are indications of this. The political risk of companies that are backed by these institutions is 
therefore mitigated, as host government actions would be constrained due to the implications 
of further funding if creating risks for associated companies. In addition, the backing of 
influential multilateral institutions could mitigate the risks for SNPA to be entangled in 
corruption, as governments would be reluctant to demand bribes or facilitation payments in 
projects where these institutions would be involved. With regards to the political 
ineffectiveness of the bureaucracies in these countries, the involvement of such institutions 
might expedite the different policy processes SNPA must undertake to conduct their business 
(Wang et. al 2004:242). Due to the political risks, cooperation on a project with the World 
Bank and IMF can also mitigate political risks ex-post, as project finance also has the 
important risk-sharing function, and thereby reduces the financial burden of the costs of 
hydropower projects and the political risk outcomes if they were to materialize. Hence one of 
SNPA’s company capabilities can influence this risk factor. 
The host governments are often the leading participants in primary energy and energy-
related projects in developing countries (Pollio 1998:687). This is the case for Zambia, South 
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Africa and Mozambique. The establishment of a strategic relationship with the host 
government is therefore essential for the political risks that can be imposed on the foreign 
companies. The advantage of nurturing a good relationship with the host government is that it 
can help to shape the policy environment to the benefit of the company (Boshoff 2010:67). It 
can mitigate the risks of the company caused by delays, lack of policy implementation, and 
other bureaucratic procedures that might have an impact on SNPA’s business activities. One 
way to manage these relations could be to sign profit sharing contracts with governments in 
order for the company to create incentives and benefits in favor of the host government 
(Bremmer & Keat 2009:138), to avoid negative government actions. SNPA’s bargaining 
advantage thus becomes essential in this regard.  
Nurturing a strategic relationship with local and provincial administration has also the 
potential of being an effective risk mitigation measure. Baldwin (2006:35) claims that 
political risk in Africa is more about local geography. Conversely, political risk must be dealt 
with at the local level to be risk mitigating. This relates especially to sub-Saharan Africa 
where the national states are not homogenous and the local and provincial administration 
often have another ethnic background than the national government. One informant (SNPA 
2011a [interview]) emphasizes a bottom-up approach on political risk. Consequently, 
pursuing active relations to the different local administrations can mitigate the factors that 
create a non-conducive business environment for SNPA with regards to political effectiveness 
and accountability, as it will be easier to navigate the bureaucracy on a local level, in addition 
of obtaining personal connections.  
  When investing in countries where corruption is prevalent, having a set of corporate 
values can serve to mitigate the risks of being involved with corruption. In weak institutional 
environments, abiding by the rules and regulations may in itself become a manifestation of 
corporate responsibility (Dobers & Halme 2009:242). As corruption is prevalent in these 
countries, the probability of natural resource companies to be involved with this practice is 
high, due to the large sums of money involved, and the frequent and regular interactions with 
governments (Bray 2003:296).  A way to avoid getting entangled with corruption is to comply 
with the national laws from the home country. Making the company’s code of conduct public 
and complying with it can help to protect a company from this (Bremmer & Keat 2009:193). 
SNPA should therefore develop clearly defined guidelines for how to deal with corrupt 
practices in their internal code of conduct. Integrating external regulations such as the UN 
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Global Compact, which addresses the issue of business corruption in SN Power’s code of 
conduct is a signal that the company will strive to adhere to these guidelines.   
Nonetheless, it is not sufficient with a code of conduct and adherence to international 
guidelines to reduce the risks caused by corruption. Consequently, a TBL approach with an 
emphasis on transparency to both internal and external reporting should be an integral part of 
the company’s reporting structure (Bremmer & Keat 2009:181). An effective communication 
to all the potential actors of risk, especially the actors of reputational risk, has the potential to 
reduce the political risk for SNPA as both transparency and reporting will “force” SNPA to 
publish its finances related to their profits, taxes, and signing of agreements, thereby secure 
transparency and accountability.  
5.4.2 Security Risks 
Crime will remain a considerable problem as long as Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique 
have high poverty and unemployment rates. Companies that aspire for investments in these 
countries should therefore develop effective measures to deal with the risks caused by the lack 
of security. One of the most important risk mitigation measures for SNPA will therefore be to 
obtain risk insurance, as it provides insurance against war and other civil disturbances that 
might result in financial losses or insecurity (Jakobsen 2004:125-126). Not all companies can 
obtain risk insurance. As Bray (2003:323) noted, the availability of private insurance cover is 
often determined based on the definition of a good project: usually a western company with a 
viable record. As previously discussed, SNPA has good credentials due to their position in the 
world industry, in addition to SN Power being the biggest borrower with regards to 
hydropower developments of IFC. The obtainment of risk insurance should therefore be 
relatively easy for SNPA to acquire. As such, company capabilities might be relevant in this 
context. In addition, SNPA should draft a contingency plan related to the different crimes in 
Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. The advantages of a contingency plan is for 
companies to be able to manage political and especially security risk at the operational level, 
protect assets and manage threat levels, and minimize the impact of the political risk to the 
projects’ people and assets (Boshoff 2010:67). The contingency plan could therefore include 
credible contracted private security companies. It could also consist of necessary security 
precautions related to general crime as use of electric fences, high walls and installations of 
alarms. In addition, no-go areas could be included followed by training programs for their 
staff on how to react when exposed to crime (EIU 2010c), to be an enabling condition for risk 
management. Notably, SNPA’s company capabilities will be of limited utility in this regard.   
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Moreover, who will protect the company from crime related activities? According to 
Bernstein (2010:285), local community engagement can reduce different risks for companies. 
This relates to the “license to operate” in a given country and concerns above all developing 
countries. Often infrastructure and natural resource projects must operate in remote rural 
locations in developing countries, far from the centers and where even local governments are 
weak. Here one can expect that law enforcement also will be weak. Enjoying good relations 
with the local community can give foreign companies security in terms of not be considered 
as “foreign”. In this context, maintaining good relations with the local police should also be 
emphasized (Bernstein 2010:285), as police corruption exists, Good relations could therefore 
secure police backing if the security of SNPA should be threatened. As there is no risk of 
terrorism, SNPA should not spend much of their resources to mitigate this insignificant risk. 
Nevertheless, since the impact is high a general evacuation plan should be drafted for 
terrorism and other force majeure18 incidents. 
5.4.3 Socio-Economic Conditions 
Since the outcomes related to this risk factor are considerable, there are many risk mitigation 
measures that could be implemented to reduce this factor to an acceptable level. The first risk 
mitigation measure is to obtain risk insurance, as risk insurance covers government actions 
such as expropriation, breach of- and renegotiation of contracts, confiscation of property and 
war or other civil disturbances (Jakobsen 2004:125-126). Risk insurance therefore covers 
many of the potential risk outcomes that can be created by this factor.   
 Hydropower projects can create political risks on their own if contributing to 
deteriorating socio-economic conditions by ignoring social and environmental sustainability 
standards. Project finance from influential international monetary institutions can therefore 
also reduce the risk for SNPA in these countries. The World Bank guidelines for investments 
in developing countries are designated to mitigate social and environmental impacts. Their 
involvement in hydropower projects in Africa may lead to higher standards being applied and 
thereby reduce political risk for the investment. In addition these institutions has also a 
particular focus on supporting investments in Africa (Bray 2003:325), and has an emphasis on 
economic development and poverty alleviation. As previously mentioned, the involvement of 
these financial institutions reduces the risk of government actions. Hence project finance 
serves two important functions with regard to the socio-economic risk for SNPA in these 
                                                
18  Force majeures are incidents outside the control of business.  
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countries, and is thus en enabling condition for the mitigation of this risk, based on both 
SNPA’s company capabilities as well as the risk mitigation measures proposed.  
Environment shaping is an essential component of risk management (Bremmer & Keat 
2009:32). A strategic relationship with both the national, and local and provincial 
governments should form an integral part of SNPA’s risk management approach in Zambia, 
South Africa and Mozambique, since the risk of government intervention in the form of 
policy changes, expropriation or breach of contract is relevant in the context of socio-
economic conditions. A way to reduce these risks is to structure contracts that work around 
the obsolescing bargain and reduce the incentives for government interventions. An example 
of this could be to sign profit-sharing contracts, which has two advantages related to political 
risk; protection against nationalization and other forms of government interventions, at the 
same time as avoiding a debate on the issue of resource nationalism (Bremmer & Keat 
2009:138), a debate that is gaining foothold as investments increase in Zambia, South Africa 
and Mozambique. The ongoing nationalization debate in South Africa is an example of this. 
By providing benefits for the government both on a national and local level, in form of 
favorable contracts, the likelihood for government actions to the detriment of SNPA’s 
activities will reduce. At the national level SNPA is able to influence through the capabilities 
it acquires of being a significant borrower from IFC,  
However, the socio-economic conditions in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique 
are to such an extent that if not managed properly, could make the governments face internal 
challenges that would threaten their legitimacy. The governments that face challenges related 
to legitimacy are among the most likely to resort to expropriation or other means to enhance 
their nationalist credentials towards the population (Bremmer & Keat 2009:141). There is a 
relationship between lack of economic growth and expropriation, and as an informant (SNPA 
2011a [interview]) argues South Africa has stagnated with regards to economic growth. A 
good relationship with the national and local government is thus recommended to reduce the 
incentives for the governments to take any actions that will result in negative outcomes for 
SNPA. Outlining the company’s technical and financial viability could therefore partially 
serve to reduce this risk, in which the risk outcomes are government actions.  
All business, and particular those with a major impact on the physical and social 
environment, need to recognize that their right to operate derives from the communities in 
which they operate in addition to the host governments’ approval (Bernstein 2010:285). 
Often, governments promise to take care of community relations when granting foreign 
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companies licenses and permits, but they do not always deliver. Subsequently, companies 
need to undertake their own consultations, as it is important to provide the local community 
with a forum where they can address their key social grievances. One of the key requirements 
when engaging with the local community could thus be to secure the “informed” consent of 
the people that might be affected by SNPA’s investments (Bray 2003:317, 312). This can be 
provided through “social accommodation” that responds to the needs of the local community 
with activities that will enhance their quality of life, as these can create informal channels and 
reduce risks of government or local community resentment, and could make an enormous 
difference if local violence erupts (Bremmer & Keat 2009:102). Potential outcomes for local 
communities could for example be resources for community development by making certain 
that those impacted by the operation have an equal or even greater level of welfare, income, 
continuation and security; fairer settlement/compensation for community assets by ensuring 
relevant assets and skills that can be transformed into sustainable livelihoods for the locals; 
and improvement of infrastructure capacity (Blowfield & Murray 2008:263). The 
employment of local workforce during the construction period, and sensitivity with land 
rights should also form a part of a company’s investment strategy. (Bray 2003:318). When 
establishing in South Africa, SN Power should set out a BEE strategy and this should form a 
part of the company’s corporate values. Absence of such a program can create reputational 
risks, as well as lead to loss of government contracts (EIU 2010b). Local content policies like 
this should also be applied in Zambia and Mozambique to secure employment.  
A suitable way of managing local community relations could be for SNPA to partner 
with NGO’s to meet the different social demands. By partnering with other social actors, 
companies can work on the contextual conditions that expose them to political risk (Kytle 
&Ruggie 2005:12). These types of relationships are implicitly rather than explicitly driven by 
the capacity of NGOs to do things that business cannot – and vice versa (Waddell 2000:194). 
According to Waddell (2000:194), this capacity is inherent in the structure as well as 
orientation that come with being an NGO or a business as two of the three organizational 
sectors besides government. They all play distinct roles in the society. Collaboration aims to 
combine the different organizations resources and strengths in order to offset their 
weaknesses. However, despite some difficulties by these partnerships such different goals, 
cultures and world-views, business and NGOs collaborations are increasing in number as well 
as complexity. This is an indication that both parties better understand the rewards of these 
types of partnerships (Waddell 2000:194).  
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SNPA’s socio-economic commitments in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique 
could also be a part of the company’s code of conduct. In this way the company can highlight 
and communicate its principles to all the actors of political risk and collaborate with NGOs, 
governments and local communities on how to best meet these standards. It is important to 
note that there is a significant difference between taking the views of shareholders into 
consideration, and actually being accountable to them in a meaningful way (Blowfield & 
Murray 2008:224-225). This is because corporate codes of conduct are completely voluntarily 
for companies (ILO 2011). Enforcement of SNPA’s code of conduct should therefore be 
provided through TBL where transparency and external reporting are guaranteed through 
SIAs and EIAs that both assesses the potential impact of SNPA’s activities before the 
investment takes place, as well as when the investments are made. Addressing and reporting 
the different risks through impact assessments will most likely send out a signal to actors of 
risk about their social responsibility. Social and environmental performance indicators should 
therefore be developed to enable external reporting and measurability.  
The abovementioned risk mitigation measures are integrative and aims to increase 
foreign companies into the host environment (Brink 2004:156). In addition to these measures, 
SNPA ought to include the potential consequence of risky socio-economic conditions such as 
political violence, civil unrest, riots and war in their contingency plan if investing in these 
countries. An assessment of the potential impact this could have for the company in terms of 
security, staff attendance and general disruption of business should be conducted (EIU 
2010c). Emerging market countries are more vulnerable to unrest. Hence, companies that are 
doing business in developing countries need credible emergency response plans in place when 
events outside the company’s control materializes, in addition to the integrative techniques 
that aims to address the root causes of the risks. A contingency plan ought to include of clear 
management responsibilities and preparation of secure infrastructure. The selection and 
training of the personnel could also be a part of this (Nodland 2006:25).  
5.4.4 Human Rights  
The general human rights risk for SNPA is not as prevalent in Zambia, South Africa and 
Mozambique. Nevertheless, since micro risks often are more rampant for companies, the 
human rights risk for SNPA should be assessed. This relates especially to securing labor 
rights to avoid labor strikes and labor militancy of SNPA’a workforce, and popular 
displacement, which can create reputational risks if not handled in a satisfactory way. There 
are three elements that explain why displacement marks the public debate around dams; First, 
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it is the extent of human impact as large groups of people often are negatively affected by 
imposed losses and social disruption; second, in most developing countries the regulation 
frameworks around this matter are often absent or weak, consequently, it becomes easier to 
commit human rights violations, and third; under-financing due to underestimation of 
economic losses caused by displacements, insufficient compensation to the displaced, and a 
general lack of sensitivity add to the often unbearable burden it is for people to get displaced 
(Cernea 2004:7). Hence, the potential social impacts are enormous.  
 With project finance, SNPA can mitigate some of the risks related to human rights by 
entering into a project finance partnership with the big multilateral institutions. As previously 
mentioned, project finance from these institutions requires that the company comply to certain 
regulations on social standards for the project, and thus “forces” SNPA to comply with their 
regulations. The World Bank’s hydropower development approach is lessons learned by “best 
practices” to improve the outcomes of the different projects (The World Bank Group 
2007:28). Accordingly, the World Bank’s Involuntary Resettlement and Indigenous People 
Policies will be the policy for SNPA to undertake if deciding to invest in these countries. 
These guidelines include replacement resources, new job training, land-for-land 
compensation, and other types of income restoration assistance for those that are being 
displaced (Ledeq & Quintero 2003:7). Stringent guidelines on how to deal with displacement 
can reduce the reputational risks for SNPA in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, and 
could therefore be applied when investing in these countries. With regards to labor rights, it is 
not expected that project finance will have a mitigating effect on the potential risk outcomes 
of poor labor rights and standards.19 Since one of SNPA’s capabilities are closely linked to 
this, the backing from financial institutions can serve to mitigate the risks this factors poses.  
 National and local government engagement can contribute to risk mitigation for SNPA 
by acting as mediators between those affected by their operations: those that will be displaced 
and the workers. The risks that can be created through popular displacement can be mitigated 
through consultation and participatory decision-making (Ledec & Quientero 2003:5). In these 
processes both the national and local community should be involved to secure the best 
possible outcomes for those that will be replaced. The national government could for instance 
share the costs of resettlement with SNPA, and the local government must actively be 
involved in the compensation processes, especially related to land-for-land compensation to 
ensure same/ or better quality of land. This is of importance in order to mitigate the 
                                                
19 I was not able to retreive information with regards to IMF labor standards related to project finance. 
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reputational risks for SNPA. Often those that are displaced end up being more impoverished 
than before (International Rivers 2007). Cooperation with the governments can serve to avoid 
this outcome. By making sure to include the governments in these processes, the chances for 
the displaced to be satisfied with their compensations might increase. With regards to labor 
rights and standards, both the national and local governments play a pivotal role to ensure the 
rights of the workers. SNPA should therefore engage in constructive partnerships with the 
different governments to enhance labor legislations in these countries. If labor strikes, or labor 
militancy where to break-out, cooperation with the governments and the different trade unions 
is likely to be more effective than if SNPA where to deal with this alone.  
 Those that will be affected by SNPA’s activities through displacement should be 
included in a consultation project where NGOs also can participate. In addition, the displaced 
are only the most visible victims of dam construction. Many have lost land and homes to the 
canals, roads and other infrastructure associated with dams (International Rivers 2007). 
Consequently, it is important to include the local community as a whole and not only those 
that will be displaced in a consultation process. However, this will represent some challenges 
for SNPA. An example is who will be entitled to customary land rights and thereby 
compensation. This is something that is difficult to deal with in a society where land rights 
often belong to clans rather than individuals. Customary land rights may not be formally 
registered, but those who believe their land rights have been infringed upon may react 
violently. This relates especially to African countries where access to land is the most 
important source of wealth and prestige (Bray 2003:318). SNPA could ensure that it has 
addressed the concerns of everyone who has an entitlement, and provide compensation to 
avoid resentments and grievances from the local community to reduce the risks (Bray 
2003:318).  
The political risk caused by the increase in labor militancy, unrest and strikes in 
Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique can be mitigated through fostering good relations 
with the labor unions and other active social organizations in these countries (EIU 2010b). 
NGOs can integrate business and community goals, and creates and enforces popularly 
supported standards and codes. (Waddell 2000:195), and can therefore help corporations in 
mitigating risks that are associated with the businesses’ operations. They represent the 
stakeholders outside of the core corporate structures, thereby enabling SNPA to deal with 
issues related to human rights (Waddell 2000:194, 196).   
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In addition to the abovementioned measures, SNPA could integrate their approach to 
this risk factor in their corporate values and TBL reporting. The company’s code of conduct 
should include how the company intends to manage its relation to those affected by the 
hydropower construction and to their workers. This could be done through a clear definition 
of their various rights, and also, how the company will manage potential conflicts with the 
various stakeholders. In addition, the principles related to human rights in the UN Global 
Compact should be adhered to. By applying TBL reporting, the company provides both an 
assessment of the impacts of their business to the potential human rights victims, in addition 
to a reporting structure that enables the company’s external environment to monitor the 
company’s initiatives and activities. Transparency and accountability has therefore the 
potential to mitigate the company’s political risks related to human rights, and as such, is an 
enabling condition for SNPA to manage this risk factor.   
5.4.5 Human Capital  
The political risk caused by human capital in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique is 
considerable. Nevertheless, there are a variety of ways in which SNPA can reduce the risk 
created by this factor. The first risk mitigation measure is to enter into joint venture 
partnerships with domestic companies. As there is a scarcity of skilled human capital, it is 
reasonable to believe that the most competent personnel already are employed in the different 
domestic hydropower companies in these countries. The mega-projects in Mozambique have 
already recruited a substantial portion of the workforce. Subsequently, partnerships with 
domestic companies enable SNPA to work with the most competent personnel, and the need 
for significant human capital training will not be as rampant. Joint venture partnerships will 
also provide the company with local knowledge of the market, which again can increase the 
productivity. The local knowledge of domestic companies can also serve for SNPA to obtain 
insight in how to deal with all the diseases that create a shortage of human capital in these 
countries. Here SNPA can use its capabilities in form of resources and competence to enhance 
the quality of the workforce, and thus increase productivity and thereby mitigating this risk.  
There are also many opportunities to mitigate risks derived from human capital by 
engaging in strategic relationships with national and local governments, the local community 
and NGOs. Both at the national and local government level, SNPA can cooperate with the 
universities, and especially the technical education system to enhance the competence of the 
graduates, fund the universities, provide scholarships for those who cannot afford a university 
education, internships etc. In addition, SNPA could engage in a partnership with local NGO’s 
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related to job training as well as establishing a variety of programs to reduce HIV/AIDS 
(Bekefi & Epstein 2006:37) On a local community level, SNPA could partner with the local 
medical clinic to provide testing and medical treatment to their workers and their families, in 
addition to funding of medical facilities for the rest of the community.  
Corporate values and TBL reporting concerning human capital could also be applied 
in SNPA’s risk management. A detailed training program should therefore be a part of this, 
and provides SNPA an opportunity to use its technological and managerial capabilities. 
Moreover, all the companies operating in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique are in need 
of a clear policy dealing with the effects of HIV/AIDS and other diseases in the workplace. 
Important areas that could be included in the policy are absenteeism due to illness or funerals, 
falling labor productivity as the disease advances in the worker, in addition to death benefits 
for workers and their families. The most important policy that has the potential to mitigate the 
risk it is to invest in a country where the HIV/AIDS prevalence is so high, as in the respective 
countries, will be to cover medical costs. As the public health sectors are weak in the 
particular countries, much of the medical care is provided through company-run, private 
insurance schemes (EIU 2010c). SNPA could therefore provide their workers and families 
with private insurance to secure their health and thereby productivity.   
In addition, SNPA could try to mitigate this risk through establishing different 
programs in their code of conduct related to work place education, condom distribution, 
voluntary HIV testing, and medical treatment for workers and their families (Bekefi & 
Epstein 2006:37). The integration of health care facilities in a company’s risk management 
might lead to the following advantages; namely increased productivity and decreased costs of 
health care and other employee reimbursements. Hence, it should form an integral part of 
SNPA’s risk management approach in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique (Bekefi & 
Epstein 2006:40), and all of the initiatives should be reported in TBL to ensure its 
commitment to mitigate this risk factor.  
5.4.6 Environmental Vulnerability  
Risk management with regards to environmental vulnerability must be dealt with at two 
different levels; namely the risk that the company is exposed to, and the risks that the 
company can create in the context of being a hydropower developer. One of the risk 
mitigation measures that can be applied here is project finance from financial institutions. The 
World Bank Group (2007:26-27) has engaged in hydropower for both energy and water 
security, where the objective has been to address hydropower from a water management 
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perspective in Africa, given the continent’s challenges of the multiple demands for water. It 
also has an emphasis on the risks hydropower developments pose, and especially in relation to 
the regulations of rivers. By partnering with the World Bank Group, SNPA must comply with 
the different regulations and guidelines set out in order to secure their finances. Consequently, 
compliance with all of these regulations has the potential to mitigate some of the risks of 
environmental vulnerability, since mitigation of environmental impact is one of their main 
guidelines (Bray 2003:325). Thus one of SNPA’s company capabilities namely backing from 
IFC can become an enabling condition to manage this risk.   
The most extreme outcome of environmental vulnerability risk is the risk of social 
unrest from the population. However, this outcome must be seen in relation to the threats of 
food- and water security, combined with poverty and environmental degradation. If violence 
were to break out, risk insurance can cover the potential financial losses of SNPA’s activities. 
Nevertheless, risk insurance must be complemented with other risk mitigation measures. 
Hence, SNPA could engage with both the national and local government to secure effective 
risk mitigation. This relates both to the risks created by natural hazards and climate changes 
(country-level), as well as the environmental risks caused by hydropower projects (project-
level). In developing countries, regulation is often weakly developed and poorly enforced 
(Warhurst 2001:64). In this context, compliance of environmental legislations is in itself a 
manifestation of companies’ commitment to comply with environmental standards. EIAs for 
instance, place a massive administrative burden for governments struggling to deal with their 
most basic functions. This has resulted in complaints by political leaders that environmental 
legislation causes development delays and slows down economic activity (Bernstein 
2010:234). The administrative and bureaucratic institutions manage the daily allocation and 
usage of the water resources among competing users (Meissner 2010). Consequently, SNPA 
could also engage in a water security dialogue with the government, as resolving this 
challenge will be based on the participation from governments, business and NGOs, since the 
water security is declining due to population growth, climatic variability, urbanization, 
pollution, over-allocation and competing use of the river basins. A constructive partnership 
both at the local and national level is therefore needed to ensure human and infrastructure 
capacity to satisfy the water demand (Meissner 2010). In this way, the company can mitigate 
the risks caused both from country-level- and project-level environmental risks. According to 
Meissner (2010), companies that operate from a pro-active stance regarding bet water 
management, have a greater competitive advantage. In addition, this could create goodwill 
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from all the levels of governments. A water management approach could therefore be the 
emphasis of SNPA to enable reducing environmental risks. Most solutions related to water 
require a collaborative management (Meissner 2010). Hence, the same approach should be 
pursued when dealing with both the local community and NGOs in Zambia, South Africa and 
Mozambique, as it will allow companies to pool resources, expertise and knowledge, which 
again might lead to an effective water utilization (Meissner 2010).  
Business can suffer from reputational risks where water is short in supply and there is 
a heightened competition between the company and local communities for the resource 
(Meissner 2010). A commitment to a water management perspective followed by cooperation 
with the local community can therefore mitigate the reputational risks for SNPA. This can be 
done through providing skills training and infrastructure maintenance to the ones the company 
will share the water resources with (Meissner 2010). A NGO partnership could therefore be a 
fruitful way of approaching this. For a period, the World Bank moved away from funding 
large dams due to the enormous influence NGOs had, and illustrates how strong NGO 
activism can be, and also how this can create reputational risks for companies (Bernstein 
2010:79). A partnership with different NGOs could therefore mitigate these risks, as well as 
provide knowledge, and help towards engaging with the local communities.  
SNPA’s commitment to address the environmental challenges in Zambia, South Africa 
and Mozambique should be included in the company’s code of conduct to mitigate risks. This 
concerns both the challenges related to climate change and natural hazards in general. In 
addition, the company should adhere to the environmental guidelines from the UN Global 
Compact, to add an external guideline component in their business activities. A TBL 
approach with an emphasis on external reporting will provide the company an incentive to 
actually comply with the standard they have set out through transparency. This will serve to 
obtain the trust from all the actors of environmental risks, and has therefore the potential to 
mitigate the risks for SNPA. The TBL reporting could include targets on how to reduce the 
project risks of hydropower projects such as measures related to watershed management and 
other sediment management techniques, environmental rules for contractors, water pollution 
control, management of water releases, mitigation of water-related diseases, fishing 
regulations, wild-life rescue, and other environmental measures related to the specific 
hydropower project (Ledec & Quintero 2003:4-8). With properly implemented mitigation 
measures, many of the potential negative environmental impacts of hydropower projects can 
be reduced at acceptable levels. Nonetheless, the single most important environmental 
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mitigation measure would be good site selection by avoiding sites that could have a 
substantial negative environmental impact  (Ledec & Quintero 2003:4-8).  
When drafting a contingency plan, SNPA as other hydropower companies, should 
include emergency response plans on how to handle environmental risks. According to Imhof 
& Lanza (2010) most of the new African dams are being built with no examination of how the 
climate changes might impact on them, even though many dams are already suffering from 
droughts that cause power-shortages. An examination of how the climate changes might 
impact the company and measures on how the company will mitigate them could therefore be 
a part of the company’s contingency plan, in addition to how to deal with droughts and floods 
if they cause power-shortages. Emergency response in relation to the risks the company can 
















6.0 EVALUATION OF FINDINGS 
6.1 Chapter Introduction  
The previous chapter attempted to provide an answer to the research question. As such, the 
enabling conditions for SNPA to mitigate its high-risks in Zambia, South Africa and 
Mozambique was discussed. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate both the company’s 
capabilities and the proposed risk mitigation measures to discuss their potential weaknesses 
and strengths in relation to SNPA investments in these countries to be able to say something 
more specific about the conditions that enable risk mitigation for SNPA.  
6.2 Evaluation of SNPA’s Company Capabilities 
As seen, from the previous chapter, SNPA’s company capabilities related to nationality, 
position in the world industry, bargaining advantages, and dealings with host governments are 
interconnected. As such, they will be evaluated jointly in this section. From the analysis there 
are several capabilities, which can provide SNPA with the possibility of influencing its 
political risks in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. A further assessment of the specific 
conditions must be discussed to accurately evaluate the various capabilities.   
 The capability nationality does not seem to provide SN Power AfriCA with significant 
leverage so as to have a substantial influence on the company’s political risk, as the 
Norwegian government is considered as harmless, indicating that nationality will not serve to 
mitigate the company’s political risk to a noteworthy extent. The historical ties between the 
Norwegian government and the southern African liberation movements, Norway’s democratic 
culture, which can provide the host governments with predictability and the country’s strong 
UN position, do not appear as if they can provide the leverage needed when relating to host 
governments based on the actual risks the company might face. Nevertheless, the Norwegian 
network already established in the country, is risk-mitigating to the extent that it can work as 
a facilitator for SN Power AfriCA when establishing in this countries, but does explicitly not 
affect any of the risk factors.        
 SNPA’s position in the world industry seems to be more influential in terms of being 
able to manage the political risks in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, as it provides the 
company with both financial and technical viability and industrial competence, which is 
essential for the African countries to meet their energy demands. In addition, it provides 
SNPA with a strong corporate brand reputation due to its parent companies, which host 
governments can use to attract further investments. Hence, this capability is what seems to 
provide SNPA with some political leverage when dealing with host governments. 
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Furthermore, SNPA’s strongest bargaining advantage is that SN Power is the biggest financial 
borrower from the IFC, recalling the significant influence The World Bank Groups has in the 
African countries, this is a condition with the greatest potential to mitigate the political risks 
for the company, followed by SAPP’s similarities with the Nordic power market, which 
provide them with unique skills, essential for the further integration of the power pool. Based 
on these capabilities SNPA can to some extent mitigate the risks related to parts of the factors: 
security risk, socio-economic conditions, human rights, and environmental vulnerability, and 
based on the analysis, more so with the factors political effectiveness and accountability, and 
human capital.          
  SNPA’s dealings with the host governments will be further discussed under section 
6.3.4, which entails the host government as a risk mitigation measure. The next section will 
discuss the implications of SNPA’s company capabilities in the context of the political risks 
in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique.   
6.2.1 Implications of SNPA’s Company Capabilities 
One of the principal challenges foreign companies faces in host countries is how to manage 
their political interactions with the host governments. This can be done in two ways: The first 
is to avoid interfering in the politics of the host governments. This is particularly challenging 
in developing countries where governments often are weak and unstable. The second is for 
SNPA to recognize the political influence they do have, and then try to wield their 
responsibility (Bernstein 2010:273). The fact that business can shape its political environment 
is an indication that the latter is the most relevant. Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
political capabilities and behavior alone cannot mitigate the political risks foreign companies 
might be exposed to in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. When it comes to political 
risk for foreign companies, the literature has been focusing on the relationship between the 
host government and the foreign company when assessing business as political actors. The 
company capabilities that were outlined in the theoretical chapter, mainly relates to this 
relationship. However, recalling the assessment and analysis, other political actors can create 
political risks in these countries as well.  
For this reason SNPA’s company capabilities might therefore only effectively mitigate 
the political risks that are created by the host government, and to a lesser degree when dealing 
with other relevant actors of political risk. Foreign investors are not immune towards 
expropriation or other types of government interventions, as there is always a risk that African 
national government will overturn agreements (Baldwin 2006:35), but the risks in Zambia, 
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South Africa and Mozambique also involves other political actors. Hence, a research gap has 
been identified, and that is what are the company capabilities that can serve to reduce political 
risks from these political actors such as local governments, NGOS, local community and 
workers? 
As mentioned, local, regional and other political interests often assert themselves 
towards “the social license to operate”. Issues related to this license are often outside of 
governments’ control, which in developing countries often are either absent or ineffective 
(Garver 2009:82). Hence, it is not sufficient to assess SNPA’s company capabilities when 
conducting a risk management analysis. According to Baldwin (2006:35), traditional political 
risks created by host governments as nationalization and expropriation have remained static or 
are in decline, while political risks for investments of non-state actors are increasing. NGOs, 
militia groups, individual politicians or specific arms of government are all potential threats to 
foreign investments. Basically, “African investment is more about local geography as striking 
a deal with central government” (Baldwin 2006:35). Hence, company capabilities in relation 
to other political actors should be identified in order to accurately assess company’s risk 
exposure and their response in terms of risk management. For now, the company capabilities, 
derived from the literature, can mitigate some of the risks that were identified, and especially 
related to the factor political effectiveness and accountability, and human capital. It seems 
evident that company capabilities alone are not an enabling condition to mitigate the 
identified risks in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique.   
6.3 Evaluation of the Risk Mitigation Measures in the Context of 
SNPA in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique 
“Investors must…assess each potential safeguard not only with respect to the original hazard 
that it is intended to mitigate, but also the new risks and costs that it introduces”  (Henisz & 
Zelner 2002:14). The previous chapter analyzed which of the risk mitigation measures that 
can reduce the high-risks for SNPA in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique in conjunction 
with company capabilities. How successful the risk mitigation measures will be depends on 
the strengths of each of the measures. These have also the potential to create even more risks 
for the company. This section will therefore discuss the potential implications of the proposed 
risk mitigation measures, to provide a comprehensive analysis of the conditions that enable 
risk mitigation for SNPA. Where deemed fit the company’s capabilities will be included.   
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6.3.1 Joint Ventures 
Entering into joint ventures are not without risks for SNPA in Zambia, South Africa and 
Mozambique. As previously mentioned, most of the infrastructure development in developing 
countries are either controlled by the state or are state-owned entities. The likelihood for 
SNPA to partner with a company with close links to the government is therefore present. This 
might pose considerable risks if not taken into consideration. A potential risk is that a partner 
can expropriate an investment with the support of the government. (Bray 2003:322). This can 
happen after a shift in SNPA and the partner’s bargaining power. Shifts in the balance of 
power happen when local partners acquire sufficient knowledge and skills, and thereby 
eliminate the dependency of the foreign company (Inkpen & Beamish 1997:177). Protection 
of the company’s intellectual property should therefore be a part of the company’s strategy to 
mitigate the risk derived from this measure.  
Moreover, the involvement of a private partner has also the potential to cause risk for 
the company, because companies often seek joint venture partners that are well connected and 
often with personal connections to political actors. This can backfire if the political 
connections have a reputation for corruption or bad reputation in general (Bray 2003:322). 
Since the political and economic ties in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique are 
interlinked, the risk of corrupt practices increase. This can create reputational risks for SNPA. 
“A JV in a country with a poor human rights record, or with a partner that engages in 
questionable business practices, can burden a firm with enormous public relations 
problems…” (Bremmer & Keat 2009:138). Joint ventures also involve significant costs in 
terms of coordination and reconciling of goals. Hence many partnerships become transitional 
rather than stable arrangements (Inkpen & Beamish 1997:177), and might not be as 
sustainable in the long run. As mentioned previously, joint venture is both a protective and 
integrative tool. Hence, it might be challenging to balance the degree of protectiveness or 
integration with regards to this measure. What should be given priority?  
A way to mitigate the risk created by entering into joint ventures is due diligence on 
potential partner’s financial resources and integrity reputation. If a company enters into 
partnerships with the government it can gain political leverage through political connections. 
However, it can become a liability if there is a regime change because having a previous joint 
venture with a business that is connected to the old regime can increase the risk of 
expropriation or creeping expropriation from the new regime (Bishoff 2010:67). The success 
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of this risk mitigation measure will therefore depend on selecting the right partner (Bray 
2003:322, Bremmer & Keat 2009:138, 101).  
Overall, partnering with local firms are valuable in a risk management context, as it 
can help SNPA to establish credibility with national and local governments, as well as other 
agents of risks such as trade unions. In addition it can also help to identify the company as 
legitimate contributors to local development endeavors (Doh & Ramamurti 2003:347-348). 
Despite of its potential to create risks, it seems riskier to avoid this measure in the context of 
the local risks in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique.   
6.3.2 Project Finance 
There are many advantages with project finance from multilateral financial institutions 
(Jakobsen 2004:124). However, the controversial role that these institutions have played in 
sub-Saharan Africa might create some risks of its own. The African continent has experienced 
a severe debt crisis affecting development in a negative way, and most of the countries have 
had difficulties servicing their debt owed to these international institutions, which has 
operated with the concept that only a significant restructuring of the economic and political 
systems of Africa will save them from total impoverishment (DeLancey 2007:127-128, 
Gordon 2007:93). The structural reform programs forced African states into a swift and hasty 
liberalization, which only served to further marginalize the continent, and under these 
circumstances, economic decline and stagnation continued and continues to mark most of the 
African states (Gordon 2007:94). Even though it is rational for governments to not intervene 
in projects where these institutions are involved, the difficulty of balancing between the 
interests of private enterprise and the developmental state is critical in these countries. The 
effectiveness of project finance as a risk mitigation measure for SNPA requires that 
governments behave as rational agents. This is not always the case for governments who often 
act under bounded rationality or conflicting interests (Boshoff 2010:67). In addition, there are 
other disadvantages related to this, as project finance deals often are time-consuming, serve to 
raise financial costs, and add complexity for investment companies. It is therefore not 
considered as the “cure” to effectively manage political risk (Bray 2003:322).  
However, for hydropower development, and especially in the African continent, 
project finance is inevitable, as the continent is considered as a high-risk destination, and 
infrastructure projects require substantial capital that will be impossible for the company to 
finance alone. In addition, project finance from these institutions will make it easier for the 
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company to secure additional contributions from other banks (Bray 2003:346). The potential 
risks related to project finance is therefore outweighed by the advantages.   
6.3.3 Political Risk Insurance 
As Africa is regarded as a region of high political risk, equity investors, lenders and 
insurers therefore demand significant risk premiums to finance projects. Political risk 
insurance can thus strengthen a company’s position towards these actors (World Economic 
Forum 2010:10, Bremmer & Keat 2009:102). Political risk insurance can be an effective risk 
mitigation measure, the problem however is that it does not cover all aspects of political risk 
and must therefore be complemented with other risk mitigation measures, as it is merely a 
safety net and not a solution, and it can also be very expensive for companies. In addition it 
mainly covers state-level risk and not political risk on the local level or from political actors 
(Boshoff 2010:67), which are prevalent risks in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. 
Reputational risk and public relations caused by campaigns from NGOs are not covered by 
political risk insurance and by that represents a weakness of this risk management measure, as 
this is a significant risk for hydropower companies in these countries.  
Public insurance, and especially the insurance offered by the World Bank (MIGA) has 
the potential to mitigate the risks for SNPA for the same reasons as project finance, stemming 
from the notion that host countries most likely will be reluctant to antagonize the World Bank 
by threatening projects sponsored by MIGA. Throughout MIGA’s history, there has only been 
one claim to them. In other occasions, MIGA has had the role as a mediator between its 
clients and host countries to resolve problems that might have led to claims. Moreover, MIGA 
promotes collaboration with private insurers20, and private insurers are usually more willing to 
insure projects if MIGA is involved (Bray 2003:324). In addition, MIGA always conduct due 
diligence of the political environment of projects that wants to be insured. Subsequently, by 
obtaining risk insurance, many of the risks has already been identified and mitigated before 
underwriting (Bekefi & Epstein 2006:36). It has now been generally accepted that public 
sector insurance has an important role to play to supplement the inadequate capacity of the 
private market on risk insurance. This is particularly important in the insurance for projects in 
developing countries that are considered as high risk where some of the private risk insurance 
companies have been unwilling to cover companies operating in risky regions (Bray 
2003:324).  
                                                
20 Private political risk insurance can be obtained by for example AIG Global Trade and Political Risk Insurance 
Company, Meridian Finance Group, and Marsh Private Equity Mergers and Acquisition Services, all insurance 
companies that are well known and reputable (Brink 2004:164). 
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The weakness of risk insurance is that it does not address the root causes of political 
risks, and has therefore only an ex-ante and protective function. Even though risk insurance 
has its inherent limitations, political risk insurance is still the most common form of risk 
mitigation (Brink 2004:163), and is therefore one of the conditions that will enable SNPA to 
mitigate its high political risks.  
6.3.4 The National Government  
To understand how engaging in a strategic relationship with the government can pose risk for 
foreign investment companies, one must understand the conflicting role of the host 
governments that are related to infrastructure projects. Host governments are 
sponsors/investors, consumers/costumers, rule-makers/regulators and mediators/moderators 
of political opposition and NGOs. In this sense, the national governments serve as both a 
source of risk and an absorber of risk (Doh & Ramamurti 2003:340).    
 The most problematic aspect for SNPA in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique is 
the high levels of corruption due to the strong tie between the economic and political elites. 
For SNPA it is essential to point out that their commitment will be to the countries and not to 
the different governments or individuals who happens to be in power if deciding to acquire 
hydropower plants in either of the countries. As with many governments in developing 
countries, these countries governments are governed out of personal interests, or more 
precisely, the governing party’s interests. Hence, there might be no concept of the national 
interest, and in particular, long-term national interest, because the governments might be more 
inclined towards quick returns and personal benefits (Bray 2003:316). SNPA’s dealings with 
host governments do therefore constitute a risk for the company: Being too tightly connected 
to the government can create reputational risks and SNPA can be more prone to corruption. 
However, not nurturing a relationship in governments where strong personal and party rules 
dominate can also be obstructive for the company.  
In addition, SNPA’s dilemma related to their relationship with the different host 
governments will be compounded if the governments fail in distributing the revenues that are 
derived from the company’s operations (Bray 2003:316), not to mention the reputational risks 
the company could face from NGOs. If revenue distribution in the countries is perceived to be 
unfair, the companies can be blamed (Bray 2003:316), and especially those that are directly 
related to development, such as hydropower.  Another implication related to this is that SNPA 
will never be able to fully control the relationships with host governments, as they depend on 
many externalities and the mere fact that the interests of the host government and the foreign 
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company might not always align (Boshoff 2010:67). The combination of big, enduring and 
specific assets, obsolescing bargaining, and highly politicized consumption- such as 
hydropower projects and energy development respectively, makes hydropower companies 
especially vulnerable to expropriation and other forms of government interventions.  
“Because a large proportion of utilities’ assets are sunk, governments are able to 
substantially reduce utilities’ financial returns ex post, knowing that they will continue to 
operate as long as their marginal costs are covered” (Holburn 2001:15-16).  
Governments have therefore an incentive to expropriate or intervene in order to meet the 
short-term demands from domestic constituents (Holburn 2001:16). The relationship between 
the national government and SNPA must also be seen in the context of the company’s 
company capabilities. As concluded, SNPA has some bargaining advantages that might 
mitigate the likelihood of government interventions or action to their detriment. Nevertheless, 
as Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique are fairly democratic countries, this will ultimately 
depend on the demands of the domestic constituents in these countries, and the way the 
governments balance these interests. Despite of the inherent risks related to engaging with 
host governments, it is not possible to operate in a country without the governments’ 
consents. Subsequently, a constructive engagement should therefore be encouraged. 
6.3.5. Provincial and Local Administration 
It is often the national government that are the main boosters for FDI, but local and regional 
administrations have also the same incentives to encourage investments in their regions. 
Strategic engagement with local and provincial administration can therefore create both risks 
and opportunities for SNPA. According to Bremmer & Keat (2009:153), local officials often 
expect that FDI directly will benefit them and their political allies. Due to the high corruption 
rates in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, this can become challenging for foreign 
investors, as a failure to understand the various expectations of local officials, can lead to 
problems for foreign companies. National officials might at times intervene on investors’ 
behalf, but in many cases they choose to side with the local governments (Bremmer & Keat 
2009:153). Moreover, local and regional administrations often argue that they do not benefit 
from investments in their territories. This can strain the relationship between the national 
government and local administrations and the relationship between the local governments and 
the company (Bray 2003:316).  
 Another dimension of risk is the relationship between the national and regional 
administration, which can affect SNPA if they have diverging interests. This is especially the 
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case when different ethnic groups dominate national and local governments with different 
political interests (Bray 2003:316). This risk is most prevalent in South Africa, where the 
legacy of apartheid still is present, and where there has been hostility between the different 
ethnic groups, which again is manifested through the political parties. Political contestation 
between the different ethnic groups has also been a feature in Zambia, indicating that this 
could create some risks and challenges for SNPA if deciding to operate in these countries. 
The conflict dimension in Mozambique has been the rural-urban division, which has created a 
tense political climate. For these reasons, the relationship between the local government in 
which SNPA decides to invest, and the national government should be thoroughly assessed 
before the investments are made. Furthermore, another element of risk is elections at the local 
level. When local governments change, new political leaders with different attitudes than their 
forerunners might be empowered. Their attitudes towards foreign investments will therefore 
lay the basis for foreign companies local investment climate (Bremmer & Keat 2009:153). 
Despite of the possible risks for SNPA when engaging with local and provincial 
administrations, business must relate to these administrations, and especially in Africa where 
political risk is more about the social license to operate, and local conditions than national 
politics. This was also confirmed by one of the informants as the most viable approach to 
mitigate risks (SNPA 2011a [interview]). Consequently, the company’s company capabilities 
are expected to decrease in significance at the local level since local governments need not 
take national implications into consideration because of their local orientation. 
6.3.6 Local Communities  
The management of the company’s relationship with the local community is crucial to 
mitigate, as mistakes made in this relationship might never be fixed (Bray 2003:312). The 
social license to operate from the local community has been stressed as the most important 
factor when establishing hydropower operations (SNPA 2011a [interview]). Yet, engaging in 
strategic relations with the local community brings about significant challenges for foreign 
companies. The primary challenge is to identify clear negotiations partners within the 
community (Bray 2003:317). Involving NGOs, local administrations and local trade unions 
can help to identify whom to undertake consultations with, and thereby mitigate the risks that 
can be created from the local communities. 
In developing countries such as Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, the national 
and local governments do not always deliver basic social services to their population as 
mentioned. The local communities may therefore look to companies to fulfill some of 
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government’s functions, as for example the provision of schools and medical care. This can in 
itself create problems, as companies’ expertise does not cover to serve as development 
agencies. In addition, if the local community’s expectations are either unrealistic or the 
company is unwilling to meet the communities’ demands, they may at worst, resort to force to 
demand what they consider as their rights (Bray 2003:317), or engage in other actions that can 
cause reputational damage for SNPA. Another risk implication is that local community 
relations require careful planning and a significant amount of time for the management to 
ensure a project-specific approach that actually can be effective to mitigate political risks. The 
failure to successfully plan for local community projects can actually increase political risk if 
the projects cause discontent among the local population if not addressing their demands 
properly (Bishoff 2010:67). A partnership with NGOs that can provide local knowledge can 
therefore help SNPA to address the local community’s demands. The most important thing 
foreign investment companies’ can do to mitigate the risks from the local community, is to 
ensure that it has addressed the concerns of the ones with a genuine entitlement. Securing the 
informed consent of the people and ensure compensation for those affected by the investment 
are therefore essential (Bray 2003:318, 312).   
6.3.7 Non-Governmental Organizations  
The relationships between companies and NGOs remain diverse and multifaceted, where both 
sides often demonstrate a deep distrust of the other. Many NGOs argue that a formal 
relationship with companies can compromise their independence and are therefore reluctant to 
engage in a constructive partnership. However, over the years there has been a greater interest 
in engagement and even in partnership (Bray 2003:321) To mitigate risks, it is essential to 
have a strategic relationship with NGOs, and especially those at the local level that can help 
foreign companies to address issues related to the local community. The risk related to NGO 
partnership, is the same as with local community relations; if the partnership fails, the risks 
for the company might even increase than if not engaging with NGOs from the onset. It is 
also important for the company to ensure that the selected NGO partners have a strong grass 
root support and that they can provide their services effectively.  
The challenges related to engaging NGOs as strategic partners, are among others to 
identify “the key drivers” of the NGOs, and whether they complement or contradict the 
company’s objectives (Warhurst 2001:71). Business-NGO partnerships are particularly 
complex because the different sectors have dissimilar objectives, cultures and worldviews. 
These discrepancies can therefore complicate the communication process. For SNPA to 
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efficiently tap the rewards, the distinct role between the company and NGOs must be 
understood (Waddell 2000:194). Furthermore, if companies select the wrong partner, they risk 
waste their resources. A successful NGO partnership depends on the NGO to maintain a clear 
accountability to its own stakeholders, and that is not always the case (Cowe 2004). A 
partnership with NGOs can improve the contextual conditions that create risks for the 
company in the first place. Hence, regardless of the political risk, this type of partnership is 
the best way for the company to gain knowledge about the social expectations in the host 
countries, better connection with the actors of risk, as well as a smarter allocation of the 
resources to local community programs. Partnerships are a high-risk mitigation measure, but 
the advantages and mutual benefits are believed to outweigh the risks involved (Kytle & 
Ruggie 2005:12, Jamali & Keshishian 2009:280). Subsequently, SNPA could engage with 
local NGOs in order to mitigate their potential risks by allowing them to assist in the 
implementation of suitable risk management so as to anticipate future risks. Business is in 
need of NGOs, as they can bring knowledge, expertise, credibility and reputational gains 
(Kytle & Ruggie 2005:12, Cowe 2006), in spite of the risks they can generate.   
6.3.8 Corporate Values 
The establishment of corporate values and principles to mitigate political risks is a necessity 
for investment companies (Nodland 2006:23). Nevertheless, there are many challenges related 
to this, some of them with the potential to create even more risks for SNPA as: “Fine words 
are not enough”. Companies must also actually live up to the standards that are outlined in 
the company’s corporate values guidelines (Nodland 2006:24). This relates both to the 
company’s internal code of conduct as well as compliance to their external regulations. A 
failure to do so can create political risks by those affected by the company’s conductance. 
SNPA could therefore ensure that employees, joint venture partners and even their supply 
chain are educated to adhere to these guidelines. The spread of voluntary guidelines has led to 
a debate on their merits versus regulation. NGOs have expressed their concerns over the lack 
of formal regulations for companies and that there is no reason to trust companies’ 
commitment to guidelines as they function as an easy alibi with no real pressure for 
compliance. Code of conducts depends on credibility, which in turn depends on monitoring, 
enforcement and transparency. Transparency in itself can mitigate risks for SNPA, as it is 
useful for companies to have an alibi when facing the threat of corruption (Bray 2003:305, 
332, ILO 2011). This can in itself create a risk for SNPA as the company might lose business 
opportunities for not accepting bribes, kickback or the request for facilitation payments. 
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Nevertheless, the risk of engaging in corrupt practices remains more prevalent. The key 
challenge for SNPA related to corporate values, is to translate these principles and guidelines 
into practical strategies at the project level, and also to implement them with the capacities 
and resources available for the company (Warhurst 2001:69). It will not be sufficient to 
simply state compliance. The company needs to actually comply with the guidelines to 
appease the different actors of risk.  
6.3.9 TBL 
SIAs and EIAs are procedures that can evaluate SNPA’s compliance with the political risk 
management guidelines and should therefore be an integral part in a company’s risk 
management (PwC 2006:29). A lack of a clear reporting structure can in itself transform into 
political, reputational and regulatory risks. The importance of transparency and reporting in 
the companies’ business activities should therefore not be underestimated (Bremmer & Keat 
2009:181). However, there are some challenges related to TBL reporting; the first is the 
problem of what to measure. The second challenge relates to the question of whose interests it 
is to understand the concept impact (Blowfield & Murray 2008:330-331). Third, how will the 
company answer to the range of interests and concerns that exists within the company’s 
political environment? The balancing of these sometimes competing interests can make it 
difficult for the company to make purposeful decisions (Bernstein 2010:31). Nevertheless, 
successful management of political risk is predicated upon an effective communication both 
within the company and with external stakeholders. This should be done through providing 
information about the company’s approach to risk, how it defines political risk, potential 
consequences if the risks are not mitigated, in addition to the means of reporting the different 
risks. The internal communication should include training, communication via the company’s 
intranet, and be a part of the company manuals. Furthermore, an internal reporting mechanism 
should be established for employees to report on different risks (Bekefi & Epstein 2006:39).  
Although external reporting is not mandatory, SNPA should still report externally, and 
if so, to whom and how extensively? External risk reporting should be subject to a cost-
benefit analysis, as this also can create some risks for the company. SNPA should therefore 
think about the competitive disadvantage from disclosing information and the bargaining 
disadvantage from the disclosure to suppliers and employees (Bekefi & Epstein 2006:41). The 
extent of external reporting must therefore be balanced in a way so that SNPA can satisfy the 
potential actors of risks without experiencing a competitive disadvantage that might result in 
financial losses for the company.  The costs of monitoring, of who should do the audits, what 
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they should focus on, and how often, are issues for SNPA to consider when implementing 
TBL reporting (Bernstein 2010:67). Despite of the possible challenges and weaknesses of this 
risk mitigation measure, TBL, which takes into account all of the concerns of the relevant 
stakeholders, might reduce the political risks that can be created by them.   
6.3.10 Contingency Plans 
Contingency plans do not pose a direct risk for companies. However, a failure to prepare for 
emergencies can result in considerable financial losses for a company, as contingency plans 
contains emergency response plans on force majeure21 issues (Wang et. al 2004:241). On a 
general basis, emerging market countries are more vulnerable than rich world countries to 
civil unrest and environmental disasters (Bremmer 2011) A contingency plan is therefore a 
prerequisite for companies that invest in countries with high crime rates, political and socio-
economic conditions that might lead to social unrest and political violence, and countries that 
are vulnerable towards natural hazards for instance drought and floods such as Zambia, South 
Africa and Mozambique. Another implication with regards to this measure is that contingency 
plans add to the company’s expenses and time for training of the personnel. Nevertheless, in 
some countries, they are essential and must be an essential part of the company’s risk 
management (Bremmer 2011:194).  Furthermore, the disadvantage of a contingency plan is 
that it for the most part is a protective measure and therefore provides a limited ability to 
address the root causes of the political risks in the company’s business environment (Boshoff 
2010:67). Contingency plans should therefore be implemented in SNPA’s risk management as 
long as it is combined with measures that address the root causes of the different risks.  
6.4 What are the Conditions that Enable SNPA to manage its High-Risks in 
Zambia, South Africa & Mozambique? 
The main findings of the analysis will be summarized in the tables below. The first table will 
sum of the most important company capabilities of SNPA in the context of investments in 
Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. The second table sums up the high-risks that can me 
mitigated by virtue of SNPA’s capabilities, and the third table summarizes which of the risk 
mitigation measures that can address the high-risks identified:  
 
 
                                                
21 : “The circumstance that are out of the control of both foreign and local partners, such as flood, fires, storms, 
epidemic diseases, war, hostilities and embargo” (Wang et. al 2004:241). 
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Table 6.4a SNPA’s Company Capabilities 
Strong brand reputation and financial support from the parent companies SN Power, Statkraft & 
Norfund 
Technical and financial viability 
Skills and expertise  
Financial and political backing from IFC & Compliance on social and environmental standards 
Joint venture orientation 
 



















         X       (X)        (X)       (X)        X        (X) 
 
The analysis indicates that SNPA’s company capabilities can explicitly manage some of the 
high-risks in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique through its strongest bargaining 
advantage; the backing from the IFC. As such, SNPA’s company capability mainly relates to 
project finance from these institutions and its function as a risk mitigating measure. With 
regards to the risk factor political effectiveness & accountability, being backed by heavy 
financial institutions can speed up the various processes in the bureaucracies, reduce the 
chances of being involved in corrupt practices, and is risk sharing in form of providing capital 
and share the costs of a hydropower project. Since political interference in the bureaucracies 
occurs regularly in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, this bargaining advantage reduces 
the chances of risk outcomes stemming from government actions such as expropriation, 
breach of contract and other policy changes to the detriment of SNPA, as governments would 
be more hesitant of intervening in projects where these actors are involved. Regarding 
security risk, SNPA’s company capabilities only becomes significant when obtaining risk 
insurance, which is easier when a company already is in the system of the World Bank Group.
 With regards to socio-economic conditions, human rights and environmental 
vulnerability the various guidelines from the World Bank related to social and environmental 
considerations are mitigating to some extent, since SNPA must comply to these guidelines in 
order to secure funding, but it is difficult to say anything specific about its risk mitigating 
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function. However, it is not expected that this will have any significant importance on 
influencing the company’s political risks. It is not directly related to SNPA’s capabilities as 
project finance’s function, as risk mitigation measures mainly relates to these institutions 
capabilities and not SNPA’s per se. Consequently, it is partly an enabling condition for risk 
management.  SNPA’s capabilities in form of their industrial competence and technology can 
mitigate the risks related to human capital, as they can provide the necessary training to 
increase the competence of the local workforce, and thereby reduce the risks related to 
incompetence and thus, productivity. For the general risk of government actions, and seeing 
the political risks factors jointly, a strong corporate brand reputation and the company’s 
commitment to joint ventures could have an overall risk mitigating effect.   
 Taken as a whole, this analysis concludes that the identified company capabilities 
alone cannot mitigate the high-political risks in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, and 
that the concept of company capabilities needs to be broadened in relation to other political 
actors in the literature of political risk, and especially with regards to African countries with 
the same characteristics as Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. This is because the main 
political risks stems from the local level in these countries. However, it is important to note 
that it is the governments that are the wielders of power in the host countries, and that they 
ultimately decide whether one are “welcome” in the country or not. The function they also 
serve as mediators between business and civil society indicates that they can exert to negative 
government actions if the remaining political actors are not satisfied with the way SNPA 
conducts its business. This will especially relate to (weak) democratic countries such as 
Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. Furthermore, the proposed risk mitigation measures 
have also shown their appropriateness in mitigating the high-risks in Zambia, South Africa 
and Mozambique. A summary of the findings of the analysis and evaluation is illustrated in 
the table below: 
















Joint ventures       X            X       
Project 
Finance 
      X       X      X         X 
Risk 
Insurance 
      X      X               X 







      X       X     X     X        X 
Local 
communities 
      X      X     X     X        X 
NGOs        X     X     X       X 
Corporate 
Values 
      X       X     X     X       X 
TBL       X       X     X     X       X 
Contingency 
plans 
             X      X          X       X 
 
As can be viewed from the table, the different risk factors have more than three risk 
mitigation measures that address them. In fact, most of the risk factors have six or more risk 
mitigation measures that can be applied, indicating the relevance of these tools to mitigate the 
political risks in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. All of the proposed risk mitigation 
measures do therefore address the various political risks for SNPA in Zambia, South Africa 
and Mozambique. However, the degree of how well the risks are addressed varies, and in 
some instances, the measures even create new risks for the company, which serve to weaken 
their strength as risk mitigating measures. Nevertheless, a combination of SNPA’s company 
capabilities and these risk mitigation measures seems to be enabling conditions for the 
company to mitigate some of its high-risks, but SNPAs company capabilities on a local level 
should be assessed in order to provide more comprehensive answers to the research question. 
As such, these tables provide a summary of the answer to the research question.   
 However, since this analytical framework has not been tested in practice, it is difficult 
to say anything specific about its utility in actually reducing the high risks in Zambia, South 
Africa and Mozambique, namely: political effectiveness and accountability, security risk, 
socio-economic conditions, human rights, human capital and environmental vulnerability. 
Nonetheless, the objective of this research study was to analyze the conditions that enable 
SNPA to mitigate its high-risks in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. The findings 
provided, answer the research question that was posed, and should be further studied to 
produce more valid inferences.  





7.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
7.1 Summary of the Research Study 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the conditions that enable hydropower companies to 
manage the high political risks in the African continent. This was done by making use of the 
Norwegian hydropower company SNPA, which is currently exploring for investment 
opportunities in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique. First, an analytical approach was 
developed to facilitate an analysis derived from the political risk literature, with an emphasis 
of making it relevant in the African context as well as the industry. This was followed by an 
empirical assessment to lay the basis for the analysis. To enable an analysis, the capabilities 
of the company was analyzed before an assessment of the probability and impact of the 
identified political risks was made, to extract the variables deemed as high-risk for the 
company in these countries. The political risks rated as high was then analyzed in the context 
of the company’s capabilities as well as risk mitigation measures identified from the 
theoretical literature, in order to detect what the conditions that enable SNPA to mitigate its 
high-risks are.   
7.2 Theoretical, Methodological & Practical Implications  
Since PRA is more of a systematic approach than an actual theory, it has been proved 
challenging to conceptualize, identify and assess the concept of political risk and political risk 
management. In addition, it is difficult to accurately forecast the political risk for companies 
as the political environment is characterized by unpredictability. Forecasts are therefore based 
on probabilities. Nevertheless, since a systematic approach at least enables comparisons 
between countries, the study can be said to have moved towards theory building because the 
literature on political risk has yet to develop a theory on hydropower investments in the sub-
Saharan continent, and as such, a research gap was identified and explored with this thesis.    
A PRA is ultimately subject to human judgment. It is therefore recognized that I might 
have overemphasized and/or ignored some factors, contextual conditions, company 
capabilities, risk mitigation measures, or other subjects relevant to this study. Nevertheless, I 
have attempted to balance my subjectivity by providing a variety of sources in both 
developing the analytical framework and the analysis of the political risks in Zambia, South 
Africa and Mozambique. It is therefore trusted that potential biases might have been reduced.  
 The practical implication with regards to this study is the actual implementation of a 
risk management for investment companies, but also for a research purpose. Since there are 
many risks, it will become challenging to balance all of the risks, yet alone identify them to 
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accurately forecast their potential implications for companies. The success of the company’s 
capabilities and risk mitigation measures, and especially the latter, will also be determined by 
their intensity, which also constitute a challenge, since it will be difficult to accurately assess 
to which degree a risk mitigation measure should be implemented to effectively mitigate 
political risks. Nevertheless, all of the potential implications related to this research study 
have been thoroughly discussed. However, I do recognize that I might have overlooked some 
implications that could be of relevance.  
7.3 Answering the Research Question  
The research question that the research study aimed to answer was: What are the 
conditions that enable SNPA to manage the high political risks in Zambia, South Africa and 
Mozambique?           
 The research question was answered through developing an analytical approach in 
which the relevant risks for hydropower investors in sub-Saharan Africa was identified. The 
political risks that were rated as high were the macro risks; political effectiveness and 
accountability, security risks, socio-economic conditions, and the micro risks; human rights, 
human capital and environmental vulnerability, which serve to indicate the scope and extent 
of political risks in these countries.  
The firm-specific risks addressed SNPA’s company capabilities and it was concluded 
that the company’s position in the world industry, technical and financial viability, corporate 
brand reputation due to their parent companies, and IFC where risk mitigating in the context 
of investments in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique when relating to host governments. 
However, they were of more of limited utility when dealing with the risks that can be created 
from other actors with the potential to create risks, with the exception that SNPA is required 
to follow social and environmental guidelines according to World Bank standards, which 
might have a mitigating effect with regards to the factors socio-economic conditions, human 
rights and environmental vulnerability. The fact that it is easier to obtain risk insurance if a 
company is accredited as a project finance partner does to some extent reduce risks related to 
security, and SNPA’s skills and expertise can mitigate the risks created by lack of human 
capital as they can provide the necessary training of personnel in order to increase the 
productivity of the projects.           
 The company capabilities of SNPA do therefore not enable mitigation of the high-risks 
in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique alone, as the literature on political risk with regards 
to company capabilities has mainly been focused on political risk from host governments, less 
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on local political risk. Hence, company capabilities in relation to the other political actors 
have yet to be developed in order to say more about enabling conditions for risk management 
in this context. It is viable to assume that the specific capabilities when dealing with these 
actors are of another nature than the capabilities identified for this research purpose.  
 The risk mitigation measures on the other hand, are more encompassing, and might 
therefore have the ability to mitigate the high-risks in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique 
if executed properly. This relates to the fact that political risk in Zambia, South Africa and 
Mozambique should be dealt with at the local level, as the social license to operate is even 
more prevalent in developing countries. Subsequently, the corporate responsibilities of a 
foreign company become more important when operating under these conditions. Overall, 
these are the conditions that enable hydropower companies with the same firm-specific 
capabilities as SNPA to mitigate the political risks in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, 
and those countries with the same characteristics as the ones studied in this thesis.   
7.4 Recommendations for Further Research  
Although unable to qualitatively prove the efficiency of SNPA’s company capabilities and 
risks mitigation measures, the findings in this study could be a stepping-stone for further 
research on the subject. An interesting study would be to analyze all of the countries in the 
sub-Saharan region to strengthen the external validity of these findings to assess whether the 
findings made in this study actually can be contingently generalized. Furthermore, to 
strengthen the internal validity of the findings made, a study that analyzes actual hydropower 
investments risk exposure and risk management in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique, 
could further either strengthen or weaken the findings made in this study. The objective of 
this study was to conduct an analysis of an academic field marked by lack of systematic 
studies, and above all, studies specifically related to hydropower investments in the African 
continent. As investors attitudes towards investments in Africa is characterized by perceptions 
of risk, and thereby reluctance, further research could stimulate to make investment decision 
based on more objective knowledge of risks, and thereby reduce the uncertainty that 
characterizes investors’ attitudes of political risk in Africa.     
7.5 Concluding Remarks 
As the energy demand in the African continent increases, so will the demand for private 
capital to finance the expenses of costly infrastructure projects such as hydropower. The 
political environment in Zambia, South Africa and Mozambique presents some challenges for 
foreign companies in forms of political risk. If not effectively managed, companies can lose 
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money or not make as much money as expected before the investments took place. Political 
risk management can mitigate high-political risks, and is therefore a viable approach to 
undertake when investing in sub-Saharan Africa. Understanding the political environment and 
operating as good corporate citizen can take companies a long way toward achieving their 
corporate goals because  
“…social and political forces, after all, can alter an industry’s strategic landscape 
fundamentally; they can torpedo the reputations of business that have been caught unawares 
and are seen as being culpable; and they can create valuable market opportunities by 
highlighting unmet social needs and new consumer preferences” (Bonini et al. 2006:22).   
The negative exposures that companies might face if not implementing appropriate measures 
to mitigate political risks or exerting their capabilities to actively shape their business 
environment, could be lost revenues, reduced market shares, and damaged reputation. Even 
though a proactive stance in seeking to manage political risks contributes to influence 
company’s risk exposure, risk management offers no guarantees, as it is virtually impossible 
to forecast potential probabilities and impacts of risks upon a firm. Nevertheless, hydropower 
companies that take political risk management seriously when investing in Africa are more 
likely to benefit in form of creating value. This indicates that they have to proactively 
understand and engage with their business environment to achieve their corporate goals. 
Studies with regards to hydropower investments in the African continent is important 
to acquire more knowledge about as the energy demand in sub-Saharan Africa will increase in 
the future. In order for the continent to achieve economic development, access to energy must 
be made available, and this is not possible without private investments. Hence, research 
studies that can reduce the uncertainty and the reluctance of investors to invest in the African 
continent have the possibility to contribute to increase the investments flows into the region. 
In addition, if environmental and social concerns are taken into consideration when 
developing hydropower, clean hydropower can be developed, and thereby reduce Africa’s 
dependence on fossil fuels. FDI trough clean energy thus seems as the most crucial criteria to 
meet the continent’s energy demand, and is the more sustainable in the long run. An analysis 
of political risk management and actual implementation of risk management should therefore 
be an essential component of company’s strategy abroad, not only to ensure profitability, but 
also to add value to the host countries. Since the political risks in these countries are high, the 
latter is an essential component to ensure the former, as there are many risks and many actors 
who can create risks in sub-Saharan Africa as witnessed by this study. A holistic risk 
management approach such as a corporate sustainable risk management that was introduced 
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in the theoretical chapter seems as a viable risk management approach for investment 
companies to undertake when investing in “risky” investment destinations such as Zambia, 
South Africa and Mozambique, and sub-Saharan Africa in general. However, this must be 
further researched. Nevertheless, the purpose of this study was to shed light on a subject that 
is important in the real world, but also important for an academic purpose. It is therefore 
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Political Risk Factors from EIU: 
Bad neighbors War/armed insurrections 
Authoritarianism Urbanization pace 
Staleness Islamic Fundamentalism 
Illegitimacy Corruption 
Generals in power Ethnic tension 
Political Risk Factors from BERI 
Fractionalization of the political spectrum and the power 
of these factions 
Organization and strength of forces for a radical left 
government 
Fractionalization by language, ethnic and/or religious 
groups and the power of these factions 
Dependence on and/or importance to a hostile major 
power 
Restrictive (coercive) measures required to retain power Negative influences of regional political forces 
Mentality, including xenophobia, nationalism, corruption, 
nepotism, willingness to compromise 
Societal conflict involving demonstrations, strikes 
and street violence 
Social conditions including population density and 
wealth distribution 
Instability as perceived by non-constitutional 
changes, assassinations and guerilla wars  
Political Risk Factors from Jakobsen (2004): 
Authoritarianism Terrorism 
Socialism and Marxism Labor unrest 
Coup, revolution and regime stability Corruption 
Rule of law Reputational risk  
Ethnic and religious tensions  
Political Risk Factors from Brink (2004): 
POLITICAL RISK FACTORS 
1. Political system 
2.  Separation of powers 
3. Openness of political system and domestic openness 
4. Public accountability of government 
5. Economic planning issues 
6.  Form of government 
7. Racial, ethnic, religious, nationality and language issues 
8. Border disputes/external conflict and international relations 
9. Political terrorism 
10. Militarization 
11. Legitimacy issues 
12. Government behavior 
13. Consequences of social revolution 
14. Political (in)stability 
15. Civil War 
16. State of emergency 
17. Economic expectations and reality 
18. Leadership succession issues 
19. Military in politics 
20. Erosion of domestic support for the regime 
21. Unconstitutional change of government 
22. Ideology as a political factor 
23. Organized religion in politics 
24. Demographics, tradition and parochialism 
25. Corruption/nepotism in government and rent-seeking 
26. Law tradition 
27. Status of the media 
28. Human rights record 
29. Quality of bureaucracy  
30. (Lack of) political will 
31 Involvement in international organizations 
32. Geographic position and geopolitics 
33. Contract repudiation by government 
34. Selective discrimination 
35. Political violence 
 
SOCIAL FACTORS OF POLITICAL RISK 
1.  Government investment in human capital 
2.  (Il)literacy rate 
3. Job mobility impediments 
4. Gini coefficient 
5. Education ratio – student:teacher 
6.  Per capita income 
7. Mean period of schooling 
8. Unemployment rate 
9. Attitude toward foreign businesspeople and visitors 
10. Acceptable quality of life 
11. Urbanization rate 
12. Population 
13. Average calorie intake and nutrition 
14. Health care 
15.  Life expectancy 
16. Infant mortality rate 
17. Telephone communication and ICT 
18. Population access rates  
19.  Provision of public services 
20. Global human development rating (HDI) 
21.  Daily newspapers 
22.  Radio and television 
23. Social consciousness and conscience of government 
24.  Societal uprising 






I politisk risiko litteraturen er det fire egenskaper ved utenlandske investeringsselskaper ”key 
corporate variables” som påvirker selskapets politisk risiko i vertsland: Politisk risiko er 
definert som: “the analysis of the probability that factors caused or influenced by the 
(in)action or reactions of stakeholders within a political system to events outside or within a 
country, will affect investment and business climates in such a ways that investors will lose 
money or not make as much money as they expected when the initial decision to investment 
was made. These factors can be of internal (from inside the host country) or external origin, 
and can pose macro (generic) and/or micro (specific) risks (Brink 2004:1). In addition, 
foreign companies can also be agents of political risk.  
Brink’s definition of political risk will be applied in this research study because (i) it views 
political risk in the context of a political system and by that includes other stakeholders than 
only political leaders, (ii) it differentiates between micro and micro risks, (iii) makes a 
distinction between internal and external political risk factors, and (iv) takes into account the 
notion that companies themselves can create political risks. De fire egenskapene knyttet til 
politisk risiko er:  
• Nasjonaliteten til selskapet; 
• Selskapets internasjonale posisjon innenfor sin sektor; 
• Spesielle forhandlingsfordeler; 
• Befatning med nasjonale myndigheter  
  
1. Hvilke fordeler/ulemper er det å være et norsk selskap i Zambia, Sør Afrika og 
Mosambik i forhold til å påvirke politisk risiko? 
 
2. Hvilke forskjeller er det mellom landene i forhold til dette og hvorfor? 
 
3. Hvordan anser du SN Power AfriCAs internasjonale posisjon, og i hvilken grad/ hvorfor 
påvirker dette selskapets politiske risiko i Zambia, Sør Afrika og Mosambik? 
 
 
4. Hvilke forskjeller er det mellom landene i forhold til dette og hvorfor? 
 




6. Hvilke forskjeller er det mellom landene i forhold til dette og hvorfor? 
 
7. Hvordan forholder SN Power AfriCA seg til de nasjonale myndighetene i Zambia, Sør 
Afrika og Mosambik? 
 
                                                




8. Hvilke forskjeller er det mellom landene i forhold til dette og hvorfor?  
